VZCZCXRO4316
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHPB
DE RUEHWL #0392/01 3240444
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 190444Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5548
INFO RUEHNZ/AMCONSUL AUCKLAND 1800
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 5330
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 0764
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHFJUSC/US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHINGTON DC
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 WELLINGTON 000392 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/ANP, PACOM FOR J01E/J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR PREL PTER NZ
SUBJECT: NEW ZEALAND - HOSTED PSI EXERCISE MARU 
 
WELLINGTON 00000392  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶1. (U) Summary:  In September 2008, the United 
States participated in the New Zealand-hosted 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise, 
MARU, in the Hauraki Gulf and the port of Auckland, 
New Zealand.  MARU was the thirty-sixth PSI exercise 
since the inception of the initiative in 2003.  The 
exercise included the participation of Asia-Pacific 
nations and many global PSI partners.  MARU was 
unique among PSI exercises in that it incorporated 
live exercise play into a table top exercise 
focusing on post-interdiction disposition issues. 
Additionally, MARU had a strong customs and law 
enforcement focus, with military support 
highlighting the interagency nature of PSI 
activities.  Plenary sessions allowed discussion of 
issues such as legal standards for action, and 
intelligence sharing, by representatives of the 29 
countries present.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) From September 13-19 2008, the New Zealand 
Customs Service (NZCS) hosted the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise MARU in Auckland. 
The 31-member USG delegation included 
representatives from several parts of the Department 
of Defense, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), the FBI, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), 
the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the U.S. 
European Command (EUCOM), the U.S. Seventh Fleet, 
and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG).  Consulate General 
Auckland also played an active role, with the 
Consular Chief acting as a group leader for plenary 
discussions, and the Ambassador paying a visit to 
the U.S. delegation's task force workroom. 
Including the United States, there were eight 
countries participating in the exercise, eleven 
countries observing which have formally endorsed the 
PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, and ten 
countries observing which have not endorsed these 
PSI principles. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Exercise MARU Overview and Goals 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) Exercise MARU consisted of several phases, 
including live exercises (LIVEX) dealing with 
maritime interception and interdiction, LIVEX port 
search demonstrations, and a tabletop exercise (TTX) 
gaming phase exploring post-interdiction disposition 
issues.  The exercise also included substantial 
outreach efforts to the attending non-endorsee 
delegations and an industry workshop dealing with 
trade security.  Objectives for the exercise 
included: 
 
- To demonstrate the law enforcement approach of 
PSI, which includes the interdiction, investigation 
and prosecution of proliferators attempting to 
circumvent domestic and international laws. 
 
- To give PSI partner countries an opportunity to 
participate in a maritime interdiction operation 
involving interception (location), surveillance 
(tracking), and interdiction (ship-boarding). 
 
- To advance understanding of issues related to 
interdiction, flag state consent, diversion, 
liability, proliferation network investigation, and 
the gathering of evidence to support prosecution. 
 
- To raise the profile of weapons of mass 
 
WELLINGTON 00000392  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
destruction (WMD) proliferation issues in the Asia- 
Pacific region and to enable non-PSI states to 
understand better the initiative and its 
contributions to nonproliferation. 
 
- To advance industry engagement and technical 
outreach regarding PSI. 
 
- To advance understanding of information and 
intelligence sharing at national and international 
levels. 
 
¶4. The exercise was the first of its kind in several 
respects, including that it was the first PSI 
exercise to include TTX game play that dealt 
primarily with the decision-making process after the 
interdiction of a shipment of proliferation concern. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
The Live Exercise and its Corresponding TTX Scenario 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) MARU followed a general scenario designed 
to test the exercise objectives, using the transfer 
of proliferation-related dual use materials between 
two countries of concern (RED and GREEN) as the core 
of its storyline.  Intelligence and information 
gathered by the participating countries indicated 
that COUNTRY GREEN was attempting to procure 
materials, equipment, and technology necessary for 
its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs 
from COUNTRY RED.  To avoid detection of the 
transfer of these goods (which would be in violation 
of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
against the two countries), the WMD components were 
transported by an indirect route, transshipping 
through several countries, and repackaged in new 
containers to mask the origin and final destination. 
The materials included Missile Technology Control 
Regime-controlled aluminum powder, metal sheets and 
ball bearings, as well as various hazardous 
chemicals.  In addition to trying to conceal the 
transfer of materials by a circuitous route, the 
materials had also been given false end-users and 
had been improperly manifested. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In the scenario, the materials had been 
sent in four identified containers from COUNTRY 
RED's procurement network in Asia to Singapore by 
the vessel Redstar.  Following this, three of the 
containers were loaded on the vessel MV Seabreeze, 
destined for transit through the Port of Tauranga in 
New Zealand next, before being transshipped once 
again to ports in Europe, from which the 
proliferation network of COUNTRY GREEN would then 
again re-route the cargo to GREEN.  However, 
intelligence and information gathered from several 
countries determined while the shipments aboard the 
Seabreeze were in transit that it would be necessary 
to locate, track, and board the vessel.  A decision 
was also made within the scenario that it would be 
necessary to divert the Seabreeze to the Port of 
Auckland rather than allow it to continue to 
Tauranga.  The corresponding live and tabletop 
exercises explored: the operational capabilities to 
perform these actions; the necessary international 
cooperation and information sharing involved; the 
ramifications for this type of interdiction 
including the ability to conduct a criminal case 
against the involved parties; further investigation 
of the proliferation network; and the costs of 
interdiction, including which parties would be 
liable for these costs. 
 
