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Viewing cable 08ACCRA1592, SCENE SETTER FOR A/S FRAZER'S VISIT TO GHANA,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ACCRA1592 2008-12-19 07:48 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Accra
VZCZCXRO0477
PP RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHAR #1592/01 3540748
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190748Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7402
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ACCRA 001592 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W AND AKUNNA COOK, AF/FO FOR DANA BANKS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OTRA OVIP PREL PGOV ECON AMGT GH
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR A/S FRAZER'S VISIT TO GHANA, 
DECEMBER 26-28, 2008 
 
1. U.S. Mission Accra warmly welcomes the visit of Assistant 
Secretary Frazer and Staff Assistant Dana Banks to Ghana, 
with a scheduled arrival on a UN flight on December 26 at 
approximately 11:00, and departure on December 28 at 21:55 on 
a KLM/NWA flight 8590 to Amsterdam.  Control officer for this 
visit will be Ms. Janelle Guest, who can be reached at (233) 
21 741-178 and mobile phone number (233) (0)244 330-373.  A/S 
Fraser and Ms. Banks will be staying at the Ambassador's 
residence. 
 
 
2. (U) Ghana's presidential run-off is scheduled for Sunday, 
December 28.  The Electoral Commission is expected to release 
the results within seventy-two hours, or by Wednesday, 
December 31.  Under Ghanaian law, campaigning must end 24 
hours prior to the opening of the polls.  With the Christmas 
and Boxing Day Holidays close to election day, post 
anticipates that most campaigning will be over by December 
24. There will be just over one week between the announcement 
of the result of the presidential runoff and the 
inauguration, scheduled for January 7.  Should one of the 
parties wish to dispute the election, Ghana's constitution 
allows for a petition challenging the result, which must be 
filed with the Supreme Court within 21 days. 
 
3. (U) Post anticipates that the campaign will be hard 
fought, as both candidates-- and their supporters-- 
understand that they have a good chance to win this election. 
 Fewer than 105,000 votes separated the NPP's Nana Akufo-Addo 
and the NDC's John Atta Mills ater the first round, and 
control of parliament hinges on two yet to be determined 
seats.  The campaigns will focus on getting out the vote, as 
many voters (and more NPP supporters) apparently decided to 
sit out the election. Nationwide, led by the Greater Accra, 
Central and Western Regions, fewer people, in absolute 
numbers, voted in 2008 than in 2004, Motivating those members 
of the public who are not their committed supporters will be 
key for either party to win. (Note: There was also a decline 
in voters in the Volta Region, although an early closing of 
the border with Togo by the GOG may have been a factor. Post 
anticipates that the border will again be closed for the 
run-off, limiting the ability of Ghanaians-- mostly NDC 
supporters-- who work in Togo to return to Ghanaian homes to 
vote. End Note.) 
 
4 (SBU). Your visit will be an opportunity to re-enforce the 
USG's neutrality in the election, and our support for free, 
fair and transparent elections, conditions Post believes were 
met in the first round of voting.  Post is working to arrange 
meetings between you and the two presidential candidates.  If 
meetings are not possible, or are only possible with one 
candidate, we will work to arrange telephone conversations. 
 
5. (SBU)  For the December 28 election the US Mission will 
field approximately 20 observation teams outside of Accra, 
and another four in the Greater Accra Region.  The two person 
teams will be deployed to constituencies whose results were 
in some manner "interesting" from the first round, such as a 
reversal of historic voting patterns.  The Mission plans to 
have five teams in Ashanti and four in Volta, the heartland 
areas of the two parties and regions where intimidation of 
opposition voters, or other questionable practices, are most 
likely to be attempted. The teams will phone in results the 
evening of the 28th, giving the Mission a snapshot of voting 
conditions and turnout from across the country.  The Mission 
fielded fifty two-person teams for the December 7 polling. 
There were fewer volunteers for the runoff, due primarily to 
holiday leave schedules. Post is in process of obtaining 
Electoral Commission Certification to allow you and Dana 
Banks to observe at polling stations. We propose that you 
observe voting in the Greater Accra Region. 
 
6. (U)  Other diplomatic missions and non-governmental 
organizations will also field observer teams for the runoff 
election. The UK, Canada and European Union will field teams, 
although also at a reduced level compared to December 7.  The 
EU continues to have long term observers posted across Ghana, 
where they have been engaged since prior to the December 7 
voting.  The Carter Center will support a reduced team of 
observers for the runoff. The Carter Center received funding 
support from DFID for their observer program, including a 
second installment of $311,000 for the run-off. 
 
