VZCZCXRO1569
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAS #1320/01 3551723
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201723Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6763
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0801
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1137
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 6596
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2968
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2623
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 7482

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001320 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/CT - RSHORE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
 
TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS AEMR PGOV AG
 
SUBJECT: ALGERIA: 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 124815 B. STATE 120019 
 
¶1. (U) The security situation in Algeria was marked by a decrease in 
the number of high profile terrorist attacks throughout the country 
compared with 2007, although the overall number of attacks did not 
decline and ongoing low-level terrorist activities continued in the 
countryside.  In the first half of 2008 there was a lull in attacks by 
terrorist groups as security forces stepped up their operations 
following the December 2007 bombing of the UN headquarters in Algiers. 
There was a dramatic rise in terrorist attacks during the month of 
August, however, with at least 79 people killed in various incidents 
across northeastern Algeria, most of them in suicide bombings.  The 
targets included police stations, a coast guard outpost, and a bus 
transporting Algerian workers for a Canadian company. Previously, the 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), now called Al-Qa'ida in 
the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), focused on targeting Algerian 
government interests and had been more averse to suicide attacks and 
civilian casualties.  Although Algerian government interests remained 
the primary focus of AQIM, the attack on the bus confirmed that 
foreigners continue to be included as targets, and that AQIM continued 
to diversify its tactics by importing tactics used in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
 
¶2. (U) Two events helped fuel terrorism concerns for Algeria: the 
September 2006 merger of elements of the GSPC with Al-Qa'ida (AQ) to 
form AQIM, and the conclusion of the amnesty period for Algeria's 
Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation in August 2006.  National 
reconciliation remains a contentious issue for many Algerians, who are 
still divided over whether amnesty and re-integration or a more 
aggressive, unforgiving approach to terrorism is the best way to 
address the continuing threat.  Although the Charter has officially 
expired, its terms may still be applied on a case by case basis at the 
exclusive discretion of the president. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Following the September 11, 2006 announcement of affiliation 
with AQ, AQIM began to increase the threats against what it termed 
"crusading" Westerners, particularly American and French citizens, 
although Russians, Danes, Austrians and now Canadians have been 
targeted as well.  Even before its official affiliation with AQ, the 
GSPC was an organization whose regional and international ties were 
expanding.  AQIM support cells have been discovered and dismantled in 
Spain, Italy, Morocco, Mauritania, and Mali, and AQIM maintained 
training camps and support networks in northern Mali. 
 
¶4. (U) The year was punctuated in the month of August with several 
high-profile terrorist attacks: 
 
  On August 3 a police station in Tizi Ouzou, the capital of the 
Kabylie region, was damaged in a suicide bomb attack, leaving 25 people 
injured. 
 
  On August 9 eight people, all civilians, were killed in an attack on 
a police station in Zemmouri al-Bahri, a seaside town to the east of 
Algiers. 
 
  On August 10 three policemen were killed in a bomb attack on the 
nearby beach of Tigzirt. 
 
  On August 15 an army patrol was ambushed near Skikda, in the 
northeastern corner of Algeria and several soldiers, including one 
senior officer, were reported to have been killed. 
 
  The heaviest casualties from the August spate of attacks occurred on 
August 19 when a suicide bomber exploded his vehicle outside a 
gendarmerie training college in Issers where a large number of 
prospective new recruits were waiting for the gates to open.  The 
government reported that 43 people were killed and 45 injured. 
 
  The next day there were two car bomb explosion in the nearby town of 
Bouira.  The first, outside a military building, left four soldiers 
lightly wounded, according to the official Algerian Press Service.  The 
second exploded outside a hotel and killed 11 people.  It was reported 
that the hotel was being used to house foreigners working on the nearby 
Koudiet Acerdoune dam project, run by a Canadian company. During the 
attack, the driver of the suicide vehicle rammed a bus carrying workers 
of the company and detonated the bomb. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The police and army response to the August attacks was 
energetic, and public disapproval of the large number of civilians 
killed in the attacks increased the number of tips phoned in, which may 
account for the historically low number of attacks that occurred during 
 
ALGIERS 00001320  002 OF 003 
 
 
the subsequent Ramadan holiday in September.  A noticeable increase in 
the visible security presence in major cities may have also contributed 
to the low number of terrorist incidents during Ramadan. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The majority of attacks have occurred in rural and suburban 
areas.  The terrorists have been very careful to establish remote 
bases, communicate sparingly, and plan and carry out attacks meticulous 
AQIM does not have significant popular support, and is 
not assessed as strong enough to bring down the Algerian government. 
AQIM appears aware of the need to avoid civilian casualties, but this 
has been difficult to accomplish as its police and military targets 
often operate among civilians.  When security forces are in the 
countryside, approaching terrorists often stand out and are intercepted 
before they can successfully complete their attacks. Roadside bombs 
and ambushes persist despite the efforts of the security forces.  The 
combination of a population weary of civilian casualties from over a 
decade of Islamic terrorist violence, and the growing availability and 
use of cell phones has made the terrorists more vulnerable to detection 
and attack by the police.  At the same time, the Algerian government 
has had limited success in reducing unemployment (officially 13 
percent, and much higher for men aged 18-30) or in implementing 
significant economic reforms.  This has contributed to a slow but 
steady recruitment rate for AQIM and criminal gangs in general. 
 
