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Viewing cable 08HARARE1067, HARARE MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE: COPING WITH COLLAPSE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08HARARE1067 2008-12-03 17:06 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Harare
VZCZCXRO7672
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #1067/01 3381706
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031706Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3773
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001067 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMGT SOCI ECON PGOV AMED ZI
SUBJECT: HARARE MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE: COPING WITH COLLAPSE 
 
REF:  A. HARARE 1054 
      B. HARARE 1039 
      C. HARARE 1007 
      D. HARARE 919 
      E. HARARE 982 
      F. HARARE 904 
      G. 07 HARARE 504 
 
THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.  SEE PARAS 13 AND 14. 
 
1. SUMMARY:  The collapse of Zimbabwe's infrastructure and economy 
continues to provide new challenges to post management.  Post 
currently has the capacity to provide regular water supplies to all 
USG offices and residences except those in commercial office 
buildings.  Additional wells may be required in the future, and 
Post's Public Affairs Section requires back up capabilities or 
relocation.  Health system collapse has required the Mission to 
begin self-insurance for LES, despite the workload implications. 
With current facilities, Post cannot compensate for the lack of 
reliable emergency services.  Post requests funding for well 
drilling and a prefabricated medical facility.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. Post has reported extensively (Refs E, F and G) on how 
Zimbabweans have managed to cope with their country's economic 
crisis.  Zimbabwe's collapsing infrastructure and imploding economy 
create a different set of issues for USG efforts to maintain the 
basic standards of service required to keep the Embassy running and 
our families safe and comfortable.  Just a few years ago, municipal 
services generally functioned and it was simple to identify local 
service providers capable of meeting our needs.  Within Africa, 
Zimbabwe was extraordinary in its resemblance to a first world 
country.  Today, Zimbabwe is like any other least developed country, 
and we have to provide for almost all our own needs, just as our 
management operations in places like the DRC and Niger have to 
compensate for the absence of local services.  For the last few 
years, our Mission Strategic Plans have focused on the difficulty of 
meeting these challenges with an inadequate platform. We appreciate 
the support we have received from the Africa Bureau despite the 
tight budgets of the last few years. 
 
3. While this process has been underway for several years, it has 
been punctuated by crises which require accelerated responses.  Just 
over a year ago, fuel shortages were the most significant threat to 
the Mission's ability to carry on business as usual.  Post responded 
by expanding fuel storage and transport capacity.  Water shortages 
have been a growing problem for some time, but the collapse of water 
treatment and distribution systems (Ref D) in recent weeks, combined 
with a cholera outbreak (Refs A and D), has tested our coping 
skills.  Similarly, the collapse of local health care services (Refs 
B and C) requires that the USG develop in-house capacities it did 
not need in the past. 
 
--------------------- 
HARARE'S WATER CRISIS 
--------------------- 
 
4. In the past, municipalities in Zimbabwe ran their own water 
utilities.  Until a few years ago, Harare was one of the few capital 
cities in Africa with reliably potable tap water.  The cities, 
however, were bases of support for the MDC and regularly elected MDC 
councils and mayors.  ZANU-PF undertook a number of measures to 
reduce the authority of municipal governments, including giving the 
Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) control over municipal 
waterworks.   This parastatal has been unable to generate sufficient 
revenue to maintain water infrastructure and to purchase inputs, 
including treatment chemicals. 
 
5. USG office and residential facilities in Harare have suffered 
interruptions in water service for a number of years.  We have 
functioning wells on 21 of our properties, and water tanks installed 
at all owned and leased offices and residences except our Public 
Affairs Section (PAS) and Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 
facilities in commercial office buildings.  The Harare International 
School has adequate well water as well.  The Mission has long used a 
water truck to fill tanks at locations without ZINWA service.  In 
late FY07, with the number of facilities requiring water deliveries 
growing, Post purchased a second water truck to double our capacity 
to respond. 
 
