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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001637 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019 
TAGS: PREL ECIN KSUM MARR XM XL BR MX CU
SUBJECT: BAHIA SUMMITS, PART 2: BRINGING LATIN AMERICA AND 
THE CARIBBEAN TOGETHER...AROUND CUBA 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 1636 
     ¶B. BRASILIA SEPTEL "THE SURPRISE OF BAHIA: MEXICO 
        COZIES UP TO BRAZIL 
     ¶C. BRASILIA 1301 
     ¶D. BRASILIA 1405 
     ¶E. BRASILIA 1534 
 
BRASILIA 00001637  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. Ambassador Sobel met with ministerial level 
contacts on December 18 and 19 who commented with varying 
degrees of detail on the series of summits (Mercosul, UNASUL, 
Rio Group, and Latin America/Caribbean--CALC) hosted by 
Brazil in Costa do Sauipe, Bahia December 16-17 (Ref A). 
Senior GOB officials stressed that Cuba was the dominant 
issue and played down the anti-United States elements of the 
summits that dominated the press headlines and commentary. 
According to Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, the main purpose 
of the Rio Group and CALC was to begin a process to 
reintegrate Cuba into the hemispheric community and to send a 
message to the new U.S. Administration on the need for an 
overture on Cuba as an essential element of engaging the 
region.  Without such a gesture, Jobim said, the April Summit 
of the Americas (SOA) would be "horrible."  In a separate 
meeting, Mexican Ambassador to Brazil Andres Valencia 
Benavides (protect) also told Ambassador Sobel that an 
overture on Cuba by the Obama Administration was "expected" 
and that, without one, the rest of the SOA agenda would be 
"contaminated."  End summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Lula's Chief of Staff: Region "Can't Leave the United States 
Behind" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (C) In a December 18 meeting with Presidential Chief of 
Staff Minister Gilberto Cavalho (held while President Lula 
was meeting Cuban President Raul Castro in the office next 
door), the Ambassador raised the Bahia meetings, asking about 
Brazil's regional agenda in light of press reports that had 
focused on anti-American comments by a few leaders at this 
Lula-organized event.  Carvalho stated that, while the GOB 
policy has been to seek to diversify its trade relationships, 
it remains undeniable that the United States is Brazil's 
"major partner" and a person "would have to have something 
wrong with his head" to think that Brazil or the region could 
"leave the United States behind."  Carvalho stressed that 
Lula's and other GOB officials' remarks must be taken in the 
context of the Bahia meetings, where the environment was 
"conspiratorial" and Lula was trying to play a moderating 
role.  Brazil's problems with Ecuador and Bolivia have been a 
learning experience, Carvalho said, and Lula now understands 
better the position that the United States is in. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
All About Cuba... 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3. (C) On December 19, Central Bank President Henrique 
Meirelles told Ambassador Sobel that the Bahia meetings were 
"difficult" and complained that they were "all about Cuba, 
Cuba, Cuba."  In a separate meeting, however, Defense 
Minister Nelson Jobim told the Ambassador that the Bahia 
summits had gone well.  UNASUL had approved the South 
American Defense Council, while the CALC had helped solidify 
relations with the region, and especially Mexico (septel). 
Jobim dismissed as "nonsense" comments by Morales about 
expelling U.S. ambassadors, but stressed that there was broad 
confidence among regional leaders that the new U.S. 
Administration should and would make a gesture toward Cuba. 
"The key goal of Bahia," Jobim stated, was to send a message 
that "to get (the hemisphere) together, we have to solve 
Cuba."  "Lula wanted to signal to the United States that 
there is a way to have a strategic alliance with Latin 
America," Jobim continued, and that involves the new 
Administration making a gesture toward Cuba.  Such a gesture 
would start an "irreversible" process in Cuba and would then 
allow other Latin countries to press Cuba. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
...And Regional Leadership 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4. (C) Jobim stressed that Lula had taken a risk in calling 
 
BRASILIA 00001637  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
for a change in Cuba policy by the United States, as his 
leadership position in the region will diminish, while that 
of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez would rise, if no U.S. 
overture on Cuba is forthcoming.  He said that Chavez and 
Bolivian President Evo Morales were opposed to any move 
toward resolution of issues between the United States and 
Cuba.  Chavez had asserted in closed sessions that such an 
overture would "pull a rug out from under him" because his 
discourse is related Cuba.  Without a gesture by the United 
States, Jobim said, the April SOA would be "horrible," and 
Lula would be forced to take a harder line on the issue so 
that Chavez is not strengthened.  The Ambassador asked 
whether Raul Castro even wanted a gesture from the United 
States.  Jobim responded that "we won't know until later." 
But he also said that Cuba's position on engaging the United 
States is closer to Brazil's than to Venezuela's. 
 
