VZCZCXRO5876
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1664/01 3641039
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 291039Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3175
INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8844
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3255
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7028
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5998
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7622
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7286
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0780

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001664 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV ECON CO BR
SUBJECT: Brazil: 2008 Country Report on Terrorism 
 
Ref: STATE 120019 
 
¶1. (U) The Brazilian government continues to be a cooperative 
partner in countering terrorism and related activities that could 
contribute to the facilitation of attacks in the region or 
elsewhere--to include investigating potential terrorism financing, 
and document forgery networks and other illicit activity. 
Operationally, elements of the Brazilian Government responsible for 
combating terrorism, such as the Federal Police, Customs, and the 
Brazilian Intelligence Agency, effectively work with their U.S. 
counterparts and diligently pursue investigative leads provided by 
U.S. intelligence, law enforcement and financial agencies regarding 
terrorist suspects. 
 
¶2. (U) Brazil's intelligence and law enforcement services are 
concerned that terrorists could exploit Brazilian territory to 
support and facilitate terrorist attacks, whether domestically or 
abroad, and have focused their efforts  in the areas of Sao Paulo, 
the tri-border areas of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay; Brazil, 
Peru and Colombia; and the Colombian and Venezuelan borders. 
Brazil's recognition of the potential threat from terrorism prompted 
a reform of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) that raised the 
profile of the issue by upgrading the counterterrorism division to 
the department level. 
 
¶3. (U) Brazil's intelligence and law enforcement forces work closely 
with regional and international partners.  In 2008, ABIN hosted a 
multilateral conference on counterterrorism involving the security 
services of several South American countries. Also in 2008, the 
Federal Police and ABIN, together with the United Nations 
Organization for Crime and Drugs, co-hosted an international 
conference on terrorism finance.  In addition, Brazil actively 
participates in international counterterrorism fora such as the 3+1 
Mechanism on Security in the Triborder Area, Mercosul's Working 
Group on Terrorism and the Sub-working Group on Financial Issues, 
the latter of which discusses terrorism financing and money 
laundering among the Mercosul countries. 
 
¶4. (U) Bilaterally, the USG provided a variety of training courses 
throughout Brazil in counterterrorism, combating money laundering, 
detection of travel document fraud, container security, and 
international organized crime.  In 2008, Brazil and the United 
States began exchanging information on critical infrastructure 
protection issues. 
 
¶5. (U) Although Brazil has no official list of terrorist groups and 
does not recognize the FARC as one, President Luiz Inacio Lula da 
Silva has been more critical of the FARC's use of violence and has 
publicly called on the group to desist in the armed struggle against 
the Colombian government.  President Lula also signaled a renewed 
commitment to cooperate with the Colombian government that, if 
implemented in 2009, could help curtail the FARC's activities along 
the border with Brazil.  In July, Lula and Colombian President 
Alvaro Uribe signed bilateral accords to cooperate on combating the 
illicit trafficking of weapons and munitions, enhance defense 
cooperation, and, together with Peru, combat transnational criminal 
active, particularly the trafficking of drugs, weapons, munitions, 
by increasing intelligence sharing and joint patrolling of border 
river ways. 
 
¶6. (U) Brazil is capable of monitoring domestic financial operations 
and effectively utilizes its financial intelligence unit, the 
Financial Activities Oversight Council (COAF), to identify possible 
funding sources for terrorist groups.  Through the COAF, Brazil has 
carried out name checks for persons and entities on the UNSCR 1267 
and 1373 terror finance lists, but has so far not found any assets, 
accounts or property in the names of persons or entities on the UN 
terror-finance lists. 
 
¶7. (U) Brazil also continues to undertake steps to enhance its 
capabilities to combat money laundering.  Since 2003, fifteen 
specialized money laundering courts have been established, including 
two in Sao Paulo, with each court headed by a judge who receives 
specialized training in national money laundering legislation. In 
addition, in 2008, the United States and Brazil established a 
working group with money laundering judges to share best practices 
and training needs. 
 
