VZCZCXRO3483
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4018/01 3581308
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231308Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0995
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004018 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IZ PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: "THE AX IS ALREADY IN THE HEAD":  RURAL BAGHDAD 
OPTIMISTIC ABOUT ELECTIONS, FEARS IRAN 
 
REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 3791 
     ¶B. B) BAGHDAD 3928 
 
¶1.  (U)  This is an ePRT Baghdad-5 reporting cable.  It is 
Sensitive but Unclassified; handle accordingly.  Not for 
distribution on the Internet. 
¶2.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  In meetings over the past month with 
political, tribal and governmental leaders throughout three 
of Baghdad's rural qadas (districts) -- Abu Ghraib, Taji and 
Tarmiyah -- trends have emerged that mirror, for the most 
part, those observed recently in the capital and elsewhere in 
Iraq (Refs A and B).  First, there has been a movement away 
from sectarian ideology toward a more secular nationalism 
among political leaders; Baghdad Provincial Council (PC) 
candidates have reflected that shift in both public and 
private statements, as well as in their campaign strategy. 
Second, residents from shopkeepers to sheikhs have 
demonstrated strong support for Prime Minister Nouri 
al-Maliki, if not for the Government of Iraq (GOI).  Third, 
there is a palpable fear of Iranian influence in all aspects 
of Iraqi politics and life, leading to broad endorsement of 
the recently-signed Security Agreement (SA) between the USG 
and GOI.  Finally, interlocutors expressed skepticism over 
the ability of the Independent High Electoral Commission of 
Iraq (IHEC) to conduct objective and impartial provincial 
elections in January 2009.  END SUMMARY. 
¶3.  (U) This cable presents views culled from more than 20 
meetings with leaders from three of Baghdad's rural qadas -- 
Abu Ghraib, Taji and Tarmiyah -- conducted by ePRT Baghdad-5 
during November and December. 
DEMISE OF SECTARIAN POLITICS? 
¶4.  (SBU)  Unlike the 2005 elections, which were dominated by 
religious parties pushing sectarian agendas, the 2009 PC 
elections will focus attention on the issues affecting all 
Iraqis:  national reconciliation, jobs, education, essential 
services and security, to name but a few.  This is a common 
refrain, heard among Sunni and Shi,a alike.  The people want 
&stability8 and &unity,8 and are looking for &educated, 
genuine8 leaders who can deliver on the subjects that matter 
the most.  For their part, candidates have displayed an 
understanding of the frustration felt by most Iraqis toward 
their government, and plan to make that dissatisfaction a key 
component of their election campaigns.  Indeed, even the 
incumbents with whom we spoke plan to not only highlight 
their accomplishments while in office but also emphasize 
their differences, real and imagined, wQ the ruling 
parties.  Local residents are, for the most part, 
dissatisfied with current PC members, noting time and again 
that they have not adequately represented the people's 
interests.  &Change8 was a common buzz-word among our 
interlocutors (many had closely followed the US presidential 
elections).  Despite all they have been through over the past 
few years, Iraqis within Abu Ghraib, Taji and Tarmiyah 
repeatedly expressed optimism for the future of their 
country, beginning with the provincial elections, which many 
view as a referendum on the GOI,s performance.  Repeatedly, 
local leaders and those aspiring to seats on the PC 
emphasized the need for both a national view and a focus on 
the issues of importance to local citizens. 
PRAISE FOR MALIKI 
¶5.  (SBU) Whether Shi,a or Sunni, sheikh or shopkeeper, 
residents of the three rural districts praised Prime Minister 
Maliki,s efforts to unite the country and bring an end to 
the sectarian violence that plagued Iraq during 2006 and 
¶2007.  While there was some frustration evidenced at the pace 
of rebuilding and lack of basic services in many parts of the 
Qof rebuilding and lack of basic services in many parts of the 
region the majority of our interlocutors referred to the 
prime minister as &a good person8 who worked to benefit the 
country and not just for his party's interests.  Maliki 
received particularly good marks for his negotiations on the 
SA, where even those most closely allied with the US and 
coalition forces (CF) respected the hard bargain he drove 
with the USG.  Despite strong support for the prime minister, 
the GOI on the whole was viewed as alternately corrupt, 
incompetent and not reflective of the average Iraqi's views. 
Particular contempt was held out for the major religious 
parties in power -- the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 
(ISCI), the Islamic Da,wa Party (Da,wa) and the Iraqi 
Islamic Party (IIP).  Predictions for these parties in Abu 
Ghraib, Taji and Tarmiyah were bleak:  most residents felt 
that the Islamic parties had caused serious harm to the 
country, and were confident that they would not fare well in 
the January elections. 
FEAR OF IRAN 
¶6.  (SBU) One current that ran through all of our discussions 
was a strong fear of Iranian meddling in Iraqi affairs.  For 
the most part, this was not an abstract belief that Iran is 
pulling the strings of certain Iraqi leaders, but an innate, 
deep-seated certainty that Iran will do all in its power to 
destabilize Iraq, whether politically, economically or 
militarily.  As explained in great detail to poloff by a 
 
BAGHDAD 00004018  002 OF 002 
 
 
local sheikh, Iraqis, fear of Iran goes back far beyond the 
Sunni/Shi,a split to the Babylonian period.  According to 
our interlocutors, the primary (and some feel, the only) 
deterrent to Iran is the presence of CF in large numbers. 
Thus, there was virtual unanimity on approval of the SA. 
Stating that &the ax is already in the head,8 a local 
campaign manager for Jamal Karbuli,s Reform and Dialogue 
Movement expressed his view that a quick withdrawal of CF 
would cause irreparable damage to the country and provide an 
opportunity for Iran to send agents and possibly soldiers 
across the border.   Many pointed to the 2005 elections and 
reports that Iran had shipped fraudulent ballots into Iraq. 
There is concern that Iran will act similarly in the upcoming 
PC elections. 
SKEPTICISM OVER IHEC,s IMPARTIALITY 
¶7.  (SBU) Many people questioned the ability of the 
Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC) to act 
as an impartial and objective administrator, noting that its 
employees and election monitors are selected by, and have 
strong allegiances to, the political parties in power.  Yet 
despite generally negative perceptions of IHEC and doubt that 
the PC elections will be free and fair, there is a sense that 
they will be more open and transparent than in the past. 
Additionally, although the list of polling places has yet to 
be published, many Sunni leaders were skeptical that there 
would be sufficient locations in non-Shi,a areas, especially 
since turnout is expected to be high. 
COMMENT 
¶8.  (SBU) The trends we have noticed in Abu Ghraib, Taji and 
Tarmiyah reflect those evident throughout the country.  One 
name that repeatedly surfaced during conversations with both 
Sunni and Shi,a leaders (though more often with Sunni) is 
that of Saleh al-Mutlaq and his National Dialogue Front; 
Mutlaq has a reputation here as an honest broker and one who 
acts in the interests of the Iraqi people.  Lists sponsored 
by Ahmed Abu Reesha, Adnan al-Dulaymi and Jamal Kabuli were 
also popular with Sunni interlocutors, while those supported 
by PM Maliki and former prime minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari 
were often mentioned by Shi,a.  Contempt and disdain were 
showered on the main Islamic parties (ISCI, Da,wa and the 
IIP) and on incumbents, who many feel have not acted in their 
country's interests.  Overall, residents in the area are 
hopeful that the PC elections in January, followed by those 
for nahia and qada councils in the summer and the Council of 
Representatives in the fall, will usher in a new era of peace 
and prosperity for Iraq and its people. 
CROCKER