VZCZCXRO4327
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAR #1612/01 3590758
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240758Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7432
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 0833
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0809
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0066
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0191
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0022
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU 0836
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0045
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0313
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0061
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0053
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU 0575
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 2129
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0025
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0030
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0046
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0047
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0681

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 ACCRA 001612 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR MARC HUMPHREY 
US MISSION UN VIENNA FOR MARK SCHELAND 
US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE FOR SARAH LOPP 
US DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR ED 
MCGINNIS AND CRAIG WELLING 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG EINT TRGY TBIO EINV BEXP BTIO GH
SUBJECT: GHANA'S NUCLEAR ENERGY AMBITIONS 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 127423 
     ¶B. ACCRA 1523 
 
ACCRA 00001612  001.2 OF 007 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: This cable reports on Ghana,s 
current civilian uses of atomic technology and their 
plans to become a nuclear power producer (response to 
REF A). Ghanaian atomic science research is 
established institutionally, but at a low level of 
technical sophistication.  Ghana,s atomic science 
officials highlight Ghana,s close cooperation with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and their 
membership status in GNEP.  In their nascent bid to 
become a nuclear power producer, the Ghana Atomic 
Energy Commission indicated a clear preference for 
U.S. nuclear technology.  Post,s assessment is that 
Ghana,s technological needs and favorable disposition 
toward the United States create opportunities for USG 
atomic energy and safety programming, broader U.S.- 
Ghana science and technology cooperation, and 
commercial prospects for U.S. producers of civilian 
nuclear technology.  However, the likelihood of Ghana 
accomplishing its stated goal to become a nuclear 
power producer by 2018 is unlikely, due to uncertain 
future political support and a questionable underlying 
economic rationale.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
Atomic and Nuclear Science Programs 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Ghana,s flagship facility is the Ghana Atomic 
Energy Commission,s (GAEC) small scale 30KW Chinese- 
origin miniature neutron source rQctor (MNSR), a copy 
of the Canadian SLOWPOKE reactor design.  Dubbed the 
Ghana Research Reactor-1 (GHARR-1), it uses highly 
enriched 90.2 percent Uranium 235.  (NOTE: China has 
supplied these reactors, said to be least expensive 
research reactor, to a number of countries: Iran, 
Syria, Pakistan, Nigeria and Ghana.  END NOTE.) 
Commissioned in 1996, the reactor,s fuel source is 
nearing the end of its expected 15-year life cycle. 
In a meeting with econoffs, Dr. Edward Akaho, Director 
General of GAEC, indicated that within the next two 
years they seek to replace the GHARR-1 current fuel 
with a low-enriched source, under the DOE/Argonne 
National Laboratory,s Reduced Enrichment for Research 
and Test Reactors (RERTR) program.  GHARR-1 is used 
for teaching purposes and also for Neutron Activation 
Analysis (NAA) for product and industrial testing. 
 
¶3. (U) Ghana also has a Gamma Irradiator with a 12- 
year old Cobalt-64 source that has reportedly weakened 
from 50 to 7 kilojoules of output.  Accordingly, the 
GAEC has worked through the IAEA to procure a new 
cobalt source from Hungary.  The irradiator is used 
primarily for food preservation.  Other uses include 
medical sterilization, tissue culture research, and 
also an experimental project for the mass 
sterilization of mosquitoes.  Ghana also has two 
radiological sources currently being used in medical 
facilities, and they are seeking a third nuclear 
medicine device. 
 
ACCRA 00001612  002.2 OF 007 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) To augment its teaching and testing 
capabilities, Ghana seeks to acquire a Ion-Beam 
Analysis (IBA) accelerator. Working with the IAEA, 
GAEC identified a 2MV system initially priced at USD 
1.5 million.  However, the system price has now risen 
to approximately USD 2.3 million.  The Government of 
Ghana (GOG) has allocated USD 500,000 for the system, 
and are in need of donor contributions from IAEA 
members for the remainder.  Soliciting USG 
contributions, the GAEC stated that the civil works to 
house the facility are 80 percent complete, and that 
the IBA accelerator will be used not only for 
research, but applied in fields as varied as 
agriculture, life sciences, industrial testing, and 
archeology. 
 
