VZCZCXRO7256
PP RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #3222/01 3510858
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 160858Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6450
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC 0705
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003222 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/RA, AND SCA/A 
DEPT PASS AID/ANE 
DEPT PASS USTR FOR GERBER AND KLEIN 
DEPT PASS OPIC FOR ZAHNISER 
DEPT PASS TDA FOR STEIN AND GREENIP 
USOECD FOR ENERGY ATTACHE 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
TREASURY FOR LMCDONALD, ABAUKOL, BDAHL, AND MNUGENT 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
COMMERCE FOR DEES, CHOPPIN, AND FONOVICH 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: EAGR EAID PGOV WFP AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN - ADDITIONAL FOOD AID NEEDED 
 
REF: Macklin-Stoddard email of 12/5/08 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary and Action Recommendation.  Total food aid from 
international donors, combined with the Afghan government's wheat 
purchases, adds up to only one-quarter of Afghanistan's wheat 
production shortfall estimated at 2.5 million metric tons this year. 
 Commercial imports and smuggling will fill much of the gap, but the 
shortfall is so big this year that there will still be many people 
who need food.  The World Food Program predicts there will be a 
break in the food pipeline in April 2009, coinciding with the height 
of the hunger season in Afghanistan.  Post recommends that the FFP 
program allocate another $100 million to prevent a break in the 
pipeline and supply wheat for 8.8 million vulnerable Afghans during 
April-June 2009.  WFP reports good progress with its winter 
pre-positioning effort, with 95 percent of the 36,000 mt of the 
designated food stocks already delivered to destinations in the most 
vulnerable areas.  Insecurity and mountainous terrain have hampered 
delivery of the balance, but the established mechanism for 
requesting ISAF military support to protect food convoys in insecure 
areas is operating adequately.  End Summary 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
¶2. (U) Afghanistan consumes about 6 million metric tons (mt) of 
wheat each year.  It regularly produces less than it consumes and 
makes up the difference largely through commercial wheat imports.  A 
severe drought made 2008 an especially bad year for Afghanistan's 
wheat crop, with a production shortfall estimated at 2.5 million mt. 
 (Shortfalls are normally much smaller, in the range of 500,000 to 1 
million mt.) 
 
¶3. (U) Typically much of the shortfall is made up through wheat 
purchases from neighboring countries.  Higher prices here than 
elsewhere in the region usually attract a lot of wheat, much of it 
smuggled.  While wheat prices have doubled since last year, 
reflecting the poor harvest and world prices, the good news is that 
prices have declined by about 20 percent from their recent peak, 
indicating that there are adequate supplies in the market at present 
for those with buying power. 
 
STATUS OF WPF WINTER PRE-POSITIONING 
 
¶4. (U) On December 1, WFP staff briefed the international community 
on the status of the current Protracted Relief and Recovery 
Operation (PRRO) and winter pre-positioning of food.  The total WFP 
2008 program is 387,000 metric tons (mt), 157,000 mt of this 
provided with USG assistance.  WFP is targeting wheat and other food 
supplies to 8.8 million of the country's most vulnerable people.  Of 
this WFP total, 36,000 mt or less than 10 percent of the PRRO has 
been planned for winter pre-positioning.  This food is meant to 
reach 520,000 recipients in 95 mountainous districts in 23 provinces 
likely to be cut off by winter snows.  According to WFP, about 95 
percent of these pre-positioned supplies are now in place. 
 
AFGHAN GOVERNMENT PURCHASES 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Afghan government expects to spend $100 million on 
wheat to help address the shortfall, purchasing up to 240,000 mt 
from neighboring countries (e.g. Kazakhstan).  We understand the 
GIRoA intends to put 110,000 mt of this in a strategic grain 
reserve.  The rest is likely to be given away for free. 
Unfortunately, GIRoA officials have provided few details on how they 
will distribute this food.  Distribution may be politically 
motivated; i.e. the food may well not go to those the WFP regards as 
the neediest. 
 
MILITARY PROTECTION OF WFP CONVOYS 
 
KABUL 00003222  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Road insecurity and the challenge of inaccessible mountain 
terrain have prevented the delivery of 400-500 mt of these critical 
stocks to planned destinations, especially to insecure areas in 
northern Herat, Dai Kundi and Baghdis provinces.  A mechanism is in 
place for WFP to request military support from ISAF to protect food 
convoys, which begins with action by WFP local coordinators in the 
provinces.  This mechanism has been used several times since 
September, and ISAF stands ready to consider further requests. 
Also, WFP on December 10 requested ISAF airlift support to deliver 
food to Jawand district in Badghis.  The Charge on December 6 had 
discussed with UN SRSG Kai Eide the likely need for additional 
military support to protect food delivery convoys to vulnerable and 
insecure areas, and Eide agreed to raise the matter with WFP. 
(Note: ISAF units provide protection for food delivery convoys and 
do not try to secure entire routes beyond the temporary security 
needed to protect the convoy in question.) 
 
