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UNCLAS ANKARA 002151 
 
S/CT FOR RHONDA SHORE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PTER TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: 2008 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: STATE 120019 
 
 
¶1. Domestic and transnational terrorist groups have 
targeted Turkish nationals and foreigners in Turkey, 
including, on occasion, USG personnel, for more than 40 
years. Terrorist groups that operated in Turkey have included 
Kurdish separatist, Marxist-Leninist, radical Islamist, and 
pro-Chechen groups. Terrorism in Turkey is defined in the 
Anti-Terror Law #3713 (TMK, 1991). "Terrorist" activities are 
composed primarily of crimes outlined in the Penal Code 
committed within the context of terrorist group activities, 
which target the structure of the state, changing or 
destroying the principles of the state, and aiming to create 
panic and terror in society. Thus, Turkish law defines 
terrorism as attacks against Turkish citizens and the Turkish 
state, and hampers Turkey,s ability to interdict those who 
would target non-combatants globally. This, and the 
government,s focus on the PKK, present the major challenges 
for enhanced terrorist cooperation. 
 
¶2. Most prominent among terrorist groups in Turkey is the 
Kongra-Gel/Kurdistan Worker's Party (KGK/PKK). Composed 
primarily of Kurds with a separatist agenda, the KGK/PKK 
operated from bases in northern Iraq and directed its forces 
to target mainly Turkish security forces. In 2006, 2007, and 
2008, KGK/PKK violence claimed hundreds of Turkish lives. 
The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), a group designated under 
E.O. 13224, is affiliated with the KGK/PKK and has claimed 
responsibility for a series of deadly attacks on Turkish and 
foreign citizens in Turkish cities in recent years. On 19 
February 2008, TAK announced it would engage in a renewed 
campaign of violence in Turkey. Both TAK and PKK claimed 
responsibility for a car bomb on 19 August at a Mersin police 
checkpoint and for a 23 August car bomb in a residential area 
of Izmir. PKK also claimed responsibility for a car bomb in 
Diyarbakir on 3 January, which killed six civilians and 
wounded 70; it apologized for this attack, claiming that the 
attackers were PKK members acting independently of orders. 
 
¶3. In the midst of weeks of violence, during which KGK/PKK 
attacks claimed scores of killed or wounded Turkish soldiers 
and citizens, the Turkish parliament on October 17, 2007, 
overwhelmingly passed a motion authorizing cross-border 
military operations against KGK/PKK targets in northern Iraq. 
Turkish forces carried out extensive operations along the 
Turkey-Iraq border in the latter part of the year. On 
November 5th, President Bush committed to provide Turkey 
"real-time, actionable intelligence" to counter the KGK/PKK 
in northern Iraq. Throughout 2008, Turkey continued to carry 
out strikes along the Turkey-Iraq border with increasing 
frequency. In February, the Turks launched ground 
operations into northern Iraq, targeting PKK locations, and 
then disengaging by the end of the month. The Turkish 
government claims that during 2008, 657 PKK members were 
killed, 161 were captured, and 161 surrendered in skirmishes. 
In addition, 120 PKK members turned themselves over to 
Turkish authorities under the terms of a repentance law 
passed in 2005. 
 
¶4. Other prominent terrorist groups in Turkey included the 
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), a 
militant Marxist-Leninist group with anti-U.S. and anti-NATO 
views that seeks the violent overthrow of the Turkish state; 
and Turkish Hizballah (not affiliated with Lebanese 
Hizballah), an organization of Sunni Kurds with a violent 
history. The Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C) is 
a decentralized Islamic revivalist group that was 
particularly active in the 1990s; it claimed ties with 
al-Qaida. A previously unknown terrorist organization, 
Revolutionary Headquarters (Devrimci Karargah), an apparently 
Marxist organization espousing an anti-imperialist, 
anti-Zionist agenda, conducted two attacks in Istanbul in 
2008, against political and military targets. News Reports 
claim that this organization has merged with the remains of a 
formerly active and bloody organization, DEV-SOL 
(Revolutionary Left). 
 
¶5. Investigations into an organization named Ergenekon, 
allegedly composed of former military officials, bureaucrats, 
politicians, journalists, and underworld figures, began in 
2007, leading to arrests in the summer of 2008. Alleged 
members of Ergenekon are on trial for a number of crimes 
including terrorism charges. The details of the case are 
murky, however, and Ergenekon,s status as a terrorist 
organization is under debate. 
 
