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O 220848Z DEC 08
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002522 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL, DRL/IRF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI KDEM OSCE KZ
SUBJECT:  KAZAKHSTAN:  CIVIL SOCIETY LEADER ZHOVTIS:  "I'D RATHER 
ASSIST THAN RESIST, BUT..." 
 
ASTANA 00002522  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY:  During a December 18 meeting in Almaty with the 
Ambassador, Kazakhstan International Human Rights Bureau Director 
Yevgeniy Zhovtis offered his views on democracy, human rights, and 
the political situation in Kazakhstan.  Zhovtis argued that 
Kazakhstan's ruling elite are motivated to hold on to political 
power to protect their wealth, which has neither been legalized nor 
legitimized in the public's eye.  Until the elite feel their wealth 
is secure, they will impede democratization.  Zhovtis was not 
optimistic about the impact of the new Bolashak generation, arguing 
that they are cynical and focused on their careers, and have a 
narrower perspective than earlier generations.  He said the United 
States can help by consistently promoting American values and 
continuing to be involved in specific human rights cases.  Zhovtis 
dismissed sanctions as a way to promote democracy in Kazakhstan. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
RULING ELITE FOCUSED ON WEALTH PRESERVATION 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador asked Zhovtis how Kazakhstan's history has 
affected the country's development and the development of civil 
society.  In response, Zhovtis said that Central Asia can not be 
described as part of Asia proper and would more accurately be called 
"Soviet Asia," since the Soviet Union destroyed Central Asia's 
traditional Asian way of life and introduced communism, a foreign 
ideology.  During the Soviet period, Kazakhs held to two levels of 
morality:  the public, communist ideology -- which no one actually 
believed in -- and private beliefs in Kazakh family traditions.  The 
latter allowed Kazakhs to maintain a sense of right and wrong in 
their personal lives.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
public communist ideology disappeared, but nothing took its place. 
The new post-communist, ruling elite are focused on money -- a focus 
that has destroyed the system of private Kazakh values and morals. 
The new ruling elite's view of the public is the same as in Soviet 
times:  the public is to be controlled and managed, not allowed to 
think and act independently. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The ruling elite, Zhovtis argued, maintain political power 
to preserve their wealth.  They are now struggling with how to 
legalize their wealth, as well as how to legitimize it in the eyes 
of the public.   Zhovtis descrQed a vicious circle at play:  if the 
ruling elite cannot find a way to legalize and legitimize -- and 
thus protect -- their wealth, they will not build up legal and 
judicial institutions that could in turn threaten their wealth.  The 
ruling elite will not allow a fundamental change of political power, 
since such a change could put their wealth and security at risk. 
Thus, he concluded, genuine democratization is not possible. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Zhovtis said he did not agree with the argument, often put 
forward by the government, that developing democracy and civil 
society has to take a long time in Kazakhstan.  Rather, he 
maintained, a country needs to make a fundamental choice upfront 
about which path it will follow.  Then, step by step, the country 
should follow that path.  Zhovtis noted that Kazakhstan's transition 
from a centrally planned economy to a market economy was completed 
in less than 15 years.  Thus, he asked rhetorically, why has there 
not been more success in the areas of political, judicial, and 
democratic development?  The answer is the nexus of ill-gotten 
wealth and political power.  Pointing again to the fact that there 
was rapid development and acceptance of private enterprise, Zhovtis 
also disagreed with the notion that Kazakhstan's "national 
mentality" prevents a quicker transition to democracy. 
 
PESSIMISM ABOUT THE FUTURE GENERATION 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Ambassador asked Zhovtis about his hopes for the future 
generation, especially the Bolashak scholars who are sent to study 
abroad at government expense.  Zhovtis was less than optimistic.  He 
said that in his experience, he has found it easier to deal with the 
older Soviet generation working in the government than the Bolashak 
generation.  The Bolashaks receive good higher education abroad, but 
they tend to have a less global perspective than the older 
generations, he maintained, because of the weakness of Kazakhstan's 
 
ASTANA 00002522  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
post-Soviet education.  Zhovtis argued that putting the issue of 
ideology aside, the Soviet education system was better than 
Kazakhstan's current educational system.  In Soviet times, the 
educational system offered a strong historical and global 
perspective, as well as good specialty training, and people were 
taught to think logically and analyze cause and effect.  Today's 
young generation is not being taught the basics of logic and 
analytical thinking, he averred.  The Bolashaks, Zhovtis maintained, 
tend to be stronger in concrete fields, like finance and business, 
than in more theoretical areas, like law.  In general, Zhovtis said 
many Bolashaks are cynical and are more focused on having a career 
and making money than on learning.  He suggested that perhaps it is 
wrong to expect to put the burden on the Bolashak generation to lead 
the country to a better future. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Zhovtis stressed he was not trying to insinuate that 
everything is wrong in the country, but the Kazakhstani state 
remains based on the personality of President Nazarbayev, and there 
is an inherent lack of trust in the system, which is built on 
self-protection.  The Ambassador asked if anyone in the government 
understands this problem.  Zhovtis responded that Foreign Minister 
Tazhin, Presidential Administration Deputy Head Maulen Ashimbayev, 
and perhaps a few others understand, but said there is not much they 
can do. 
 