 
Nuclear Power Program: Phase 2, Possibly 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The outgoing government in Ghana has made a 
policy decision to pursue nuclear energy; it has set 
the ambitious target of 2018 for commissioning its 
first nuclear power plant.  According to the IAEA,s 
three phase schema for development of nuclear power 
this public announcement suggests that Ghana has 
crossed Milestone 1: "Ready to make a knowledgeable 
commitment to a nuclear program." (NOTE: IAEA 
Nuclear Energy Series No. NG-G-3.1 is frequently 
cited in discussions and likely guides the GAEC 
in its policy approach to developing nuclear power.) 
Thus, Ghana,s energy officials may perceive themselves 
to be crossing into Phase 2: "preparatory work for 
the construction of a nuclear power plant after a 
policy decision been taken." 
 
¶6. (SBU) While proudly describing apparent progress 
toward their ambition of delivering nuclear energy to 
Ghana, the GAEC officials tacitly acknowledged that 
the policy decision to pursue nuclear power was taken 
at effectively the end of an outgoing administration. 
The GAEC leadership anticipates that if the opposition 
(National Democratic Congress) takes the Presidency in 
the run-off election, the commitment to pursue nuclear 
power could be revisited by the next government (NOTE: 
Following the first round of elections, the opposition 
is already positioned to control Ghana,s Parliament. 
Thus it is near certain that the outgoing government,s 
nuclear policy and plans will be critically reviewed 
by the incoming parliament. END NOTE)  The GAEC 
characterized this scenario as likely to require 
starting from scratch with extensive discussions and 
"education" with the new leadership, i.e. a return 
back to Phase 1: "Considerations before a decision to 
launch a nuclear power programme is taken." (See para 
19 below.) 
 
¶7. (U) As part of its Phase 2 activities, the current 
government has drafted a bill to create a Ghana 
Nuclear Regulatory Authority distinct from the GAEC. 
The specific inspection/enforcement powers of the 
 
ACCRA 00001612  003.2 OF 007 
 
 
proposed regulatory authority are still at the draft 
stage.  The draft bill addresses issues of domestic 
nuclear liability, and would bring Ghana into 
compliance with the Vienna Convention on Civil 
Liability for Nuclear Damage. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The GAEC does not as an institution exercise 
final authority on the proposed nuclear energy policy. 
However, its key leaders in their individual capacity 
are likely being tapped for input and participation in 
other bodies.  Ghana,s Energy Commission is broadly 
responsible for planning and assessing Ghana,s 
potential energy opportunities within which nuclear 
power is one element.  A proposed ad hoc body is the 
"Presidential Commission on Nuclear Energy" for 
developing Ghana,s Nuclear Power Policy.  This 
Commission would have a subordinate "Committee for 
Technology Assessment" that would be Qarged to 
identify and assess the suitability of specific 
technologies. (The GAEC indicated that the IAEA has 
committed to provide support to this body.)  As 
Ghana,s lead nuclear experts, the GAEC,s scientists 
would likely have key roles in these entities. 
 
¶9. (SBU) When asked about financing scenarios, the 
GAEC indicated that financial and taxation details 
would be dependent on the ultimate nuclear technology 
supplier and the associated financial terms offered. 
They anticipate that ultimately development would be a 
public-private venture, with private (or supplier 
country) participation along with a Government of 
Ghana position. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Claiming that Ghana,s geologic profile is 
similar to Brazil, the GAEC described the potential 
for uranium mining in Ghana.  While expressing 
vehement disinterest in enrichment activities, they 
suggested that production of yellow-cake would be a 
possibility. 
 
 
Domestic Capabilities: Nascent at Best 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Ghana,s economy is defined by agriculture 
and extractive industries.  By international 
standards, Ghana,s manufacturing base is 
underdeveloped.  By regional standards, Ghana,s 
relative stability and prosperity mask its fundamental 
lack of economic diversification and low levels of 
manufacturing (beyond some agricultural processing.) 
Ghana has a nascent IT services sector, but no high- 
tech components or heavy industry involved in nuclear 
technology or services.  COMMENT: While the GAEC 
emphasizes its interest in local sourcing and local 
hiring, it is unlikely that this position is anything 
more than a desire to create a demand for its domestic 
atomic-trained scientists and technicians and to 
support the GAEC,s own workshops (or otherwise create 
an incentive structure to expand its 
workshop/production resources).  END COMMENT. 
 
