VZCZCXRO0923
PP RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHCO #0795/01 3541241
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 191241Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY COTONOU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0701
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1373
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0403

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COTONOU 000795 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W ACOOK 
LONDON FOR PETER LORD 
PARIS FOR BKANEDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BN
SUBJECT:  BENIN: OPPOSITION TAKES FIRM STAND AGAINST 
PRESIDENT YAYI 
 
REF: COTONOU 622 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY: In an attempt to defuse the political crisis, 
President Yayi met individually with leaders of the opposition 
groups G4, G13 and Key Force in November 2008, and proposed a 
November 27-28 joint meeting with them. Also, on November 18, the 
GOB issued a decree to allow the full application of the 2002 
Opposition Act, which grants special privileges to opposition 
political parties. They rejected the two-day meeting proposal on the 
grounds that they had not been consulted beforehand and that the 
dates conflicted with their own meeting. On November 28 and 29, 
opposition parties met in Bohicon in central Benin. During the 
meeting they vehemently criticized President Yayi's policy and 
re-affirmed their opposition to him. It appeared that the opposition 
group will endorse a sole candidate to face President Yayi in the 
2011 presidential election, Adrien Houngbedji, the President of the 
Social Democratic Party (PRD), a component of the G4. END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) Following his November 18 decision to hold a political 
conference with the opposition, President Yayi met opposition 
parties leaders forming the G4 namely Nicephore Soglo, Honorary 
President of the Renaissance du Benin (RB), Sefou Fagbohoun, 
president of the African Movement for Democracy and Progress 
(MADEP), Bruno Amoussou, President of the Social-Democracy Party 
(PSD), and Adrien Houngbedji, President of the Party of Democratic 
Renewal (PRD). He also held talks with Nassirou Bako, the Spokesman 
of the G13 and representatives of the Force Key party. Opposition 
leaders hailed President Yayi for this initiative and expressed 
concern that President Yayi should allow them more time for better 
coordination and preparation of the conference. They also argued 
that the proposed schedule for the conference coincided with their 
own political meeting. It is notable that the meetings received 
partial media coverage, and Post learned from reliable sources that 
they were heated discussions off record. 
 
¶3. (U) In the midst of this flurry of political activity, on 
November 20, the Council of Ministers issued an enabling decree 
which will permit the application of Opposition Act 2001 of October 
14, 2002. The Opposition Act was introduced and adopted in 2002 by 
former president Kerekou. The Act has not been implemented to date 
by political parties, because it lacked an enabling decree for the 
implementation of Article 12 of the Act dealing with the protocol 
and other benefits that should be granted to declared opposition 
leaders.  To correct this, decree No 2008-649 of November 2008 
defines protocol benefits for declared opposition leaders, including 
participation in the signature of national and international 
agreements, invitation to official events, assistance by Beninese 
diplomatic missions when abroad, right to be consulted by the 
President of the Republic on issues of general interest. As part of 
other material benefits, opposition leaders are entitled to a car, a 
driver, a bodyguard, a Special Advisor and a personal Secretary. The 
initial Opposition Act No 2001-36 of October 14, 2002 sets a legal 
framework for the political opposition by defining the criteria for 
the registration of the opposition, the role, the rights and the 
obligations of the opposition. 
 
¶4. (SBU) On November 25, talks between Nicephore Soglo and President 
Yayi were reportedly friendly because prior to the meeting, on 
November 20 the government and the municipality of Cotonou had put 
in place a concerted framework for resolving conflicts opposing the 
central government and the mayor of Cotonou over the issue of 
financial autonomy. On November 24, former President Kerekou played 
the role of mediator when he accompanied G13 representatives to 
visit President Yayi. Discussions between President Yayi and G13 
representatives were reportedly tense due to the overly radical 
requirements of this opposition group of 13 National Assembly's 
deputies. Many critics have linked President Kerekou's involvement 
in these discussions to his controversial affinity with Issa Saley, 
the leader of the G13 and a businessman whose business prospered 
during Kekerou's era. 
 