¶5. (C) In a December 19 meeting with the Ambassador, Mexican 
Ambassador to Brazil Andres Valencia, just back from Bahia, 
likewise described the summits as a GOB success, saying they 
highlighted Brazilian leadership in the region and President 
Lula's personal role as someone who "can talk to everyone." 
Although the summits solved none of the outstanding problems 
Brazil has with various neighbors, he said, neither did these 
problems "blow up" in any of the meetings.  Valencia reported 
that "only a few" leaders were vocally anti-American, and he 
described Lula's tone with regard to the United States as 
conciliatory, noting that Lula had stated the region needed 
to give the new U.S. Administration time to elaborate its 
policies. 
 
¶6. (C) Asked about Calderon's remarks regarding a possible 
"Union of Latin American and Caribbean Nations," Valencia 
said that it was purely Calderon's idea, and was not 
discussed by other leaders at the meeting.  Benavides 
recognized that the pronouncement had raised questions about 
the Organization of American States (OAS) and the SOA, which 
would have to be dealt with over the next months.  Trinidad 
and Tobago was concerned about the implications of the Bahia 
meetings for the success of the April SOA but he observed 
that neither Trinidad and Tobago nor anyone else mentioned 
the SOA during the meetings.  For its part, Mexico hopes that 
the new CALC forum will eventually become redundant as the 
Rio Group grows in membership and significance, Valencia 
said.  Jamaica is planning to join the Rio Group, and they 
are hopeful other CARICOM countries will, as well.  Venezuela 
had originally offered to host the second CALC, but Mexico 
and Brazil both wanted to avoid having Venezuela lead the 
follow-up process to Bahia.  As a result, a CALC foreign 
ministers meeting will be hosted by Jamaica in 2009, and 
Mexico will host a Rio Group Summit in February 2010 that 
will serve as a follow-up mechanism to the CALC.  Venezuela 
will host the next CALC in 2011. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
Regional Dynamics on Cuba...with Implications for the SOA 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7. (C) In the absence of any other concrete agreement--except 
a decision to meet again--Cuba was the big issue on the 
agenda in Bahia, Valencia said.  It was Brazil that pushed 
for the presidential-level meeting of the Rio Group to 
endorse the decision to admit Cuba, Valencia said.  Such a 
meeting was technically not necessary.  Only one country, 
Peru, had dissented on holding the extra Rio Group meeting, 
and Valencia was certain that Peruvian President Garcia was 
the only leader who did not attend the Bahia summits for 
political reasons, reportedly saying he was not going to sit 
with dictators.  Valencia described the sentiment on the need 
for the United States to lift the embargo against Cuba as 
"universal" among LAC leaders.  The most important thing that 
the new U.S. Administration can do to improve relations with 
the region, Valencia said, is to address Cuba: "Everyone 
expects it."  The results of the Bahia summits with regard to 
Cuba had complicated the scenario for the SOA.  Without a 
change on Cuba policy, Valencia said, the rest of the agenda 
will be contaminated. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment: Jobim's assertion that the purpose for the 
CALC centered on resolving the Cuba issue is a bit of 
revisionist history.  Although from the time it was first 
announced many contacts told us that Cuba would be an 
underlying issue at the CALC, post contacts also repeatedly 
told us that the meeting had no firm agenda and was a 
 
BRASILIA 00001637  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
political exercise aimed gathering the region without any 
"outside" (i.e., non-Latin/Caribbean) influence (reftel C-E). 
 While the "exclusion" of the United States and Canada from 
the CALC dominated press coverage and were widely criticized 
here, the emergent challenge to the United States to change 
our approach to Cuba has broad acceptance in Brazil and seems 
more likely to be the enduring message from Bahia. 
SOBEL