¶8. (U) A 2006 national anti-money laundering strategy goal was 
formed aimed to build on the success of the specialized courts by 
creating complementary specialized federal police financial crimes 
units in the same jurisdictions. In 2008, the Federal Police 
established such units in the Federal District (Brasilia), and the 
states of Rio de Janeiro and Sco Paulo.  In addition, the Ministry 
of Justice funded the creation of technology centers to combat money 
 
BRASILIA 00001664  002 OF 002 
 
 
laundering in the Federal District and Rio de Janeiro, the latter of 
which received two such centers, one embedded with the Public 
Ministry and one with the state Civil Police.  In 2008, the Ministry 
signed accords to establish additional centers in Bahia, Goias, and 
Rio Grande do Sul. 
 
¶9. (U) Although the Government of Brazil vigorously condemns 
terrorism, it does not acknowledge the presence of terrorist groups 
on Brazilian soil and insists that no identifiable terrorist 
incidents have occurred in the country.  The Government of Brazil's 
counterterrorism strategy consists of deterring terrorists from 
using Brazilian territory to facilitate attacks or raise funds, by 
aggressively monitoring and suppressing transnational criminal 
activities that could support terrorist actions.  It accomplishes 
this through increasing effective actions between its law 
enforcement entities and through cooperation with the United States 
and other partners in the region. 
 
¶10. (U) In 2008, the GOB and the USG continued to work together 
through the Container Security Initiative in Santos, Brazil to 
promote secure containerized cargo to the United States and through 
the establishment of a Trade Transparency Unit to detect money 
laundering through trade transactions. 
 
¶11. (U) The Brazilian government is achieving visible results from 
recent investments in border and law enforcement infrastructure that 
were executed with a view to gradually control the flow of goods -- 
legal and illegal -- through the Tri-border Area (TBA) of Brazil, 
Argentina and Paraguay, the proceeds of which could be diverted to 
support terror groups.  The inspection station at the Friendship 
Bridge in the TBA that was completed by Brazilian Customs (Receita 
Federal) in 2007 has continued to take effective action to suppress 
the smuggling of drugs, weapons, and contraband goods along the 
border with Paraguay.  According to Brazilian Customs (Receita 
Federal) in 2008 the agency interdicted more than $76 million in 
smuggled goods, including drugs, weapons, and munitions, an increase 
of eight percent from 2007.  As a result of the effective crackdown 
on the Friendship Bridge, most smuggling operations now take place 
through the Parana River and Lago Itaipu and some have migrated to 
other sections of the border such as the towns of Guiara and Ponta 
Pora.  The Federal Police has Special Maritime Police Units in both 
Foz de Iguacu and Guaira that aggressively patrol the maritime 
border areas but because of the scale and complexity of the endeavor 
to curtail smuggling and trafficking activities through the 
waterways, Brazil is currently considering using an Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle to assist law enforcement in monitoring the border, a 
development that could further improve border security. 
 
¶12. (U) Brazil's overall commitment to combating terrorism and the 
illicit activities that could be exploited to facilitate terrorism 
is undermined by the GOB's failure to significantly strengthen its 
legal counterterrorism framework.  Two key CT-related legislative 
initiatives continued to languish in 2008.  An anti-terrorism bill 
that would have established the crime of terrorism and other 
associated crimes was drafted but shelved before its introduction in 
Congress and a long-delayed anti-money laundering bill has not been 
approved by Congress. If passed, the latter bill would facilitate 
greater law enforcement access to financial and banking records 
during investigations, criminalize illicit enrichment, allow 
administrative freezing of assets, and facilitate prosecutions of 
money laundering cases by amending the legal definition of money 
laundering and making it an autonomous offense. 
 
¶13. (U) Post POC Javier A. Gonzalez can be reached at 
GonzalezJA@state.gov or (55-61) 3312-7509. 
 
 
KUBISKE