VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #3865/01 3461117
ZNR UUUUU ZZH(CCY ADDED SENSITIVE AD0A7C77/MSI7363)
R 111117Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0789

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 003865 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (ADDED SENSITIVE CAPTION) 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PARM PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION (CWD) ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ: 
PROGRAMS, PROGRESS, PROSPECTS 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: With one of the highest levels of 
landmine and unexploded ordnance contamination in the world, and 
possibly millions of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) in the 
hands of insurgent groups, militias and private citizens, Iraq has 
struggled to make progress in reducing the impact of conventional 
weapons on its citizens.  Since 2003, the U.S. (working through the 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement, PM/WRA) has invested over $132 million to help Iraqis 
free themselves from the humanitarian and economic impact of 
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). This funding has been successful in 
the clearing of over 14 million square meters of land and over 
140,000 pieces of ordnance; the destruction of over 19,000 
confiscated weapons, the initiation of the ongoing Landmine Impact 
Survey (LIS), Victim Assistance Programs; and Mine Risk Education 
for thousands of Iraqis. 
 
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY AND COMMENT CONTINUED:  PM/WRA and Embassy Baghdad 
are focused now on improving Iraqi capacity and political desire to 
take ownership and to exercise direction of Iraq's National Mine 
Action Program, as well as on discouraging an ill-conceived Ministry 
of Defense plan to take over humanitarian demining.  Fitful efforts 
by the GoI to take the lead in addressing these issues are beginning 
to achieve some modest results.  Post and PM/WRA will continue the 
effort to guide Iraq toward independence in humanitarian demining 
and related fields, including by encouraging an effective division 
of labor between military and civilian programs.  END SUMMARY 
 
U.S. INITIATIVES 
---------------- 
 
 
3.(SBU) Although the full extent of the problem of explosive 
remnants of war is still unclear, existing information shows Iraq to 
be one of the most seriously contaminated in the world.  Conflicts 
with Iran in the 1980s and coalition forces in 1991 and again in 
2003, as well as Saddam-era campaigns against Iraq's Kurdish 
population and internal fighting since 2003, have left large areas 
virtually unusable.  Some international estimates put the number of 
landmines remaining in Iraqi territory as high as 25 million. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In 2007, the Department established a temporary two-person 
CWD office at U.S. Embassy Baghdad.  The primary duties of this 
office include serving as the CWD strategic planning advisors to the 
Embassy, Iraqi Ministries, International Organizations (IOs), 
Coalition Forces (CF) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). 
CWD advisors oversee numerous PM/WRA in-country programs and assist 
Iraqi ministries in developing plans for the removal and destruction 
of conventional weapons and munitions including landmines, 
unexploded ordnance, abandoned ordnance, man portable air defense 
systems (MANPADS) and SA/LW. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In addition, the CWD office develops the governance 
capability of the Iraq National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), 
assists in developing tactical plans for CWD in the Iraqi oil fields 
within the Ministry of Electricity, Environment, Oil and others as 
required.  To date this office has had oversight of $25 million in 
funding for Humanitarian Mine Action activities in Iraq, provided 
direction in the clearance of 14,209,403 square meters of land, the 
survey of 1,019,667 square meters of land, the destruction of over 
12,000 mines and 137,089 pieces of UXO. 
 