6. In the past, the chancery had reliable ZINWA service and we 
principally used municipal water from the chancery to fill our water 
trucks.  In FY07, we also installed equipment at a government-owned 
residence with a productive well to facilitate filling of the water 
truck with well water, both to cover (increasingly frequent) 
interruptions in chancery supplies and to increase our capacity. 
ZINWA recently completely stopped treating water and stopped all 
pumping for about a week.  (It has resumed supplying the city 
center, with what we assume is untreated water.)  The well we have 
relied on also gives indications that it may be deteriorating. 
However, we have 4 other wells that we can easily shift to, and with 
the advent of the rainy season, seasonal wells, such as one on the 
chancery compound, will begin to provide water.  The past week 
presented us with a short term "worst case scenario" for water 
 
HARARE 00001067  002 OF 002 
 
 
supplies, and our water trucks and the LES who drive them have 
proved equal to the task; the tanks at our offices and residences 
remained well supplied. 
 
7. Although our coping mechanisms are equal to the current water 
delivery challenge, we need to prepare ourselves for potential 
drying up of the wells we now rely on.  Our best option is to drill 
new wells in promising locations. 
 
8. Our CDC and PAS facilities are both located in city center 
commercial office buildings, and neither building provides tenants 
with a backup water system.  CDC, with 29 employees, relies on four 
1,000 liter containers the Embassy keeps filled when the taps run 
dry.  PAS, which receives about a hundred visitors a day, is in a 
different situation.  Water in the Eastgate building, where PAS is 
located, is separated into two systems, one for toilets and another 
for taps.  When the taps run dry, public access to the information 
resource center is suspended.  As long as toilets continue working, 
employees remain at work, with bottled water and hand sanitizer to 
assure hygiene.  In the past, water interruptions have been rare. 
With deterioration in basic services and an indefinite delay in 
construction of Harare's NEC, post is evaluating the feasibility and 
cost of supplying backup power and water for PAS at its current 
location.  If this cannot be arranged, relocation may be necessary. 
Either option will involve significant unbudgeted costs. 
 
------------------------------------ 
COPING WITH MEDICAL SYSTEMS COLLAPSE 
------------------------------------ 
 
9. ZINWA's failures are largely responsible for the scale of the 
current cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe, but the unusually high cholera 
fatality rate (4.5 percent nationwide) is due to the collapse in 
Zimbabwe's health systems.  In the past, the Embassy relied on a 
local medical insurance scheme for LES health care and highly 
qualified private practitioners and well equipped hospitals for 
direct hire referrals and emergencies.  While some qualified 
practitioners remain, there is no longer a functioning health 
insurance scheme and there are no medical facilities in the country 
that can be relied on to provided emergency stabilization pending 
evacuation. 
 
10. Post has responded to the specific challenge of the cholera 
outbreak by sharing prevention information with employees and 
American citizens and ordering supplies of hand sanitizer to 
distribute throughout the Embassy, with special focus on public 
access points.  Reports of an anthrax outbreak in one region of 
Zimbabwe do not currently represent any unusual threat to employees 
or American citizens; anthrax is endemic in Zimbabwe with occasional 
localized outbreaks, and human infection can be prevented by 
avoiding under-cooked meat. 
 
11. While specific disease outbreaks are manageable, the broader 
issue of systemic collapse is more challenging.  After six months of 
effort to put in place a short term commercial option for LES health 
insurance pending solicitation of bids, the Mission has determined 
that there is no viable short term solution.  Post will self insure 
our 214 LES and their family members for the interim.  This will 
create a significant new workload for Post's Medical Unit and 
Financial Management Office, but is the only means by which we can 
meet our commitment to our employees. 
 
12. Post cannot rely on its current facilities resources to 
compensate for the collapse of public and private hospitals. 
Following a recent visit, Post's Regional Medical Officer concluded 
that our in-house capabilities need to be augmented.  She suggested 
in her trip report that, because current medical unit offices 
provide no expansion capacity, we consider "adding some double-wide 
trailers or comparable prefabricated building to capture on-site 
space.  Key would be to having a stretcher-accessible mini-ER for 
patient stabilization.  Increased space for pharmacy supplies will 
also be needed.  The thoughts to a small laboratory space for simple 
lab tests to be performed on-site as well." 
 
--------------- 
ACTION REQUESTS 
--------------- 
 
13. Post requests that OBO provide US$5,000 in funding for 
well-drilling surveys at ten locations; if the surveys are 
promising, further funding will be sought. 
 
14. Post requests that the Department explore options for providing 
a prefabricated medical facility that would include a capacity to 
stabilize emergency patients awaiting evacuation. 
 
MCGEE