 
ACCRA 00001612  004.2 OF 007 
 
 
¶12. (SBU) Ghana,s nuclear-trained workforce is of an 
unknown size, and likely limited to persons with a 
scientific background, without significant applied 
skills.  Ghana lacks a significant engineering and 
technical talent base that could be readily converted 
into a large nuclear workforce.  However, given their 
modest initial goals, it is unlikely that an 
especially large number of trainees beyond local 
Ghanaians with extant raw potential would be required. 
The development of civil nuclear power would most 
likely require skilled foreign workers. 
 
¶13. (U) Ghana,s current graduate-level nuclear science 
teaching activities at the School of Nuclear and 
Allied Sciences (SNAS, a collaboration between the 
GAEC and the University of Ghana) includes the 
following specializations: applied nuclear physics, 
nuclear and environmental protection, nuclear 
engineering, nuclear agriculture, nuclear and 
radiochemistry, radiation protection, radiation 
processing, medical physics, computational nuclear 
sciences and engineering, and nuclear earth sciences. 
There are approximately 30-40 students in each M.Phil 
program class year, spread across these 
specializations.  At the PhD level, Ghana has a total 
of 14 nuclear science students.  The nuclear science 
faculty has approximately 38 permanent senior members. 
 
 
Opportunities for U.S. Industry 
------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Given its stated status as seeking nuclear 
energy, the full range of nuclear sector opportunities 
potentially exist for U.S. industry in Ghana, 
including: feasibility studies, consulting services, 
plant construction management, reactor sales, fuel 
cycle service provision, plant operations, waste 
management, and logistics. 
 
¶15. (SBU) At this stage no private companies have 
formally initiated discussions with Ghana.  However, 
GAEC,s Director General explicitly articulated to 
econoffs his strong interest in Westinghouse,s AP600 
and AP1000 nuclear plant designs. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Prior to specifically mentioning the cited 
U.S. nuclear technologies, the GAEC expressed a number 
of general preferences that would guide them in their 
assessment of potential suppliers.  First, they are 
seeking tested, reliable and safe nuclear technology. 
Second, they seek to maximize technology transfer 
provisions and utilization of local inputs and labor. 
In terms of scope, they would seek phased development, 
starting with an initial reactor output not exceed 10 
to 15 percent of the grid, to then scale up with 
additional reactors.  Ghana explicitly does not wish 
to be responsible for the fuel cycle: they would seek 
for any supply agreement to include provisions for the 
return of spent fuel. Finally, the GAEC expressed a 
strong preference for initial development under a 
bilateral nuclear cooperation program.  After their 
 
ACCRA 00001612  005.2 OF 007 
 
 
nuclear program matured they suggested that 
multilateral cooperation agreements could be possible. 
 
 
Foreign Competitors 
------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) The GAEC,s Director General, Dr. Edward 
Akaho noted that soon after the public announcement of 
Ghana,s plan to pursue nuclear power, he was visited 
by the Russian Economic Attache, who presented them 
with product brochures.  Dr. Akaho and his colleagues 
noted that the Russian diplomat did not engage in much 
substantive dialogue with them.  In a separate line of 
discussion, Dr. Akaho noted that even through he was 
trained in the UK, he did not especially like British 
nuclear technology. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Stressing that they work primarily through 
the IAEA, the GAEC officials did not state the 
existence of any formal agreements relating to nuclear 
cooperation, commerce, or technical exchanges with any 
other countries -- other than GNEP (NOTE: econoff 
cannot be sure this was a definitive statement, or 
avoiding the question.  END NOTE.).  When queried 
about the procurement of a radiological source from 
Hungary, the GAEC noted the procurement (like that of 
GHARR-1) was accomplished through IAEA mechanisms. 
 
¶19. (SBU) The IAEA has allocated Ghana funds for two 
assessment projects.  The first is titled "Evaluating 
the Role of Nuclear Power in Future Options for 
Electricity Generation (GHA/0/011)."  COMMENT: This 
project appears to correspond with Phase 1 in the 
IAEA,s phased, conditional approach for introduction 
of nuclear power, belying the public window-dressing 
that Ghana has already crossed the threshold into 
Phase 2. (See para 6 above.) Furthermore, it is not 
clear whether Ghana has sufficient funds from IAEA to 
fully execute this project.  END COMMENT.  The second 
project is entitled "Implementing the Borehole 
Disposal Concept (GHA/3/003)."  This project explores 
the possibility of using a borehole to dispose of 
radioactive waste in a safe manner. 
 
