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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1726, UNAMID DEPLOYMENT IN GREATER DETAIL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1726 2008-12-01 15:26 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3129
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1726/01 3361526
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 011526Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2429
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001726 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT IN GREATER DETAIL 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1694 
B) KHARTOUM 1670 
C) KHARTOUM 1622 
D) KHARTOUM 1524 
E) KHARTOUM 1507 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: UNAMID climbed to 50.3 percent of its authorized 
total force strength last week and expects to reach its goal of 60 
percent by end of the year, as reported in Ref A.  Most 
troop-contributing countries (TCCs) anticipated to arrive in the 
coming months have not provided load lists to DPKO, so their 
equipment and hence their deployment will be delayed.  UNAMID asked 
that the US put pressure on TCCs to finalize purchases and prepare 
their load lists.   There are only three out of nineteen anticipated 
Formed Police Units (FPUs) currently deployed, as the additional 
proposed units are experiencing equipment and capability shortfalls. 
 UNAMID hopes that the "Friends of UNAMID" group of donor countries 
including the US might help fill these gaps. End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) As reported in Ref A, CDA Fernandez, PolCouns, and Poloff 
spoke with Colonel Noddy Stafford, Chief of Military Plans UNAMID, 
Lt Col Tim House, DPKO liaison, Commander Victor Luis Hernandez, FPU 
Advisor/Coordinator for UNAMID, and Adeyemi Ogunjemilusi, Deputy 
Police Commissioner November 18-19 to discuss UNAMID deployment 
issues.  This cable provides additional detail on deployment 
figures.  Stafford said that UNAMID military force strength now 
stands at 9,815 (up from last week's total of 9,281) military 
boots-on-the-ground or 50.3 percent of the mission's total 
authorized force strength.  Stafford believes they will have 9,837 
personnel deployed by the end of the month.  In order to reach 60 
percent deployment by the end of the year, UNAMID expects to 
complete the deployment of the Egyptian and Ethiopian battalions and 
bring the former AMIS battalions up to full battalion strength when 
they rotate in December.  Hernandez reported that Formed Police Unit 
(FPU) strength still stands at three units (420 staff); combined 
with unarmed civilian police officers ("civpols") the total number 
of police stands at 1995. 
 
3. (SBU) Stafford expects the following increase in personnel by the 
end of the year: 
 
Country:  No.  Unit 
 
Pakistan:   106  Hospital 
Pakistan 335  Engineering Co. 
Ethiopia 443 Infantry Battalion 
Ethiopia 300 Multi-role Logistics Co. 
Ethiopia 125 Transportation Sector Reconnaissance Co. 
Egypt  120  Remainder of Battalion 
Rwanda  120  Remainder of Battalion 
Rwanda  262  Remainder of Battalion 
 
 
FPU (Formed Police Unit) Status, Goals, and Challenges 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
4. (SBU) Ogunjemilusi reported to the CDA that UNAMID is satisfied 
with the current FPUs (1 in El Fasher and 2 in Nyala) and that they 
are running well.  UNAMID struck water at two wells in Nyala which 
will provide each unit their own integral water supply.  While the 
Indonesian FPU officers in El Fasher are still on light duties as 
they construct their camp and await equipment, they are escorting 
women gathering firewood outside Zam Zam IDP camps and regularly 
patrolling inside the camp.  The Nepalese currently located in the 
Nyala Super camp are still undergoing camp preparation. 
 
5. (SBU) Ogunjemilusi said a goal of the FPUs is to build 83 
community police cenvers ,CPCs) in|he mos4 ieevily(poru|ateeQJImtarngl`y0Fcpleced PgRsnq@$ID\)(cAmS"to!uwQgQ$vlm~c}s j2omQgkclptn0dNnevS`q!;o.\m1m,\~e :w$rbr*1&"Cfe"4yQF#exist, but do not yet fully meet UN standards.  Ogunjemilusi also 
wants to put 50 gender-based crime desks in camps, but lacks the 
resources for this initiative as well.  He reported anecdotal 
evidence that installing lighting and patrolling is already 
mitigating some crime in the camps and hoped to find the funds for 
more lighting.  FPUs continue to recruit local volunteers to learn 
police basics and these volunteers are extending the reach of the 
FPUs.  However, volunteers must continually be monitored to ensure 
civil rights and humane practices are respected.  Ogunjemilusi also 
reported that IDPs are fickle in their attitude toward FPUs.  Some 
days it seems that IDPS are pleased with the presence of the FPUs; 
other days the IDPs are not as receptive. Relations between IDPs and 
local, Sudanese police are often tense. 
 
6. (SBU) Ogunjemilusi requested that the Friends-of-UNAMID increase 
their support to the FPUs, and that UNAMID better manage FPU 
expectations.  Because of miscommunication, troops arrive expecting 
 
KHARTOUM 00001726  002 OF 003 
 
 
to be fully equipped, uniformed, and provided a salary.  While FPUs 
cost approximately US$8 million each, there are additional needs for 
more vehicles (including maintenance packages), communication 
equipment, tents, investigation kits, and capacity building 
training.  There are other smaller but critical needs as well - 
needed to equip the community police - which would greatly enhance 
the FPU programs and which the Friends of UNAMID or other donors 
might be willing to provide:  vests, reflective jackets, 
flashlights, and identification cards. 
 
7. (SBU) Ogunjemilusi said he can only support police units within 
100 km of the major cities of Nyala, El Fasher, and El Geneina as 
equipment delivery outside this radius is impossible.  A further 
challenge is how to synchronize deployment of the additional 16 FPUs 
scheduled to arrive.  With the current slippage of arrival dates and 
equipment, Ogunjemilusi does not believe he will see more than ten 
FPUs on the ground next year and is concerned that the failure of 
each country to communicate deployment dates and equipment lists 
will hinder the smooth deployment of arriving units. 
 