¶7. (U) AQIM's strategy in Algeria appears to be influenced by AQ's 
experience in Iraq.  AQIM has issued directions to avoid civilian 
deaths and attacks have been concentrated on military, police and 
foreign national targets.  AQIM is likely seeking to disrupt business 
and commercial activity and probably uses such attacks to discourage 
foreign investment.  The overall civilian death toll due to terrorist 
attacks has been declining in recent years.  During the civil war that 
began in 1992 and had largely subsided by 2000, Algerian Islamic 
terrorists killed on average more than 10,000 people a year, with the 
majority being civilians--well over ten times the number of AQIM 
victims today.  The relative lack of civilian dead enables the new 
generation of Algerian terrorists to publicize their actions more 
energetically. 
 
¶8. (SBU) In the past, Algerian security services have expressed concern 
about AQIM using propaganda based on the call to fight in Iraq as a 
hook to recruit young people, many of whom never made it to Iraq but 
were redirected towards joining local groups.  In previous years, AQIM 
propaganda videos originating in Algeria were of amateur quality and 
poorly produced.  This has changed dramatically.  It was evident that 
AQIM has placed a greater emphasis on improving the quality of the 
videos, and that these videos and communiquQ7s were orchestrated to 
attract Algerian youth to the AQIM "cause".  Several videos posted on 
the Internet, such as the series "Shadows of the Sword" and "Apostate 
Hell" showed operations conducted against Algerian military and 
security targets that included preparations for the attacks and pre- 
briefings with the commanders that led the attacks.  The ability to 
conduct an attack and claim responsibility via communiquQ7 within hours 
demonstrated the importance AQIM placed in transmitting its message in 
an attempt to win the media war. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The February kidnapping and subsequent ransom of two Austrian 
tourists by Algeria-based AQIM terrorists provided a substantial cash 
infusion into the network that will likely facilitate operations in the 
future.  The use of suicide car bombs, suicide vests, and other 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by Algerian terrorists continues to 
indicate a significant level of cooperation and training by AQIM.  The 
proliferation of tactics used in Iraq has had a profound effect on the 
level of organization and sophistication employed by the terrorists in 
Algeria.  The main sources of funding for AQIM continued to be 
kidnapping for ransom, extortion, smuggling and the narcotics trade in 
southern Algeria/northern Mali.  Individual cells in Europe also 
provided support through small-scale funding. 
 
¶10. (SBU) It was estimated that the Algerian security services killed, 
wounded or arrested nearly 1,000 terrorists in 2008, compared to an 
estimated combined figure of about 1,100 for 2007.  Although the total 
number of attacks rose in 2008 to 295 compared to 218 in 2007, the 
number of civilian casualties decreased.  The counterterrorism 
successes of the Algerian services, combined with the public rejection 
of terrorists, possibly reduced AQIM's overall effectiveness during 
¶2008.  One of the most effective counterterrorism operations took place 
in August during which 12 terrorists were killed in the forests of 
Ouacif and Ain Elhamam, in the wilaya of Tizi Ouzou.  The surge in 
terrorist activity in late August may have been revenge attacks for 
this operation.  In addition, over 300 terrorists were sentenced (often 
in absentia, with sentences never carried out) to capital punishment 
 
ALGIERS 00001320  003 OF 003 
 
 
during 2008, of which 257 were sentenced by the court of Boumerdes 
alone.  During 2008 the government of Algeria instituted a program to 
hire 100,000 new police and gendarme officers, reinforce the borders, 
augment security at airports and increase the overall security presence 
in the city of Algiers.  The initiative was effective in reducing the 
impact of terrorist incidents during the year and also demonstrated the 
government of Algeria's determination to fight terrorism. 
 
¶11. (SBU) AQIM, thanks in part to high unemployment among Algerian 
youth, was partially successful in replenishing its numbers after the 
arrest, surrender, or death of an estimated 1,000 terrorists. Those 
remaining appeared to be more hard-line and resistant to the 
government's amnesty offer.  Despite the upsurge of AQIM activity in 
August, overall the security situation remained greatly improved from 
the situation of the late 1990's.  That said, the Algerian military and 
security forces were often perceived as slow to adapt to AQIM's 
changing tactics and to accept that they now face a better organized 
international threat in the form of AQIM rather than a purely internal 
threat.  The Algerian security services and military remained capable 
of handling a prolonged effort against internal terrorist threats and 
were a reliable counterterrorism partner. 
 
¶12. (U) Embassy Algiers point of contact for the above report is Mark 
Molnar who can be reached at molnarml@state.sgov.gov or 
molnarml4@state.gov on the opennet system. 
PEARCE