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Viewing cable 08HOCHIMINHCITY1093, 6TH HUMANITARIAN RESETTLEMENT PROCESS JOINT WORKING GROUP

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08HOCHIMINHCITY1093 2008-12-24 08:01 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
VZCZCXRO4294
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHNH
DE RUEHHM #1093/01 3590801
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240801Z DEC 08
FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5249
INFO RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 5479
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HO CHI MINH CITY 001093 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PRM, PRM/A AND EAP/MLS 
 
DHS FOR USCIS OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND REFUGEE 
CORPS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL VM
SUBJECT: 6TH HUMANITARIAN RESETTLEMENT PROCESS JOINT WORKING GROUP 
MEETING, NOVEMBER 14, 2008 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001093  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) Summary:  During the sixth and final Humanitarian 
Resettlement process (HR) Joint Working Group (JWG) meeting on 
November 14, the USG and GVN evaluated the HR process, its 
impact, and modalities for bringing it to conclusion.  The GVN 
stated that exemplary bilateral cooperation on the process boded 
well for future endeavors together. On the other hand, the GVN 
lamented that the approval rate was so low, indicative of much 
effort for little result.  The GVN called for USG immigration 
policy to place more emphasis on family re-unification.  We 
noted that notwithstanding a high level of public interest, few 
applicants were being approved because the qualifying events 
took place 30 to 40 years ago.  The GVN stated unequivocally 
that it would continue to cooperate on HR and other resettlement 
processes, but reiterated its opinion that HR should have 
completely concluded by June 25 and that the Humanitarian 
Resettlement Section (HRS) should have closed then. 
Consequently, the GVN considered the JWG's work as having 
finished; therefore, a different mechanism for ongoing 
resettlement cooperation would be needed.  We explained the 
circumstances -- including document verifications we need back 
from the GVN -- why we cannot fix a date certain for the 
complete closure of all HRS activities. The GVN asked the USG to 
provide in writing its plans to complete HR processing.  The 
meeting atmosphere was collegial, and the GVN's (largely 
pro-forma) complaints were mild in tone.  The JWG-level 
consensus between the two governments is that HR has 
successfully shown that there is no further need for 
resettlement based on ODP categories because there are very few 
people left who might qualify.  That said, HR has shown both 
governments that tens, if not hundreds of thousands connected in 
some way with the pre-1975 Republic of Vietnam still want to 
leave Vietnam for the U.S.  End summary. 
 
2.  (U) Post hosted the sixth session of the JWG on November 14 
in the Humanitarian Resettlement Section's (HRS) conference 
room.  Representing the GVN were Le Xuan Vien, Deputy Director 
of the Ministry of Public Security's (MPS) Department of 
Immigration and Emigration, and seven other MPS and MFA 
representatives.  Representing the USG were DPO Angela Dickey, 
HRS Chief Tim Swanson, and CIS OIC Mary Ann Russell.  HRS 
provided a statistical update on activity in the eleven months 
since the fifth meeting.  HRS had opened about 1,400 cases and 
USCIS had adjudicated about 2,500, approving almost 500.  Of the 
nearly 65,000 HR applications received, only about ten percent 
had been received in the final six months before June 25.  The 
number of applications had gone up for a few weeks after the 
final PIO in January and February.  One sign of the PIO's 
effectiveness was that fewer than 200 applications (about 0.3 
percent) arrived after the June 25 deadline.  Similarly, the GVN 
reported that of the more than 8,000 passports it had issued to 
persons who described themselves as HR applicants, 352 came 
after the fifth JWG meeting.  Provincial passport offices in the 
35 provinces and cities covered by the third PIO reported that 
they had received thousands of inquiries about HR after the PIO, 
but that most of the potential applicants did not appeared 
qualified. 
 
3.  (U) Mr. Vien, who did most of the talking for the GVN, 
stated that local authorities had discovered an increasing 
percentage of HR cases including imposters, with 22 reported so 
far.  Most commonly, married children of HO applicants were 
replaced with still unmarried add-on family members.   The GVN 
side has teased us with fraud information before in an effort to 
persuade us to provide a list of all HR applicants (the 
so-called "List A"), but this time, Vien stated that the GVN 
would be willing to share information about these cases 
indicating that  some of the Principal Applicants were probably 
otherwise eligible for HR.  In many, if not all of these cases, 
he continued, the detected fraud triggers a five-year exit ban, 
so we will probably come to know of these cases anyway. 
 
