VZCZCXRO6293
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3923/01 3501137
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 151137Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0866
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003923 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR IZ
SUBJECT: RRT ERBIL: THE PLIGHT OF THE SMALL: YAZEIDI COMMUNITY 
CONCERNS IN KURDISH-DOMINATED AREAS 
 
This message is Sensitive but Unclassified; handle accordingly.  Not 
for distribution on the Internet. 
 
This is an Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) cable. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The supreme leader of the Yazeidis believes that 
association with the Kurdistan Region (rather than the central Iraqi 
government) is better for his community, but resents the top-down 
imposition of KDP-chosen authorities in local communities and the 
diminution of his own powers that association would bring.  He seeks 
greater Yazeidi political representation at the Ministerial level, 
and on Provincial Councils.  Emigration has taken its toll on the 
community, and the leader fears that it will disappear altogether 
from Iraq.  The Yazeidis also fear Islamic fundamentalism and have 
publicly announced their support for U.S. actions in Iraq.   End 
summary. 
 
Yaziedi Demographics 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a meeting with the Kurdistan Region Reconstruction Team 
(RRT) on November 18, Meer (honorific) Tahseen, the "Prince of the 
Yaziedis in Iraq the World and President of the Yaziedi High 
Religious Council" gave an overview of the situation of the Yaziedi 
people in the Dohuk/Mosul region, focused on population trends that 
threaten to make them a minority in their ancestral homes.  He 
stated that there were overall 400,000 to 450,000 Yaziedi in the 
Mosul/Dohuk area.  Yaziedis are in Semel district (in the Dohuk 
Province) and in a number of locations in Mosul.  Using the Shekhan 
district in Mosul as an example of demographic trends, Meer Tahseen 
explained that this district had been 100% Yaziedi in 1930.  Over 
the years Muslims and a few Christians had moved or been relocated 
to the district.  In 1958 the district was 90% Yaziedi, 8% Muslim, 
and 2% Christian.  In 2003 the district was only 70% Yaziedi and 28% 
Muslim, with Christians still only 2%.  In places such as Semel the 
shifts were even larger - Yaziedis are now only 50% in an area where 
they were predominant. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Meer Tahseen fears that the Yaziedi community may disappear 
from Iraq altogether.  Some 150,000 were in Europe and another 1,000 
in Canada and the United States.   He called his inability to help 
his people a tragic position to be in as the leader of his nation. 
 
 
KRG-KDP Control 
--------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Meer Tahseen explained that all local officials in 
Shekhan, including the local heads of political parties, were 
assigned by the KDP.  All except the "municipalities' boss" were 
Muslim.  After the 2003 invasion, the KRG had taken over 200 
government houses.  If a (Muslim) Kurdish family wanted to live in 
Shekhan, he explained, the authorities would give him land - but not 
to Christians or Yaziedis.   Land, in fact, was being given out to 
peshmerga and to police - and only 2% of the police force was 
Christian or Yaziedi.   According to Meer Tahseen, the KRG is afraid 
that Yaziedis will ask for autonomy (like the Christians), so they 
were trying to send more Muslims to the area.  In response to the 
question of whether local authorities in Mosul are named by the 
Mosul Governor, Meer Tahseen stated that "the KDP decides." 
 
 
Yaziedis in Provincial Elections 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Although Meer Tahseen was disappointed with the decision on 
minority seats in the Council of Representatives-approved Provincial 
Elections Law, the Yaziedi will not boycott the elections.  (He 
explained that as part of the Kurdistan Alliance they would not want 
to "cause any problems.")  The Yaziedis had originally asked for 
five seats for the Mosul Provincial Council and the PUK/KDP in the 
Qfive seats for the Mosul Provincial Council and the PUK/KDP in the 
Council of Representatives (CoR) had supported their demand, but 
others had not.  Now they only have one seat.  Meer Tahseen 
explained that the Yaziedi would not form their own political party; 
they did not think it appropriate for political parties to have an 
express religious affiliation.  (He also offered that the KDP "would 
not let them" form their own party.) 
 
Appropriate Representation 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Asked which party would best represent the Yaziedi, Meer 
Tahseen said that, overall, the Yaziedi were best represented by the 
KDP and PUK.  There were Yaziedi members of these parties, which 
were secular and Kurdish (and the Yaziedi consider themselves 
ethnically Kurdish).  At the same time, Meer Tahseen confided his 
fear that some KDP leaders were in fact deeply Muslim and could 
constitute a threat.  If the Yaziedi community had to choose between 
being part of the KR or part of Iraq, it would choose the KR - 
"better to be 12% of the population than 2%." 
 
BAGHDAD 00003923  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Returning to the question of political representation, 
Meer Tahseen said that the Iraqi Constitution (which has special 
provisions for ethnic groups) did not specifically protect them, 
although it did provide for freedom of religion.  He affirmed that 
the Yaziedi community was able to practice its religion without 
hindrance; nonetheless, it "lacked rights."  More Ministerial 
representation and more representation in the Kurdistan National 
Assembly were needed.  One way to improve Yaziedi political 
representation would be for the KDP and PUK to put more Yaziedi 
candidates on their lists and push for Yaziedi candidates for the 
Provincial Councils. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Meer Tahseen affirmed his support for the United States 
and explained that he had publicly supported the invasion - even 
before it was a sure thing that Saddam's regime would be toppled. 
He voiced his fears of Islamic extremism and stated that Al-Qaeda 
would kill Yaziedis for their association with Americans.   Asked 
about the Islamic parties in the KR, Meer Tahseen said pragmatically 
"they won't eat with us or have anything to do with us - but at 
least they don't kill us like Al-Qaeda."  However, Meer Tahseen did 
state his belief that members of AQI groups (e.g., Ansar al-Islam) 
have infiltrated the PUK and KDP. 
 
Approach to Barzani 
------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Concerning the draft Kurdistan Region Constitution, Meer 
Tahseen explained that he had sent a letter to President Barzani 
explaining Yaziedi views; he thought that there would be a positive 
response and respect for their "rights" in the Constitution.  On the 
Personal Status Law, the Yaziedi community is drafting its own 
Personal Status Code (as is permitted by Article 41).  This will be 
submitted to the Kurdistan National Assembly for ratification. 
 
¶10.  (U) Note:  On November 19, the KRG announced the opening of a 
special directorate within the Ministry of Religious Affairs, headed 
by a Yaziedi Director General.  A Yaziedi commentator on the event 
expressed the hope that special attention might be paid to renewing 
confidence between Yaziedis and their elected representatives in the 
KNA, restoring and protecting the Lalish holy shrine; and 
strengthening the Yaziedi cultural heritage. End note. 
 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Historically oppressed and shunned, Yaziedis now enjoy a 
measure of autonomy over their own affairs and tolerance within the 
Kurdistan Region and areas controlled by the Kurdish political 
parties.  However, the toll of emigration has been severe on the 
Yaziedi, particularly given the absolute strictness with which 
marriage within religion and within caste is enforced.  Anecdotal 
reports abound of Yaziedi men and women finding themselves facing a 
"choice" of only one eligible mate; in some instances there are no 
eligible mates, in which case their fate is lifetime bachelor or 
spinsterhood. 
 
¶12. (SBU) As a traditional leader, the Meer is seeking to navigate 
the new opportunities for "democracy" and "rights" to the benefit of 
his people; but his aspirations do not always coincide with the 
top-down power distribution of the KDP/PUK political system to which 
the community is politically bound.