RELIGION LAW:  MEANS TO RESTRICT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION? 
 
¶8. (SBU) Zhovtis told the Ambassador that the human rights situation 
in Kazakhstan is linked to three factors: legislation, institutions, 
and procedures and practices.  Legislation, he contended, is getting 
worse each year.  Each new law affords less protection and is open 
to broader interpretation.  The government assumes that control is 
the best way to ensure security.  Despite the government's claims to 
the contrary, the new religion law (which the President has not yet 
signed) has nothing to do with fighting extremism and offers no new 
tools with which to fight extremist elements, Zhovtis argued. 
Instead, he suspects the law could be a means for the government to 
restrict freedom of association in general. 
 
UNITED STATES SHOULD PROMOTE AMERICAN VALUES 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Ambassador asked Zhovtis how the United States could 
better promote human rights in Kazakhstan.  Zhovtis suggested three 
approaches.  First, the United States should clearly articulate and 
promote American values.  This does not necessarily mean criticizing 
the Kazakhstani ruling elite, but it does mean not allowing them to 
twist American values.  Second, the United States must ensure that 
international organizations such as the OSCE and the United Nations 
promote an international definition of human rights for member 
states and not allow states to "self-define" human rights.  Third, 
the United States should continue to follow closely and get involved 
in specific cases related to human rights.  He referred to several 
pending cases, including the criminal cases against opposition 
figures Bulat Abilov, Asylbek Kozhakhmetov, and Tolen Tokhtasynov; 
recent attempts by government authorities to try to tax grant money 
disbursed to NGOs by the National Endowment for Democracy; and the 
situation of the nearly 350 Kazakhstani refugees in the Czech 
Republic.  [NOTE:  According to Zhovtis, about 80 Kazakh families 
associated with unregistered mosques have sought refuge in the Czech 
Republic, where the courts are beginning to deny most of their 
requests for political asylum.  END NOTE.] 
 
SANCTIONS WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE 
 
¶10. (SBU) Zhovtis argued that sanctions against Kazakhstan would be 
an ineffective lever to promote democracy.  He again reiterated that 
democratization would put the power  -- and thus the wealth and 
property -- of the ruling elite at risk.  Thus, the ruling elite 
would rather defy sanctions than yield to them and allow progress on 
democracy.  Although Russia does not exert day-to-day influence on 
the views of the Kazakhstani ruling elite, and elites are not 
particularly enamored of Putin's system, Zhovtis said, they 
nevertheless see Russia's growing authoritarianism as an example of 
how to preserve their own power and wealth.  "They look in the 
 
ASTANA 00002522  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Russian mirror and see themselves."  It would be better for the 
United States to try to persuade the ruling elite that the current 
political system is unstable and will be even harder to fix in the 
future if no action is taken now, Zhovtis argued. 
 
PREFER TO ASSIST THE ELITE, RATHER THAN RESIST THEM 
 
¶11. (SBU) Zhovtis said it was difficult to predict which political 
trends will prevail in Kazakhstan.  If the ruling elite can engage 
the public and try to build institutions, the result will be a more 
stable system.  However, if Nazarbayev remains "the gatekeeper," it 
is very difficult to predict what will happen.  The system is 
already less efficient and capable than previously.  Failure to 
create democratic institutions threatens to undermine the economy 
and exacerbate the lack of true rule of law.  In his parting remarks 
to the Ambassador, Zhovtis stressed that he personally would prefer 
to "assist than resist" the ruling elite in building democratic 
institutions in Kazakhstan but, in fact, spends 90% of his time 
"resisting." 
 
¶12.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Zhovtis is an impressive and articulate 
analyst.  We agree that building truly democratic institutions would 
threaten the unregulated fortunes that the elite built during the 
initial phases of privatization following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  We are not, however, quite as pessimistic as Zhovtis about 
the Bolashak generation.  Certainly, they will be tempered by the 
system as they work to rise in their careers, but we believe some 
will indeed eventually make a difference.  END COMMENT. 
 
HOAGLAND