7. (U)  The Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO), 
a group of Ghanaian NGOs, will again field the largest 
contingent of election observers across the nation, with 
4,000 observers.  CODEO worked with the National Democratic 
Institute (NDI) in the first round to implement a parallel 
vote tabulation (PVT) exercise.  CODEO observers submitted 
 
ACCRA 00001592  002 OF 003 
 
 
reports from 1,070 polling stations during the first 
election, providing the actual vote tallies which allowed 
CODEO, using statistical techniques, to model the election 
process.  Two hours after the EC announced its results, CODEO 
released the results of its PVT, which was uncannily close to 
the final result announced by the EC.  CODEO's PVT had 
forecast 49.8 percent for Akufo-Addo (actual 49.1), 47.4 
percent for Atta-Mills (actual 47.9), and 1.3 percent for the 
Convention Peoples Party candidate Papa Kwesi Nduom (his 
exact count).  Their results add a welcome shot of 
credibility to the EC's announcement. The PVT was assisted 
with financial support from USAID, and will be conducted 
again on December 28. 
 
8. (U)  The media played a generally supportive and 
responsible role in reporting on the election. FM stations 
with national reach provided regular updates on the vote 
tallies for both parliamentary and presidential races, but 
were careful to caution listeners that only the EC could 
declare a winner.  One station also provided running updates 
on its website, and became the defacto source of vote 
tabulations for the election. The media repeated the many 
calls made by civil society and religious leaders for 
peaceful elections. 
 
9. (U). Election security was provided by the police and 
other agencies, with support from the military. Each polling 
station was staffed by at least one civilian security 
officer, including officers from the prison and fire services 
and border guards.  The police staffed mobile rapid response 
teams, which in Accra, responded promptly and professionally 
to minor incidents witnessed by Mission observers. The Ghana 
military provided back up for the police with mobile units, 
but generally stayed away from polling stations. Security was 
tight in the north, particularly in areas where chieftaincy 
disputes complicated partisan politics. The most significant 
incident reported occurred in Bawku, where people were 
dispersed outside the district EC office. (Note: Bawku is an 
area with a long running chieftaincy dispute.  End Note.) 
Similar security plans are expected to be implemented for the 
December 28 election. 
 
10. (U) As of December 19, no party controls a majority of 
the 230 seat Parliament. The NDC holds 114 seats, the NPP 
107, the PNC 2 and the CPP a single seat, won by Samia 
Nkrumah, daughter of the first president. Of the remaining 
seats, four are held by independents who were formerly 
members of the NPP.  The NPP claims to have their support, 
but the Mission believes that for possibly two of them their 
allegiance to the NPP is not all that certain. Finally, two 
seats yet to be decided following election irregularities. 
One of the undetermined seats resulted from an incident where 
ballot boxes were stolen, and may require a new election. It 
is likely that most independents and third party MPs will 
wait until after the run-off to announce who they intend to 
support.  In Ghana's strong executive system, there are few 
opportunities available for an opposition MP to influence 
policy or access resources for his or her constituency. 
11. (U)  Regardless of who wins the election, the new 
President could confront a Parliament controlled by the 
opposition party, or almost equally difficult, held by his 
own party by only a seat or two, or perhaps one dependent on 
a coalition. An opposition controlled parliament would be a 
situation Ghana has never before faced.  A Parliament 
controlled by a party other than the president's would give 
the legislative majority power to block revenue bills, hold 
up ministerial appointments, halt government contracts, 
approve the sale of oil blocks, and carry out a variety of 
other measures that could bring the usually powerful 
executive to a standstill. A close parliament would give even 
small voting blocs of MPs significant power, and make party 
discipline difficult to maintain. A watchdog role played by a 
powerful opposition party in the legislature could be a good 
thing for Ghana's democracy in the long run.  On the other 
hand, under Ghana's Constitution, an opposition party in 
control of Parliament could also paralyze government.  It is 
such a resounding issue that if one party can lay claim to a 
Parliamentary majority, it would likely use the specter of a 
split government as a major campaign issue.  Time is of the 
essence, however.  If the High Courts are slow to resolve 
disputes, voters (and parties) will not know the true 
composition of Parliament by the time December 28 rolls 
around. Regardless, however, the next president will face a 
Parliament with much more potential for independence than any 
prior one in the 4th Republic, and the renegotiation of 
political boundaries could be the political story to follow 
for the next several years. 
 
12 (U).  Pressure and tension will inevitably rise during the 
 
ACCRA 00001592  003 OF 003 
 
 
run-up to the December 28 runoff.  Both parties can be 
expected to pull out all of the stops in an effort to get out 
the vote.  The country has now had a good dress rehearsal, 
but it was spared the trauma of a final outcome.  The 
performance of the EC, security forces, and the media should 
have instilled confidence in the Ghanaian populace, and we 
expect peace once again to prevail.  Next time around, 
however, there will be a loser, and we already know that a 
large percentage of voters will share in that loss.  How they 
cope with their disappointment will be the true test of 
Ghanaian democracy. 
TEITELBAUM