¶6. (SBU) From 2003 through 2008, the U.S. Government provided more 
than $132 million, while other governments and assistance 
organizations contributed another $21 million toward conventional 
weapons destruction in Iraq.  While the Conventional Munitions 
Clearance Program, through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, made 
QClearance Program, through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, made 
initial progress, large stockpiles of conventional munitions were 
left unsecured and available to Iraqi insurgent groups, and the 
problem of large areas littered with mines and unexploded ordnance 
was only partially addressed. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The GoI, through U.S. technical and financial assistance, 
formed the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) under the Ministry 
of Planning and Development Cooperation with overall responsibility 
for mine action policy, planning, coordination and budget management 
for clearance, mine-risk education and landmine survivors' 
assistance.  Although the NMAA was to be responsible for mine action 
in all of Iraq, the Kurdish Regional Government assumed control over 
mine action in the three northern governorates in 2004 and has 
retained responsibility since that time. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Working initially with expatriate advisors, the NMAA 
formulated policies of accreditation for mine action organizations 
and even developed a strategic plan in 2004 to begin prioritizing 
mine and unexploded munitions clearance.  However, as security 
deteriorated in 2005 and 2006, charges of corruption were made 
against the director and senior staff, and a series of internal 
problems surfaced; the effectiveness of the NMAA rapidly declined. 
Finally, in June 2007, the GoI closed the agency entirely, pending 
the eventual decision on a new ministry to take charge of mine 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Through PM/WRA, the Department has lead the CWD effort in 
Iraq, funding several initiatives to build capacity, clear and 
return land, and destroy weapons and munitions. Initial U.S. funding 
to build clearance capacity amounted primarily to strengthening 
existing mine and unexploded ordnance clearance organizations, with 
over $15 million funded to the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), a UK 
based NGO in northern Iraq, as well as to develop new clearance 
organizations in the central and southern portions of the country. 
Additionally, efforts were made to increase capacity within the GoI 
as well as to nurture an Iraqi non-governmental organization, the 
Iraqi Mine/UXO Clearance Organization (IMCO) - which has yielded 
strong results. 
 
¶10. (SBU) A significant amount of U.S. funding has gone into 
establishing and sustaining IMCO.  IMCO continues as the only active 
clearance organization outside of the Kurdistan region, despite 
funding shortages throughout 2006 and 2007 that reduced its 
operations to basic life support and limited and sporadic clearance 
activities.  With a current strength of about 200 technically 
capable personnel, IMCO has the capacity to double its numbers in a 
relatively short period of time. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Through 2007, all U.S. financial support for IMCO had been 
channeled through a contracted technical advisor team, but this year 
IMCO took its first steps toward becoming a more independent 
organization with the start of direct funding grants for FY 08. 
Improvements in security have enabled IMCO to increase its operating 
tempo, conducting various clearance projects with the direct grants 
as well as funds from other sources.  PM/WRA has also provided IMCO 
$897,865 for the development of a mobile SA/LW destruction 
capability which, aimed at reducing the number of poorly-secured, 
excess and confiscated weapons in the hands of Iraqi security forces 
and Coalition Forces. To date over 19,000 of these targeted weapons 
have been destroyed. While IMCO represents a major success story, 
its future is under challenge from several directions. 
 
¶12. (SBU) IMCO is scheduled to lose the lease on its present 
training and weapons destruction facility in Baghdad shortly.  Due 
to the impending loss of its lease, IMCO has had to refuse incoming 
shipments of confiscated weapons and is now actively looking for an 
alternate location in Baghdad while simultaneously re-opening a site 
in Basrah.  Moreover, there is a move afoot within the Ministry of 
Defense to have it, and all other humanitarian de-mining efforts, 
subordinated under MOD control. Embassy Baghdad is working to turn 
around this MOD initiative. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Meanwhile MAG, which began working in northern Iraq in the 
early 1990s, has expanded its capabilities, and moved from a primary 
focus on humanitarian demining to the more balanced approach, giving 
equal emphasis to destruction of conventional munitions and SA/LW. 
As the most established clearance organization in Iraq operating in 
a relatively permissive security environment, MAG has a 
well-established infrastructure that is staffed primarily by Iraqi 
nationals with a limited number of expatriate technical advisors and 
senior managers, numbering as many as 750 personnel. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Since 2004 the U.S. Government has provided over $4 
million for the Iraq Landmine Impact Survey, which has identified 
over 8,500 dangerous areas and 1,600 affected communities in 
thirteen of Iraq's eighteen governorates.  Although suspended in 
2006, the LIS has begun again, and will complete the remaining 
governorates of Al Anbar, Ninewa, Salah ad Din, Baghdad, and Diyala. 
Qgovernorates of Al Anbar, Ninewa, Salah ad Din, Baghdad, and Diyala. 
 