¶6. Islamic radicals continue to target US and foreign 
personnel in Turkey. On 9 July 2008, four gunmen attacked 
the US consulate in Istanbul, killing three police officers. 
The Turkish government arrested four alleged compatriots of 
the attackers in the following days and claims that the 
gunmen were affiliated with Al-Qaida. Earlier in the year, 
the Turkish National Police (TNP) and the National 
Intelligence Organization (MIT) conducted a successful series 
of raids against suspected Al-Qaida affiliated terrorists. 
In January, police raids in Gaziantep against an alleged 
al-Qaida cell ended in firefights, leading to the deaths of 
four suspects and the arrests of another 18. Follow-on raids 
in April led to the detention of an additional 35 people; 24 
were indicted. In mid-December, the Turks arrested another 
60 suspected al-Qaida members in Istanbul, Izmir, and Manisa. 
 
¶7. Turkey has consistently supported Coalition efforts in 
Afghanistan. After commanding International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) II in 2002 and ISAF VII in 2005, 
Turkey led the joint rotational command of the ISAF in 
Afghanistan for the Capital Regional Command from April to 
December 2007. Turkey is fielding a civilian Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Wardak Province. It has also 
undertaken training of Afghan police officials, politicians, 
and bureaucrats in Turkey. 
 
¶8. Turkey has provided significant logistical support to 
Coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, authorizing the 
use of Incirlik Air Base as an air-refueling hub for OEF and 
OIF and as a cargo hub to transport non-lethal cargo to U.S. 
troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Almost 60 percent of air 
cargo for U.S. troops in Iraq transits Incirlik. 
Establishment of this hub allows six C-17 aircraft to 
transport the amount of goods it took nine to ten aircraft to 
move from Germany, and saves the United States almost $160 
million per year. Between one-third and two-thirds of the 
fuel destined for the Iraqi people and more than 25 percent 
of fuel for Coalition Forces transits from Turkey into Iraq 
via the Habur Gate border crossing. Turkey was active in 
reconstruction efforts, including providing electricity to 
Iraq. Turkey contributed headquarters personnel to the NATO 
Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) and completed military 
leadership training in Turkey for 89 Iraqi officers as a 
further contribution to the NATO NTM-I. 
 
¶9. The Turkish government has proposed a number of reforms 
to its counterterrorism and intelligence structure. The 
reform proposals predate 2008, but were given a sharper focus 
following a PKK attack in October against a military outpost 
at Aktutun in southeastern Turkey. The proposals are still 
in the formative stage, but will probably include the 
establishment of a body within the Ministry of Interior ) 
the Undersecretariat for Security ) to better coordinate 
counterterrorism efforts, intelligence, and policy. It is 
expected that in the restructuring, the Jandarma ) a force 
jointly administered by the military and the Ministry of 
Interior ) would be placed fully under civilian control. 
 
¶10. In October 2006, a new law went into effect giving 
MASAK, Turkey,s Financial Crimes Investigation Board, sole 
responsibility for financial investigation of money 
laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/FT). In its 
February 2007 peer review report, the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) evaluated Turkish standards to combat ML/FT. 
Among its major findings was that although the new 
legislation has been in place only a short time, the number 
of convictions for money laundering was relatively low, 
confiscation measures have not yet produced substantial 
results, and the number of suspicious transaction reports was 
also relatively low. 

¶11. Pursuant to its obligations under UNSCR 1267 and 
subsequent resolutions, Turkish officials continued to 
circulate UN and U.S.-designated names of terrorists to all 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and to financial 
institutions. Only UN-listed names, however, were subjected 
to asset freezes enforced through a Council of Ministers 
decree. This legal mechanism for enforcing sanctions under 
UNSCR 1267 was challenged in Turkish courts by UN-designated 
terrorist financier Yasin al-Kadi, whose assets had been 
frozen by the state. Following a series of legal action, the 
decree freezing his assets has been successfully challenged 
but is still in effect pending appeal. 
 
¶12. Point of contact: Jason Arvey (ArveyJM@state.gov) 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk  ey 
 
Jeffrey