Completing the Process 
---------------------- 
4.  (U) HRS explained that about 1,400 applicants still need to 
be interviewed.  About 400 were to be completed by the USCIS 
circuit ending in mid-December.  A planned circuit ride 
beginning in early February after Tet and lasting until early 
April will be able to complete all remaining interviews. 
However, verification results were still pending on 143 
Re-education Camp Release Certificates HRS had sent to MPS. 
Counting those sent by USCIS after interview, 357 verifications 
were pending with 20 not yet sent.  As we had previously learned 
that the GVN had no means of expedited processing, we urged the 
GVN to do what it could to complete the verifications quickly. 
 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001093  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
5.  (SBU) Vien reaffirmed that the GVN will continue to 
cooperate with the USG to conclude HR.  However, he said that 
the JWG's work concluded with this final meeting so a new 
mechanism for cooperation would be needed.  The term for HR 
ended on June 25 and in order to continue smooth cooperation, 
the USG should inform the GVN by diplomatic note of the 
following: 
 
        -- The USG wishes to prolong the period for interviewing 
HR and other resettlement applicants. 
     -- The composition, personnel, and tasks of the HRS and 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) employees working 
in HRS. 
 
6.  (SBU) Vien said that after receiving the diplomatic note, 
his side would prepare a report for GVN decision makers on the 
subject.  He explained that the decision makers "had not 
imagined" that HR or HRS would continue after June 25.  Rather, 
they thought that HRS was "born" to administer HR and that both 
the process and the section would cease as of that date.  He 
also suggested that HRS's name be changed.  Vien indirectly 
indicated that this formality was necessary to satisfy 
higher-level decision makers and that as a practical matter, 
there would be no impact operations or cooperation.  The GVN 
also suggested that the two sides prepare a joint report on the 
outcome of HR, indicating that it might be desirable to share 
this report with other parties. 
 
7.  (U) We outlined our plans for concluding work on HR, closing 
down HRS, and factors impacting the handling of remaining cases. 
 A key point is that adjudicated cases formally become the 
responsibility of USCIS.  Also, we cannot predict when the last 
HR applicants will travel to the U.S.  The most common reason 
for delay at this point is the wait for GVN verifications of 
Re-education Camp Release Certificates.  Medical-related issues 
can delay the departure of approved applicants.  More than 1,000 
refused applicants have submitted Requests for Reconsideration 
that have not yet been adjudicated.  We also explained why the 
process will take somewhat longer than predicted at the last JWG 
meeting.  The number of cases screened in was larger than 
anticipated because the screen-in rate stopped falling. 
 
8.  (SBU) Although the GVN did not wish to discuss matters 
outside HR, we also summarized HRS's role in other resettlement 
processes such as Visas-93 and Amerasian.  While these will be 
transferred to OPE Bangkok, or -- for Amerasians -- to the 
Consular Section, HRS is attempting to complete as many of these 
cases as possible.  HRS's responsibility for these other 
processes is the primary reason why setting a definite date 
certain for HRS closure is impossible;, Even if all HR 
processing had  completed by 25 June 2008, we would still need 
to process these other cases.  We reminded the GVN that HRS is 
materially closer to closure; HRS's staff count has fallen from 
a high of about 45 to 29 personnel and will drop to about 6 by 
mid-2009 before closing entirely by the end of CY 2009.  We 
agreed to provide the GVN a diplomatic note with information 
about our plans to complete HR processing and close down HRS. 
 
Vietnamese View on Humanitarian Resettlement 
-------------------------------------------- 
9.  (SBU) Early in the meeting Vien praised the joint workshop 
held by members of the JWG along with provincial passport 
offices from the Central Highlands and Danang on 30 June.  He 
noted that it had helped both sides understand each other's 
procedures.  The provincial passport officers reportedly found 
the presentations on U.S. resettlement processing and 
eligibility very useful.  The GVN officials also appreciated 
learning more about USG resettlement processing and policies 
globally.  Vien said this had been the first time the overall 
U.S. program was explained to them and it was eye-opening to see 
that Vietnam was a rather small part of a much larger whole. 
 
