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Viewing cable 08AITTAIPEI1767, MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08AITTAIPEI1767 2008-12-22 09:43 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1767/01 3570943
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220943Z DEC 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0613
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8812
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0272
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused 
December 20-22 news coverage on the confirmation of the H5N2 avian 
flu epidemic situation in southern Taiwan; on the fourth KMT-CCP 
forum held in Shanghai; and on the local economic downturn. 
 
2. Following the recently-concluded forum between Taiwan's KMT and 
the Communist Party of China (CCP), an editorial in the 
pro-independence "Liberty Times" alleged that by giving benefits to 
Taiwan when Taiwan is facing an economic downturn, China is turning 
Taiwan into another Hong Kong or Macau in the long-run.  An 
editorial in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" said the 
meaning of the fourth KMT-CCP forum was significantly different from 
previous ones because it was actually a talk between the two ruling 
parties.  The editorial, however, warned that more complicated and 
thornier cross-Strait issues lie ahead.  One op-ed said Taiwan must 
not let China internalize the Taiwan issue, which would be 
advantageous to China in using force against Taiwan.  An editorial 
in the pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" wrote some 
scenarios that China might use to deal with Taiwan's bid to the 
World Health Assembly (WHA) in May 2009.  End summary. 
 
A) "China Uses the KMT-CCP Forum to Give Orders to the Ma Ying-jeou 
Administration" 
 
The pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 720,000] 
editorialized (12/22): 
 
"... First of all, in the KMT-CCP forum, China posed as a motherland 
rescuing a suffering Taiwan and 'Hong Kong-ifying or Macau-ifying' 
Taiwan to make it China's political and economy colony. ... 
 
"Second, the Ma Ying-jeou Administration violated the law and sent 
five officials to attend the KMT-CCP forum.  Such an action formally 
and thoroughly discredited Ma Ying-jeou's statement that the 
so-called KMT-CCP forum was a second track [of dialogue] between the 
two sides of the Taiwan Strait.  The KMT-CCP forum that [Chinese 
President] Hu Jintao touted was in fact the first track [of 
dialogue] with regard to cross-Strait policy. ... 
 
B) "The Really Complicated Cross-Strait Issues Have Not Been Put on 
the Table Yet" 
 
The centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 220,000] 
editorialized (12/22): 
 
"Although [the KMT-CCP forum] was only a party to party dialogue 
platform in terms of its nature, the meaning [of this KMT-CCP forum] 
certainly was different from previous ones because both sides [the 
KMT and the CCP] were the ruling parties and this was the first time 
that there were [Taiwan] officials sitting at the table and 
conducting dialogue directly.  Moreover, the issues being discussed 
were important ones which matter in the next stage of interaction 
between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.  At the very least, one 
can be sure that although the consensus reached between both sides 
[of the Taiwan Strait] were only called 'recommendations,' the nine 
recommendations would very likely become important points in the 
next stage of substantive interaction between the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait. ... 
 
"With the launching of the direct three links [air, sea, and postal 
service between Taiwan and China], everyone knew that both sides of 
the Taiwan Strait have started a process that can not be reversed. 
After the successful conclusion of the KMT-CCP forum and before the 
third talks between [Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) 
Chairman] P. K. Chiang and [China's Association for Relations across 
the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Chairman] Chen Yunlin next year, the table 
will be served with more issues and more complicated issues.  After 
issues such as economy and trade, tourism, shipping, and education 
are resolved, more sensitive issues will appear on the stage.  It is 
still unclear how [Taiwan's] participation in the World Health 
Assembly (WHA) is going to be resolved.  On the eve of the opening 
of the KMT-CCP forum, President Ma Ying-jeou wrote a letter to the 
Thailand media urging Beijing to remove missiles [targeted at 
Taiwan], whose purpose intention was very clear.  There are many 
complicated cross-Strait issues that have not yet been served on the 
table." 
 
C) "Beijing's Bid to 'Internalize' Taiwan" 
 
J. Michael Cole, a write based in Taipei, opined in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] (12/22): 
 
"One of the key components of Beijing's policy on Taiwan and Tibet 
has been to internalize the problems and to fight efforts by 
so-called 'separatists' to internationalize them. ... 
 
"Speaking at a forum on cross-strait developments organized by the 
Brookings Institution and National Chengchi University's Institute 
 
of International Relations on Dec. 4, University of Hong Kong 
professor Richard Weixing Hu, representing the view from China, said 
Beijing's focus should increasingly be on de-internationalizing the 
Taiwan question and institutionalizing, or internalizing, it. 
 
"The rationale behind this approach makes perfect sense, as the more 
internal the Taiwan question becomes for China, the easier it will 
be for Beijing to placate efforts, in Taiwan and abroad, to sustain 
Taiwan as a sovereign entity or argue for its defense.  A successful 
bid to sell the story of Taiwan as a domestic matter would also make 
it easier for Beijing to use force, just as Moscow has managed to 
evade international opprobrium by portraying Chechnya as a domestic 
problem. ... 
 
"If Taiwan is to survive as an independent sovereign entity, every 
effort must be made to ensure that it remains an international 
problem, even if, for the first time in decades, such efforts must 
be made without government help.  In other words, we may be 
presented with a case of sub-state actors being called upon to save 
the state from itself. ... 
 
"If the Ma administration won't do it, the people can.  Taiwan must 
remain an international issue." 
 
D) "Taiwan Must Beware of China's WHA Trap" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" [circulation: 
20,000] editorialized (12/22): 
 
"... [China's Taiwan Affairs Office Spokesman] Lee's trial balloon 
hints that a formula may be close to completion, but our greatest 
concern is under what conditions and through what channels will 
Beijing allow Taiwan to participate in the WHA. 
 
"While the vast majority of the Taiwan people want at least a formal 
and distinct observer status in the WHA and 'meaningful 
participation' in the WHO, PRC sources indicate that Beijing 'will 
remain firm on sovereignty' and will insist that any concessions on 
Taiwan's participation in the WHA or WHO an 'exception' that will 
not be applicable to any other international organization in the 
United Nations system. 
 
"To realize even this limited concession, Beijing would have to 
invalidate the secret memorandum it signed with the WHO 
secretary-general in May 2005 that granted the PRC Ministry of 
Health the authority to vet all WHO health-related communications 
and information to Taiwan and to permit Taiwan specialists from some 
participation in WHO events under the rubric of 'Taipei, China.' 
 
"The chances that Beijing will agree to revoke this arrangement are 
low.  A more likely scenario from Beijing's standpoint would be to 
allow Taiwan to receive first-hand and timely information from the 
WHO, perhaps as a 'health entity' under the rubric of 'Taipei, 
China' or at best 'Chinese Taipei.' 
 
"Such an arrangement, which would not transgress the bounds of the 
May 2005 MOU, would exclude Taiwan from formal and distinct 
participation in the WHO system and allow Beijing to retain an 
ultimate veto power on Taiwan's participation, but fall far short of 
what most Taiwan people see as 'international participation.' 
 
"It is also possible that the PRC could simply verbally discourage 
its diplomatic allies from vetoing Taiwan's application for WHA 
observer status as a hypocritical sign of 'goodwill,' regardless of 
the outcome of the actual vote. 
 
"Naturally, the worst case scenario would be for the PRC to continue 
to reject Taiwan's bid for WHA observer status outright in 
expectations that Ma and the KMT will not dare to reconsider their 
'tilt' toward Beijing regardless of such a slap in the face. ..." 
 
YOUNG