 
TOWARD GOI LEADERSHIP 
--------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) In early 2008, the GoI decided to transfer responsibility 
for mine action to the Ministry of the Environment, but to this 
point, progress under the Ministry has been extremely limited. 
Minister of the Environment Narmin Othman Hassan, who has little 
experience in the mine action field and who must devote much of her 
time to duties as Minister of Women's Affairs, has expressed 
frustration with the pace of progress.  Deputy Minister Dr. Kamal 
Hussein Lateef has spent most of the year studying the proposed 
structure of the National Authority, now known as the Mine Action 
Directorate, and looking for a capable Director General. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Progress has also been hampered by the sporadic nature of 
assistance from the UNDP Senior Mine Action Advisor, who is based in 
Amman and visits Baghdad only periodically.  Minister Hassan has 
also recently rejected the nominee recommended by both her deputy 
and UNDP for Director General, potentiall delaying the 
reestablishment of a NMAA. Recently there has been growing interest 
by the GoI to include the Ministry of Defense in Iraqi demining 
programs and meetings are currently being held to decide the 
direction this effort may take. 
 
¶17. (SBU) One positive development has been the Minister of 
Environment's proposal to employ up to 500 unemployed people from 
the Basrah governorate as mine action workers.  With very little 
 
clearance infrastructure remaining in Basrah, the plan poses 
significant, but manageable problems.  IMCO has committed to 
training and employing 100 people in a pilot project that would lead 
to the mapping of most minefields in the southern governorates over 
the twelve-month period of the project.  UNDP has also proposed a 
similar effort through the NGO Rafidain Demining Organization (RDO) 
but is unlikely to be able to deliver in the next six to twelve 
months, given the limitations of RDO and the limited presence of 
UNDP mine action personnel in Iraq. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Nonetheless, IMCO has moved forward with plans to 
reestablish a base of operations near Basrah which will support the 
Ministry of Environment's employment project.  Moreover, the project 
will position IMCO for potential projects that support the expansion 
of oil production and exploration in the south, where many oilfields 
and production facilities are seriously contaminated with mines and 
ordnance. 
 
PROSPECTS 
--------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) As the GoI continues to grapple with developing a coherent 
approach to the problem of mine and unexploded ordnance 
contamination, there are several reasons to be concerned about the 
slow pace of advance.  Foremost is the humanitarian imperative for 
removing these hazards as quickly as possible.  Although there are 
no reliable estimates for how many civilian casualties are caused 
annually, conservative estimates put the figure at about 300 victims 
each year.  Anecdotally, in one village of less than one thousand 
people living along the Iranian border there are known to be at 
least thirty children who are landmine victims, and the actual 
number throughout the country could conceivably number in the tens 
of thousands. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Second, as the security situation in the country has 
steadily improved, reconstruction and development projects have 
again begun grow in number.  Without an effective coordination body 
within the GoI, there is still no mechanism for prioritizing and 
contracting the clearance work that is needed.  Unless more money is 
allocated to a central coordinating body, mine and ordnance 
clearance could depend more on who is willing to pay the most, 
resulting in emphasis on economically profitable demining at the 
expense of other less profitable but equally important projects. 
 
 
¶21. (SBU) Finally, with only limited clearance capabilities existing 
throughout most of the country, expansion of this capacity is 
becoming more urgent.  The GoI has the financial resources to 
support expansion, but so far it has not done much to support or 
promote this need.  Post and PM/WRA will continue the effort to 
guide Iraq toward independence in humanitarian demining and related 
fields, including by encouraging an effective division of labor 
between military and civilian programs. 
 
CROCKER