¶5. (U) On November 28 and 29, leaders of the G4, G13, Key Force and 
allied movements during a political meeting in Bohicon, central 
Benin, voiced vitriolic statements against president Yayi's 
governance. Each leader took the floor and vigorously criticized 
President Yayi's policies. Bruno Amoussou, the Spokesman for the G4 
and leader of PSD in his opening remarks said that the root cause of 
the current difficulties lay in the political practice of the 
"government of change", in its political philosophy and in its style 
of governance. Nicephore Soglo, the RB's Honorary President and 
Mayor of Cotonou pledged the unity of opposition parties. Lazare 
Sehoueto, the leader of Key Force told the audience that the only 
promising prospect of the opposition ahead of the 2011 presidential 
 
COTONOU 00000795  002 OF 002 
 
 
election was "to change the car and the driver". This last statement 
epitomized the opposition's ultimate goal to alternate power in the 
2011 presidential election. 
 
¶6. (U) During the Bohicon meeting, Adrien Houngbedji, the president 
of the PRD, a bonifree opposition leader, described the decree No 
2008-649 of November 2002 as "an empty shell", because it failed to 
address the crucial issues of security and equal access of the 
opposition to the media. It is noteworthy that the very Opposition 
Act No 2001-36 had already covered the security and equal access to 
media issues so that the enabling decree no longer need to address 
them. The issuance of the decree did not generate the expected 
enthusiasm among political leaders that had linked the absence of a 
declared opposition to the lack of an enabling decree to make it 
fully applicable.  Logically, Adrien Houngbedji appears to be the 
only political leader that qualifies to be the opposition leader 
under the Opposition Act, since PRD secured in the March 2007 
legislative election 10 seats of the 83, exceeding the 10% of the 
vote as required by the Act. Notably, leaders of parties with at 
least 9 deputies at the National Assembly can register as opposition 
leaders. No other parties have met this threshold requirement, 
unless minor parties at the National Assembly group together to form 
9-member parliamentary groups. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Credible sources confirmed to Post that the G4, G13 and 
Force Key seek to present PRD's Adrien Houngbedji as President 
Yayi's challenger in the 2011 presidential election. NOTE: In the 
March 2006 presidential poll, Houngbedji was backed by over six 
political parties and thirty various movements and associations. In 
the first round he obtained 24% of the vote and finished second. The 
results of the run off showed Adrien Houngbedji with 25.5% of the 
final tally END NOTE. 
 
¶8. (U) The published report of the opposition's meeting provided a 
somber picture of the economic, financial, social and institutional 
situations confronting the country. As part of the recommendations, 
the participants in the meeting urged the opposition coalition to 
pool efforts towards national unity and peace, to hone strategies 
for attaining power change in 2011. Participants also invited other 
political forces to join them in the fight ahead of the 2011 
presidential elections. Many observers believe that the Bohicon's 
meeting, instead of fostering political dialogue and easing the 
political tension, was a real trial of President Yayi's government. 
 
¶9. (SBU) COMMENT: The electoral campaign for president in 2011 has 
begun with the opposition's declared commitment to defeat President 
Yayi. It is now uncertain that the G4, G13 and Key Force will enter 
Yayi's government. This situation will continue to hamper the smooth 
functioning of the National Assembly. If the opposition group, with 
its current configuration, continues to stick together to propel 
Houngbedji ahead of the 2011 presidential election, this will augur 
ill for President Yayi. On the other hand, precocious electoral 
campaigns by President Yayi will distract him from the efficient 
implementation of his agenda. Since Benin's political landscape is 
characterized by individual and opportunistic interests, intrigues, 
regionalism and the politicians' readiness to jump ship, no one can 
predict today what will happen in 2011.  END COMMENT 
 
BROWN