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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0562/01 3461418
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111418Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4702
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0078
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 8666

C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000562 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018 
TAGS: FI MARR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: FINLAND TO INCREASE ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Barbara Barrett for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  According to Finnish officials, the revised 
Afghanistan policy to be presented to the Finnish Parliament 
in February 2009 will call for increased civilian and 
military personnel, as well as greater development 
assistance. Debate within the government (GOF) about 
increasing support or maintaining current levels appears to 
have resulted in the broad consensus to increase, deferring 
until a later date specifics - and possibly renewed debate 
with skeptics - about the timing and extent of increases. The 
top priorities for the GOF will be (1) civilian personnel; 
(2) support for the 2010 elections; and (3) Operational 
Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) contributions.  The focus on 
civilian personnel will be on police trainers.  The GOF 
foresees an increase in the OMLT contribution from 10 to 30 
(with some possibly at the battalion level).  Assuming 
leadership of the Mazar-i-Sharif PRT from the Swedish 
government appears unlikely, though the GOF remains 
interested in leading a PRT.  The GOF offers few specifics on 
increased development assistance; they have pursued training 
opportunities in Finland and welcome suggestions on future 
opportunities, e.g., utilizing their expertise on 
(re)forestation matters.  A clearer picture of the situation 
in Afghanistan might allay concerns among skeptics about the 
utility of pursuing development in the current security 
environment, and assist the GOF in more clearly articulating 
and implementing increased assistance.  To that end, S/CA 
intends to send experts to brief key Finnish officials in 
early 2009 on the situation in Afghanistan.  END SUMMARY. 
 
GOF to support greater involvement in Afghanistan 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (C) In a December 6 meeting with Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Krol and Ambassador Barrett, Foreign Ministry 
Director General Elina Kalkku (Department of Asia and the 
Americas) and Political Department Deputy Director Anu 
Laamanen shared the GOF,s "decision in principle" to 
increase its civilian, military and development assistance in 
Afghanistan.  The decision, part of the GOF's 
Parliament-mandated review of its Afghanistan policy, follows 
a debate within the government between those who wish to 
increase support and those who believe current levels are 
sufficient. According to Kalkku, those in the latter group 
point to deteriorating security in Afghanistan and assert 
that the situation is "almost lost," so why spend more. After 
her visit to Afghanistan last October, Kalkku issued an 
internal report noting the grim security situation but 
advocating that the GOF do more, a report that appears to be 
the basis of the decision in principle.  As the GOF looks to 
increase engagement, its top priorities will be (1) 
increasing civilian personnel; (2) support for the 2010 
presidential elections; and (3) increasing contributions to 
an OMLT. The GOF also will examine more funding to the Afghan 
Trust Fund and border police training. 
 
¶3. (C) While the GOF will present to Parliament a revised 
Afghanistan policy advocating increased engagement, doubts 
linger within the government regarding the security situation 
in Afghanistan and the ability to effectively carry out 
development projects.  Such doubts also exist in the 
Parliament.  Kalkku welcomed DAS Krol's offer of information 
from U.S. interlocutors regarding the security situation in 
Afghanistan, hoping that such information would help ease 
concerns amongst those who have advocated maintaining the 
current level of engagement. (NOTE: S/CA has decided that an 
expert team headed to Moscow in January will also visit 
Helsinki in order to brief Finnish officials on the situation 
in Afghanistan.  END NOTE.) 
 
Increasing civilian contribution a challenge 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Laamanen said the GOF has encountered difficulties in 
recruiting civilians to work in Afghanistan (in a prior 
meeting Laamanen pointed to competition with recruitment for 
police trainers in a (considerably safer) Kosovo as part of 
the problem).  Given concerns about the security environment 
in Afghanistan, and the difficulties in recruiting, Laamanen 
emphasized that the GOF will carefully consider what roles to 
fill before they send more personnel.  Generally, they are 
looking to increase police trainers, but will consider other 
roles. 
 
OMLT increase; renewed PRT leadership discussions 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (C) Kalkku said Finland's OMLT contribution would increase 
from 10 to 30 (Laamanen acknowledged that the original 
commitment for 10 has not been filled yet, with only 2 
currently on the ground).  While there is no firm decision 
yet, Kalkku said the intention is that part of this 
additional contribution be at the battalion level, not just 
garrison. 
 
¶6. (C) Regarding the possibility of Finland assuming 
leadership of the currently Swedish-led PRT in 
Mazar-e-Sharif, Kalkku said the topic had arisen again within 
the GOF, after having faded when Finnish-Swedish discussions 
earlier in the year led nowhere.  According to Kalkku, the 
"Swedes won,t give up" the Mazar PRT, which "is a 
comfortable place to be."  She emphasized Finnish interest in 
leading a PRT, adding that if Lithuania can run a PRT then 
Finland could.  Regarding troop requirements for a PRT, 
Laamanen said that the GOF anticipates withdrawing 
approximately 60 troops from Operation Althea in Bosnia, and 
that in Kosovo they expect to go down to 350 from 450. 
(NOTE: Staff of the Parliamentary Defense committee 
subsequently told PolChief that the number in Kosovo could 
decrease to 250 over the next two years.  END NOTE.) 
 
Increase in overall development assistance 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Kalkku, noting that Finland lags behind the other 
Nordic countries in overall development assistance, said that 
the GOF supports a doubling of its assistance, albeit "over 
the long term."  With the "funding curve going up" and not a 
flat line, assistance to Afghanistan would also increase, 
though again Kalkku offered no specifics.  As funding levels 
increase, Kalkku said they will consider how they deliver 
assistance: typically the GOF works through trust funds, as 
limited resources require that they try to avoid "cumbersome 
bilateral programs," but they will consider bilateral 
funding, given that there are a number of good organizations 
in Afghanistan with whom they could partner. 
 
¶8. (C) DAS Krol raised the possibility of training 
opportunities for Afghans in Finland, for example, training 
that capitalizes on Finnish expertise in (re)forestation. 
Kalkku mentioned a planned "pilot project" for rule-of-law 
training to court officials and police, and good governance 
and human rights training offered to Afghan parliamentarians. 
 They look to repeat the training to parliamentarians. 
Kalkku welcomes any suggestions regarding training in 
Finland, as the government has funding available.  Regarding 
forestry-related assistance, Kalkku stated that currently the 
ministry of trade and development is focusing on water 
sanitation and renewable energy projects, but that they could 
consider forestry projects. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) Whether flowing from Nordic Cooperation or Nordic 
Rivalry, the Finns have seen their neighbors commit to 
increased troops or development assistance to Afghanistan, 
and it seems that they have concluded that they too must do 
more.  (The Finns also seek a seat on the UN Security Council 
in 2013-14, and realize that actions taken now and over the 
next few years will impact that candidacy.)  According to 
Kalkku, this revised policy will be more streamlined than 
last year's, described by her as too cumbersome, a decision 
that might also allow a broad consensus within the governing 
coalition on increased support while still deferring 
disagreements and debate about the timing and substance of 
increases to a later time. Our engagement, e.g., through 
briefings to key officials and parliamentarians that provide 
a clearer picture of the situation in Afghanistan, can help 
allay concerns and assist the GOF in articulating the extent 
and pace of its increased assistance.  END COMMENT. 
 
BARRETT