VZCZCXRO9228
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1523/01 3530404
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 180404Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1266
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0358
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0261
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0202
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0239

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001523 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KIRF KISL TI
SUBJECT: GROWING INFLUENCE OF TRADITIONAL ISLAM IN TAJIKISTAN - WHAT 
WE SHOULD BE DOING 
 
REF:  08 DUSHANBE 1409 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: On December 11 and 12, EmbOffs accompanied William 
Trigg, USAID's Regional Society and State Advisor based in Bishkek, 
to meetings with Muslim clerics, government officials, and 
researchers in Dushanbe.  During Trigg's visit, interlocutors said 
the Government of Tajikistan had little credibility in religious 
circles, but would not rethink its failing policy.  Traditional 
Islamic leaders with no government connections - and who even openly 
oppose the government - are growing in influence. The United States 
should engage them in a discussion of the image of the United States 
and its commitment to defending religious freedom.  End summary. 
 
GOVERNMENT POLICY ACCOMPLISHES OPPOSITE OF INTENDED EFFECT 
 
¶2. (SBU) Abdullo Rahnamo, a researcher at the Center for Strategic 
Research, said the Government's religious policy over the last ten 
years was a failed ideological experiment.  The Government wanted to 
co-opt religion to legitimize and augment its authority; government 
officials have sought to both control and restrict religious 
communities, and to court religious figures as allies of the 
government.  This contradictory path had accomplished the opposite 
of what the Government intended. 
 
¶3. (SBU) According to Rahnamo, each restriction on religious 
expression has hurt the image of the Government.  The government 
sought to control Tajikistan's clerics by creating the "independent" 
Council of Ulamo and weakening the country's muftiate.  However, 
individual imams became far more influential than those on the 
Council of Ulamo (reftel).  The Government sought to control 
religious instruction by taking over the Islamic Institute and 
placing it under the Ministry of Education.  However, imams trained 
abroad had much more authority in religious communities than the 
"secular imams" trained at the Institute.  The Government sought to 
control the country's youth through dress codes.  Banning the hijab, 
however, energized young people, and wearing the hijab became a 
symbol of individual expression. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Traditional Islamic leaders - as opposed to those who the 
Government posits as religious leaders - had a large and increasing 
constituency.  Rahnamo said Islam was "in the hands of these 
traditional leaders," not government officials.  For example, while 
the Government cited the need to prevent the growth of "foreign" 
religious influence, it would be Tajikistan's traditional religious 
leaders who would prevent the growth of the Salafis. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Nevertheless, President Rahmon's government remained 
committed to its highly flawed policy.  Officials in the newly 
established Islamic Studies Center, the Ministry of Culture's 
Department of Religious Affairs, and law enforcement agencies lacked 
the specialized knowledge to effectively engage religious 
communities.  They were detached from the communities they 
theoretically served; how could Murodali Davlatov, the head of 
President Rahmon's newly created Islamic Studies Center, formulate 
policy when he was "against Tajikistan's clergy?" 
 
¶6. (SBU) Idibek Ziyoev, a senior official in the Department of 
Religious Affairs, largely confirmed Rahnamo's criticisms of 
government officials.  After saying his agency had "no 
complications" with the religious community, he spent fifteen 
minutes explaining the problems posed by the Salafis and made 
several factual mistakes about Islam.  He did not know the number of 
Qseveral factual mistakes about Islam.  He did not know the number of 
students who went abroad for religious studies and was unable to 
explain how his agency collected information about religious 
communities.  He said the Government had a "different way" of 
approaching religious issues than Iran, Pakistan, and Arab 
countries, but could not be more specific.  He said the hijab issue 
had been blown out of proportion; women and girls were wearing 
hijabs mainly as a fashion statement, not out of religious belief. 
 
NEGATIVE IMAGES OF SECULAR GOVERNMENTS 
 
¶7. (SBU) Badriddin Karimov, the imam-khatib of the Pakhtakor mosque, 
complained "the Government does not allow us to express independent 
ideas in our sermons; if you go beyond the instructions of the 
government, you will have problems."  He resented the Government's 
restrictions on religious expression, a sentiment shared by many 
imams. 
 
¶8. (U) On November 28, the State Committee for National Security 
summoned Eshoni Nuriddin, the imam-khatib of the Muhammadi Mosque in 
Vahdat and one of Tajikistan's most respected and popular religious 
figures (reftel) for questioning in Dushanbe.  Local media reported 
extensively on the incident.  Nuriddin told Asia-Plus the 
authorities "accused me of criticizing the government policy...I 
said that is not so.  I just try to put people to the straight and 
narrow..."  He accused Murodali Davlatov, President Rahmon's advisor 
 
DUSHANBE 00001523  002 OF 002 
 
 
on Islamic issues, of collaborating with the State Committee on 
National Security. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Traditional Islamic leaders' views on the United States are 
of particular importance because of their growing influence in 
Tajikistan.  In a meeting with Mullo Abdurahim, the imam-khatib of 
the Qazoqon Friday prayer mosque in Dushanbe, who is one of the most 
popular of Tajikistan's traditional Islamic leaders (reftel), he 
appeared to have a negative - though not hostile - impression of the 
United States, formed by the war in Iraq and U.S. assistance to 
Israel.  Other traditional Islamic leaders have brought up the same 
issues, including the rumor that the United States brought Salafism 
to Tajikistan.  In contrast, Badriddin Karimov had a more positive 
impression of the United States, which was likely a result of his 
participation in a USAID Community Connections program. 
 
WHAT WE SHOULD BE DOING 
 
¶10. (SBU) Comment: The Government's adherence to a highly flawed 
policy appears to be increasing the alienation of religious 
communities and strengthening the influence of traditional Islamic 
leaders.  The most recent draft of a Law on Religion is now 
circulating through Parliament, and we anticipate its passage within 
the next month.  This new draft, which contains numerous provisions 
that are objectionable to religious communities and civil society, 
typifies the lack of foresight in the government's approach.  While 
there is little that we can do to engage Tajik officials in a 
discussion of this issue, we can step up our efforts to engage 
traditional Islamic leaders.  Mullo Abdurahim said interaction with 
American Muslims in Tajikistan and the United States would be 
interesting and useful. 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) Comment continued: In addition to continuing to meet with 
imams around the country, Embassy staff, including from USAID and 
PAS will: 
-Identify important traditional Islamic leaders and share the 
information with other sections and U.S. Government agencies at 
Post; 
-Obtain copies of sermons of these leaders on DVD and analyze their 
messages; 
-Distribute the International Religious Freedom report directly to 
these leaders and discuss the U.S. commitment to religious freedom; 
-Send these leaders to the United States on Community Connections or 
International Visitor programs; 
-Bring American Muslims to Tajikistan to discuss Islam in America 
with these leaders. 
 
¶12. Comment continued: Our small public diplomacy budget, a holdover 
from the days when the Embassy was located in Kazakhstan, and our 
overstretched public diplomacy staff, the smallest in the South and 
Central Asia Bureau, limit our ability to engage effectively with 
this mostly-Muslim population.  Post has requested additional 
resources and believes that additional exchange and educational 
programs would make a big impact in our understanding of and 
influence on an increasingly religious population. End comment. 
 
JACOBSON