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Viewing cable 08ATHENS1617, GREECE/IRAQ: U.S.-IRAQ AGREEMENTS AND GOG

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ATHENS1617 2008-12-03 13:23 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Athens
VZCZCXRO7417
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIHL RUEHIK
RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR
RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTH #1617 3381323
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031323Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2863
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS ATHENS 001617 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID ECON EFIN GR IZ PGOV PREL UNSC
SUBJECT: GREECE/IRAQ: U.S.-IRAQ AGREEMENTS AND GOG 
ASSISTANCE 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 126109 
     B. ATHENS 1572 
     C. 07 ATHENS 872 
 
1. (SBU) During a wide-ranging initial call, DCM Deborah 
McCarthy discussed ref A points on the U.S.-Iraq Agreements 
with MFA A6 Middle East Directorate head Ambassador Vassilis 
Papaioannou.  Papaioannou was already aware of the agreements 
through the Greek Embassy in Baghdad, though he nevertheless 
appreciated our update.  He said Greece was glad to see the 
agreements finalized.  They would add "greater stability and 
predictability" to the situation. 
 
2. (SBU) DCM also took the opportunity to thank Papaioannou 
for his role in conceiving and organizing the training of ten 
young Iraqi diplomats at the Greek MFA Diplomatic Academy in 
November (ref B).  Papaioannou said that, while Greece was 
unable to provide troops in Iraq, it wished to assist the new 
Iraqi government and the Iraqi people and was doing so 
through a number of humanitarian and other assistance 
programs.  He noted, amongst other efforts, Greece's role in 
the EU's training of 1,800 Iraqi judges and Greece's recent 
forgiving of Iraq's debt, which Papaioannou said had been 
tough politically.  (NOTE: For other Greek equipment 
donations and assistance to Iraq, see ref C.  END NOTE.) 
Papaioannou also mentioned that the Iraqis were appreciative 
that Greece never closed its Embassy in Baghdad, despite the 
difficult security situation at times.  This also had a good 
impact on other Arab countries' views of Greece. 
 
3. (SBU) Finally, on Iraq, Papaioannou said that recent 
reports from their Embassy indicated the situation in Iraq 
was "not negative."  They believed that PM Maliki was sincere 
in his efforts to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq -- it was 
"not just for show."  Nevertheless, tensions remained -- 
particularly between the north and other parts of the 
country, but these were not "threatening." 
 
SPECKHARD