 
Motivations For Pursuing Nuclear Power 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) Ghana,s stated justification for pursuing 
nuclear power is domestic energy security, and a 
desire to serve as a regional power generator and 
exporter.  (NOTE: Ghana was historically a power 
exporter from the commissioning of the Akosombo Dam in 
1965 until the 1990s.  With the further expansion of 
the USAID-supported West Africa Power Pool, increased 
transmission capacity will further boost the 
prospected for Ghana serving as a regional exporter, 
assuming increased production in Ghana.)  Framed in 
development terms, increased power production is 
needed for Ghana,s socio-economic development and goal 
to become a middle income country.  Citing burgeoning 
 
ACCRA 00001612  006.2 OF 007 
 
 
domestic demand and unmet regional power needs, GAEC 
officials conclude that nuclear power is more certain 
than the vagaries of imported gas from Nigeria via the 
West African Gas Pipeline. COMMENT: Missing from the 
public arguments on the economic need for nuclear 
power is the likelihood of cheap, domestically 
produced natural gas from Ghana,s 2007 new offshore 
oil discoveries. END COMMENT. 
 
¶21. (SBU) The GAEC pragmatically recognizes that 
political considerations -- both domestic and 
international -- influence both the resources and 
directions they receive, and will impact decisions on 
nuclear cooperation.  Internationally, they noted that 
once they are locked into a nuclear cooperation 
relationship, it was difficult to change course; thus 
they are sensitive to securing an external long-term 
supplier who would not be subject to political 
vagaries.  The GAEC also stressed that with the 
introduction of nuclear power they are seeking 
technology transfer and donor support for development 
of greater indigenous capacity and human resources. 
COMMENT: Local content and technology transfer are 
likely positive externalities of a successful nuclear 
program.  However, the GAEC,s implication that these 
factors may be "conditions" or otherwise heavily 
weighted within the underlying economic rationale for 
pursuing a nuclear power program suggest institutional 
self-interest at play within the GAEC,s advocacy of 
nuclear power.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
Comment: Reality and Ambition - An Uncertain Gap 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶22. (SBU) It is difficult to assess the political and 
practical viability of Ghana,s stated goals to pursue 
nuclear energy.  The Ghana Atomic Energy Commission is 
most likely not an impartial source - we cannot expect 
anything less than a positive assessment of nuclear 
technology and its benefits for Ghana from this 
analytically  captured, group of nuclear technical 
specialists.  While Ghana does have indigenous 
technical capability sufficient to serve as a host 
for external support, it is unclear what domestic 
political support and economic resources Ghana can 
muster to sustain its nuclear ambitions. 
 
¶23. (SBU) The current political climate suggests 
that the (opposition) NDC party will control 
Ghana,s parliament in late January 2009.  (The 
presidential election returns will be known by 
the end of December.)  Thus, political support 
for the outgoing administration,s energy plans 
cannot be taken for granted. Given the IAEA,s own 
commitments to what appear to be a feasibility 
studies for nuclear power in Ghana, a reasonable 
conclusion is that the outgoing government,s 
announcement of a goal to achieve nuclear energy 
by 2018 was a political gesture to bolster the 
NPP,s claim to delivering modernization and 
prosperity to Ghana.  After the current election 
 
ACCRA 00001612  007.2 OF 007 
 
 
period political dust settles, a clearer view of 
the underlying national political appetite for 
nuclear power will be possible. 
 
¶24. (SBU) Even assuming continued domestic political 
support for the pursuit of nuclear power in Ghana, the 
economic and financial rationality of any proposed 
nuclear power plant will depend entirely on the terms 
of external financing, and the costs of alternative 
sources of energy.  Consistent with the current global 
economic down-turn, Ghana faces the usual macro- 
economic pressures associated with large budget 
deficits, and the increased costs of essential 
imported economic inputs - e.g. oil.  While dropping 
oil prices will ease some of the pressure on Ghana,s 
current account, concerns regarding Ghana,s increasing 
levels of external indebtedness are likely to persist 
until Ghana,s domestic oil production comes on line in 
late 2010 or 2011.  While expansion of domestic power 
production is a clear economic priority for Ghana, 
cheap domestically produced natural gas (and gas-fired 
power generation) may erase in the shor-to-medium- 
term the economic arguments for a multi-billion dollar 
investment in nuclear power. 
 
 
TEITELBAUM