AFGHAN FOOD NEEDS BEYOND MARCH 2009 
 
¶7. (U) Beyond this winter, WFP reported a shortfall of $240 million 
to cover the purchase of an additional 280,000 mt of food, to extend 
distribution to the neediest beyond March through the rest of 2009. 
Of this, WFP says 100,000 mt is needed during April-June. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Bottom line:  Total food aid from the international 
community, combined with the Afghan government's wheat purchases, 
adds up to only about one-quarter of the total shortfall.   The 
commercial market will fill much of the gap, but the shortfall this 
year is such that there will still be many people who need food. 
Because four to six months is needed from the time food assistance 
is pledged until it is dispatched in Afghanistan, WFP predicts there 
will be a break in the food pipeline in April 2009.  This projected 
break would coincide with the height of the hunger season in 
Afghanistan, which is immediately before the winter wheat harvest in 
late spring. 
 
USG ACTION TO DATE 
 
¶9. (U) As Washington agencies are aware, in 2008 the USG more than 
doubled its food aid to Afghanistan through WFP, compared with our 
contributions in 2007 or 2006.  Our food is now reaching an 
estimated 4.5 million poor Afghans out of the estimated total of 8.8 
million in need.  In 2008 the USG provided more than $50 million for 
a seed and fertilizer voucher program, to get more winter wheat in 
the ground quickly and boost next year's harvest. 
 
¶10. (SBU) USAID is also now working to shift an additional $100 
million in funding from other programs to provide additional help 
with Afghanistan's food security needs; $50 million will go towards 
cash-for-work programs, to boost the poor's purchasing power 
(especially in urban areas); $50 million will be added to the 
successful agricultural vouchers program, with the harvest from 
these plantings starting in June.  Embassy Kabul will encourage the 
PRTs to provide additional and substantial resources for 
cash-for-work programs, as soon as possible; these are excellent 
ways to increase purchasing power and help address food needs. 
 
ADDITIONAL EFFORTS BY THE U.S. MISSION 
 
¶11. (U) Post will continue to work closely with WFP, the GIRoA, our 
PRTs, and other donors to share information on food aid delivery 
efforts and the government's food distribution plans.  USAID will 
also conduct an independent analysis of the food security situation, 
based on data from three provinces -- Badghis, Ghor and Ghazni -- to 
provide a broad view of conditions for food distribution.  In 
Badghis, despite poor security in vulnerable areas, WFP implementers 
 
KABUL 00003222  003 OF 003 
 
 
have reportedly been reluctant to use ISAF assets for security, 
resulting in a disrupted distribution schedule.  In Ghor, logistics 
in accessing remote areas present problems for distribution of 
pre-positioned food stores.  In Ghazni, a concerted effort with PRT 
and maneuver security forces has ensured delivery to vulnerable 
districts.  USAID staff will verify current food security 
conditions, identify ongoing challenges to distribution, and propose 
solutions.  This spot-check analysis will be conducted in the next 
three weeks with a report expected o/a January 5. 
 
¶12. (U) Recognizing that the food security situation is dynamic, 
USAID's Famine Early Warning Network (FEWSNET) will send a team to 
Afghanistan to begin a food security assessment in January.  The 
team will prepare a report on national food security needs and the 
impact of the WFP distribution programs, expected to be completed by 
the end of February. 
 
ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
¶13. (SBU) With respect to questions raised refmail, Post believes 
that given the progress to date in WFP's winter pre-positioning 
effort and smooth operation of the existing mechanism for requesting 
and providing ISAF protection, any issues of possible additional 
military support for WFP convoys are best handled in country. 
Further, military airdrops are often not effective at delivering 
food to those who most need it but they remain an option that can be 
implemented as permitted by operational requirements and available 
resources. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The key challenge here is making sure WFP's pipeline is 
not broken in March/April, as feared.  Post therefore recommends 
that FFP allocate a further $100 million in additional food aid to 
supply wheat via WFP for 8.8 million vulnerable people from 
April-June, when the harvest begins.  While we should also urge 
other donors to increase their food aid pledges for 2008, 2009 and 
beyond, their record to date suggests we should not expect a strong 
response.  The GIRoA does not have additional resources to buy food. 
 Beyond the obvious humanitarian aspect, the U.S. has a strong 
interest in preventing hunger-related social unrest in the critical 
pre-election period. 
 
WOOD