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Viewing cable 08HARARE1133, ZIMBABWE PASSPORT REGISTRAR IN DENIAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08HARARE1133 2008-12-19 06:32 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Harare
VZCZCXRO0422
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #1133/01 3540632
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 190632Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3842
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 0555
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0150
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001133 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP AND AF/S B. WALCH 
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO KCC 
JOHANNESBURG FOR RCO MICHAEL VEASY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CMGT PGOV KCOR KFRD ZI
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE PASSPORT REGISTRAR IN DENIAL 
 
REF: HARARE 000996 
 
HARARE 00001133  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (U) SUMMARY:  In a meeting on December 16, Zimbabwe Registrar 
General Tobaiwa Mudede denied the existence of any problems with 
Zimbabwean passport controls.  Instead, he boasted of Zimbabwean 
passport security features that insured individual identity, and 
blamed Zimbabwe's excessive passport processing time on the failure 
of applicants to check on their applications.  Mudede's remarks come 
on the heels of a three-fold increase in Zimbabwe passport fees, a 
processing time measured in years, and confirmation by Post of 
compromised Zimbabwe blank passports.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) As the Registrar General, Tobaiwa Mudede is in charge of 
Zimbabwe passports and voter registration.  In a meeting with Conoff 
to discuss Zimbabwean passport security features that was three 
months in the making, Mudede boasted how Zimbabwe had led the region 
in incorporating machine-readable passports that included a 
fingerprint image on the bio page.  Accompanied by his passport 
policy expert, passport technical expert, and a host of MFA 
onlookers, Mudede refused to discuss any security features unique to 
Zimbabwean passports.  Instead, he attempted to assuage concerns by 
anecdotally comparing the uniqueness of Zimbabwean passport security 
features to zebra stripes. 
 
3. (SBU) With attempts to discuss security features thwarted, Conoff 
inquired about Zimbabwe passport controls and processes, and 
presented Mudede with evidence that strongly suggested a compromise 
in the security of Zimbabwe passport supplies.  Mudede responded 
that if true, such a situation represented a world-wide criminal 
problem, and was a matter for the police.  He demanded that all 
suspect passports be turned over to the Registrar General's office 
immediately so the holders could be thrown in jail.  When asked 
about the Zimbabwe passport process and the extended backlog in 
applications, Mudede blamed the applicants themselves for the 
backlog, saying they presented "problem" applications in which the 
personal data could not be verified.  He went on to say that his 
office did not have the time to write to every "problem" applicant 
for verification of personal data, but instead waited for applicants 
to return to the Registrar's office to check on their applications. 
He attributed the Zimbabwe passport backlog to the failure of 
applicants to check on their applications in a timely manner. 
 
4. (SBU) As reported reftel, corruption has become endemic within 
the Zimbabwean civil service, resulting in a near total collapse of 
government controls over passports and official documents.  Civil 
servants, whose salaries have been eroded to practically nothing by 
hyper-inflation, have become not only susceptible, but dependent on 
bribes and kickbacks for basic subsistence.  On December 11, citing 
escalating costs, the Registrar General's office raised passport 
fees 300 percent, resulting in a fee of USD 650 for an urgent 
(expedited) adult passport.  Although the fee for normal processing 
was only raised to USD 120, our sources involved in the Zimbabwe 
passport process report that only expedited applications are being 
processed and that only U.S. dollars are being accepted for payment. 
 This dramatic increase in cost will most certainly add to the 
popularity of alternative passport services, and further fuel a 
flourishing industry of fraudulent document vendors. 
 
5. (SBU) In the latest example of passport fraud seen at Post, an 
alert FSN recognized a suspect Zimbabwean passport during NIV 
intake, and immediately notified the Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU). 
The FSN's suspicion was raised due to a lighter than normal 
background printing on the bio page.  Upon examination, we 
determined the passport was printed from an authentic blank (book), 
but was obviously fraudulent.  The bio page had a sealed film that 
was a crude attempt to mimic the glossy appearance of authentic 
passports, and the passport lacked the fidelity found in the 
background printing of authentic passports.  In addition, the 
fingerprint image included on the bio page obviously did not match 
the prints taken during the subject's NIV interview. 
 
6. (SBU) Upon investigation by the FPU and ARSO, the passport was 
found to have been obtained through a Harare "agent" in 2006, and 
was used to travel from the U.S. to Zimbabwe in December of 2008. 
In December 2004, the subject had received an F1 visa to study in 
the U.S., and was in school when her passport expired in 2007. 
Unable to obtain a new passport through the Zimbabwe Embassy in DC, 
she asked her mother for help. 
 
7. (SBU) The mother told us she was frustrated in her attempts to 
apply for her daughter at the Registrar General, and mentioned her 
dilemma to an agent that had previously helped her with a South 
African visa.  She said she paid the agent a USD 200 brokerage fee, 
received the passport a few days later, and then mailed it to her 
daughter in the U.S.  The daughter was applying to renew her F1 visa 
when the fraudulent passport was discovered at Post. 
 
HARARE 00001133  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
8. (SBU) COMMENT:  Passports for Zimbabweans have become more than 
just travel documents.  They represent an opportunity to obtain 
food, medical care, and subsistence that has become unavailable in 
Zimbabwe.  The state of denial exhibited by the Registrar General is 
all too familiar.  While average Zimbabweans struggle with multiple 
examples of a failed government and a cholera outbreak that was 
unimaginable just a few years ago, Zimbabwe's leadership refuses to 
acknowledge the situation.  We anticipate the demand for Zimbabwe 
passports to increase, with a growing percentage of this demand 
supplied by fraudulent document agents.  END COMMENT. 
 
DHANANI