8. (SBU) Ogunjemilusi also briefed the CDA on the UNAMID goal of 
providing training to GoS police.  He finds that like the IDPs, 
their attitude towards the FPUs fluctuates.  While they state their 
desire for training is serious, they will not start without the full 
construction of new training facilities.  Local police also state 
they intend to conduct joint patrols, but will not do so unless they 
receive reflective jackets.  Ogunjemilusi characterizes GoS 
expectations as, "Give us weapons, train us on weapons, provide a 
salary, and don't allow the community police volunteers to become 
pro-rebel militia". 
 
9. (SBU) While Ogunjemilusi would like to sponsor Human Rights 
training for all GoS police up to the senior management level, 
UNAMID lacks the capacity to do so.  He opines outsourcing in a 
separate country may be the most effective mechanism, but many 
Sudanese are suspicious, viewing training outside the country as a 
method of "brainwashing police to perform intelligence functions". 
 
 
Equipment Movement 
------------------ 
10. (SBU) Movement of equipment is progressing, with 91 containers 
being transported last week.  Equipment moves from Port Sudan on new 
trucks to El Obeid, where it is transferred to older vehicles that 
will be "less of a financial burden if lost or hijacked."  Ethiopian 
contingent-owned equipment (COE) is just beginning to move.  The 
1,000 Ethiopians are ready to deploy, but must await the arrival of 
their equipment.  The same is true for the Rwandans and Senegalese 
who are scheduled to deploy 1,318 troops by the end of the year, but 
their COE is not scheduled to arrive until January.  Stafford is 
concerned that demand may soon outpace the contractors' 
capabilities. 
 
11. (SBU) An emerging problem is that of units not able to deploy as 
previously agreed due to lack of capacity to acquire and prepare 
their equipment for shipment.  Senegal, Tanzania and Burkina Faso 
all pledged troops, received advanced training, and UNAMID 
tentatively scheduled their equipment movement.  However, these 
countries have not provided their load lists and cargo readiness 
dates, primarily because they have not yet purchased their own 
required equipment.  A better flow of information is required to 
avoid shipment delays, conflict of movement, and duplication of 
plans.  To circumvent this problem, Stafford and House plan to meet 
soon with Thai officials to discuss plans and details of their 
deployment schedule and brief them on particulars of their site. 
Stafford said the current goal of deployment by March 30 will slip 
if countries are not pressured to uphold their commitments.  When 
countries miss their target dates for shipping COE, the entire 
logistics chain is affected. 
 
APCs 
---- 
12. (SBU) Currently Canada is providing 104 Armored Personnel 
Carriers (APCs) divided between the Nigerian, Senegalese, and 
Rwandan Battalions.  However this support could end soon and the 
battalions are expected to provide their own APCs.  There have been 
significant obstacles in making this happen.  The Nigerian battalion 
has some APCs but no maintenance package, so as equipment breaks 
down, it remains inoperable.  Rwanda has a contract for 20 APCs to 
be manufactured in China that were due last October.  The Chinese 
have yet to produce the vehicles and the manufacture date has pushed 
back to January 2009.  Given a four month lag time between 
acceptance and delivery, the Rwandans will not receive their 
equipment until April at the earliest.  Senegal reported a "fiscal 
problem" with their APC supplier, suggesting they do not have the 
funds to procure their APCs.  Canada has been approached to extend 
 
KHARTOUM 00001726  003 OF 003 
 
 
the usage of their equipment and provide maintenance through the end 
of June, 2009.  While they have been sympathetic and appear 
supportive, according to their Charge in Khartoum, final resolution 
has not been reached. 
 
Future Plans 
------------ 
13. (SBU) UNAMID plans to close two redundant camps, Malha in Sector 
North and Saortony in Sector South, before June, 2009 as they do not 
fit into current IDP needs.  Both camps are old AMIS camps in areas 
dominated by hills, so they are indefensible from a security 
perspective.  They are also located far from IDP concentrations. 
 
14. (SBU) While UNAMID hopes the security situation will improve, 
they are prepared for future Phase V contingencies.  Stafford 
explained the three parts of UNAMID's contingency evacuation plan to 
CDA Fernandez.  First, UNAMID would re-deploy 25 per cent of its 
personnel outside Sudan including unarmed police, military 
observers, staff officers and non-essential civilians.  Second, 
UNAMID would consolidate personnel to 12-13 battalion locations 
abandoning 19 camps.  FPUs would remain in place.  Third, complete 
evacuation would take place to Entebbe, Uganda.  Stafford noted that 
Entebbe is also the evacuation point for UNMIS, so if both units 
must evacuate simultaneously, a strong measure of coordination and 
synchronicity will be required (and it would be a major challenge 
for Entebbe to support the massive influx of UN and humanitarian 
personnel).  UNAMID hopes to have advanced warning of any 
deteriorating security situation and be allowed two months to 
redeploy, however Stafford said the plan is to be able to move out 
in as little as ten days. 
 
Comment 
-------- 
15. (SBU) Equipment and training gaps remain which need to be 
addressed, especially for the FPUs.  The proposals for equipment 
donation to the FPUs and community police programs by the Friends of 
UNAMID or other donors deserve our attention and support.  The UN, 
the USG, and others need to pressure the TCCs to procure equipment 
in a timely fashion and establish a liaison mechanism for relaying 
deployment data to UNAMID.  UNAMID specifically requested that 
Senegal, Tanzania, and Burkina Faso provide their load lists to the 
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) within the next two 
to four weeks to allow UNAMID to plan these shipments accordingly. 
 
FERNANDEZ