10.  (SBU) On HR itself, Vien stated that there were three 
remarkable positive characteristics.  First, the PIO was 
unprecedented in scope and length.  Previous rounds of 
resettlement had not been publicized through the media to 
anything like the extent of HR.  The media effort was multiplied 
by overseas sources.  Therefore, Vien opined that everyone 
interested should have been able to learn about HR.  The second 
point was the large number of persons interested in HR.  Based 
on the over 100,000 application forms distributed and a family 
size of 10, applications reached about one million people. 
Using the same family size and the over 60,000 applications 
received, over 600,000 persons expressed interest in 
resettlement.  (Note:  We do not know why Vien used 10 as a 
 
HO CHI MIN 00001093  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
family size multiplier; this seems too high.  End note.)  Third, 
the cooperation between the two sides was friendly, effective, 
and mutually respectful; it could be considered a model for 
cooperation in other areas. 
 
11.  (SBU) On the other hand, the GVN offered some critiques of 
HR.  Using the numbers cited in Para 10, only about 1.6 percent 
of applicants were found qualified, a number that was too small, 
Vien said.  While acknowledging that U.S. immigration policy had 
to be followed and agreeing with the USG point that the passage 
of time made it difficult for many applicants to demonstrate 
that they were qualified, Vien said that the U.S. should ensure 
family re-unification, remarking on the importance of family and 
family unity to the Vietnamese people.  The GVN regretted that 
the cooperation between the two governments had not been 
reflected in the U.S. media or by U.S. citizens.  For instance, 
House Resolution 3096, the "Vietnam Human Right Act," claimed 
that the GVN did not approve passport issuance for Vietnamese 
citizens and that the GVN did not give its citizens permission 
to leave the country.  Vien said this was increasingly erroneous 
as the passport application processing time had dropped from 
between three to six months to a current time of seven to ten 
days. 
 
USG Evaluation 
-------------- 
12.  (SBU) We stated that the purpose of HR was to provide to 
those eligible for, but who ad not been able to take advantage 
of the ODP process, a final opportunity to apply and for 
consideration for resettlement to the United States.  The hope 
has been that after HR, there would be no further need for 
ODP-like resettlement programs from Vietnam because virtually 
everyone who could go and wanted to resettle would have done so. 
 There are several signs that HR has been successful: 1) the 
large number of applications received from all parts of Vietnam; 
2) the lack of claims that local authorities had interfered with 
the application process -- a common complaint under the ODP; 3) 
the openness of GVN cooperation on the PIO and other matters 
related to implementing HR.  The large number of applicants, the 
small percentage who were screened in, and the even smaller 
portion qualified for resettlement also collectively 
demonstrates that HR has met its goal.  In conclusion, we noted 
that the two sides' goals in HR were compatible and that made it 
possible to work through the procedural and other differences 
created by our two different systems. 
 
Comment 
------- 
13.  (SBU) The GVN notion that HR should have ended completely 
on 25 June 2008 is not new -- they have bandied it about many 
times and we have consistently answered that the date signified 
the end of the application period -- just as we have applied 
cutoff dates to previous resettlement processes.  It seems that 
the GVN members of the JWG are perfectly comfortable with our 
definition of the cutoff date; they raise the issue to satisfy 
their superiors and to remind us that the GVN's patience is not 
endless.  We bypassed the usually contentious fraud 
prevention/List A issue by holding a separate, working level 
meeting the week before.  At the working level, practical 
concerns related to questionable documents and other types fraud 
were easier to explain.  By paying attention to each other's 
concerns in the HR process and building professional 
relationships, we seem to have made some concrete gains in the 
bi-lateral relationship. 
 
14.  (SBU) Ultimately, both sides have been interested in 
concluding resettlement stemming from the aftermath of the war 
that ended in 1975, and these compatible interests have helped 
us work through differences of opinion and procedure.  The 
JWG-level consensus between the two governments is that HR has 
successfully shown that there is no further need for 
resettlement based on ODP categories because there are very few 
people left who might qualify.  That said, HR showed both 
governments that tens, if not hundreds of thousands connected in 
some way with the pre-1975 Republic of Vietnam still want to 
leave Vietnam for the U.S.  End comment. 
DICKEY