WELLINGTON 00000392  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
--------------------- 
The Tabletop Exercise 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) In the weeks prior to Exercise MARU, and 
continuing through the LIVEX, participant countries 
(with the exception of France) were involved in a 
table-top game which built further upon the 
activities being demonstrated in the live exercising 
phases. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Before the exercise, participant countries 
received scenario "injects" with information and 
intelligence related to the COUNTRY RED and COUNTRY 
GREEN proliferation networks, including intelligence 
on the transfer of shipments and associated 
individuals and front companies connected to the 
networks.  The injects contained information limited 
to only certain countries, forcing participant 
administrations to determine if they wish to share 
the intelligence further with other countries based 
on its potential sensitivity.  The injects continued 
on September 15, 16, and 17 as the LIVEX was going 
on, and reflected a series of situation updates 
based on actions occurring within the LIVEX about 
the shipment of the three suspect containers aboard 
the MV Seabreeze, and also occurring with a fourth 
container identified already in New Zealand. This 
latter container was held and intended for export by 
the New Zealand-based front company (SCIFO Ltd NZ) 
associated with the other three inbound suspect 
containers (and was likely the fourth container from 
the Redstar, illegally transited to NZ with its 
origin hidden).  This fourth container was inspected 
and determined to contain controlled dual-use 
strategic goods including radial ball bearings and 
stainless steel sheets, which were not properly 
licensed for export. 
 
¶9. (SBU) During the tabletop exercise, the seven 
participating countries manned country-room 
operations centers, and communicated with one 
another and with the Exercise MARU Ops Center by 
computer message and occasional interpersonal 
interplay.  The focus throughout the game play was 
to gain sufficient information from other playing 
countries to build as strong a case as possible 
against the proliferation network involved in the 
illicit movement of the WMD-related materials.  In 
this effort, the exercise players dealt with and 
shared potentially sensitive intelligence which 
might well not be obtained, or released in court, in 
the real world. 
 
--------------------------- 
Plenary Session Discussions 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Throughout the week of the exercise, 
additional activities enriched the experience of all 
countries involved, participating and observing 
states alike.  An example was an industry workshop 
dealing with trade security.  Perhaps of most use 
overall were the plenary sessions held in the last 
two days, which discussed independently issues that 
the countries participating in the TTX were dealing 
with, and which finally served as a summation of the 
whole week's activity.  Some of these central 
questions were: 
 
-What domestic and international authorities do 
governments have to divert, board, and search a 
 
WELLINGTON 00000392  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
vessel? 
-What domestic and international legal authorities 
do governments have to detain goods and claim 
jurisdiction? 
-What evidence are countries properly relying on to 
divert, board, search, and detain goods, and how can 
countries address the issues of information 
classification and intelligence sharing? 
-What information can or should be shared with the 
media through the investigative process? 
 
Participant countries played the strongest role in 
attempting to answer these questions, explaining 
their respective decision-making process, and the 
various laws and authorities used within that 
process. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) By all accounts, Exercise MARU was a 
resounding success.  The Ambassador and the Acting 
Consul General in Auckland visited the virtual U.S. 
Ops Center, and were impressed with the complexity 
of the exercise and the quality of the U.S. 
involvement.  The field visits to New Zealand 
military installations, and especially the at-sea 
boarding exercises, contributed a strong sense of 
immediacy.  But the tabletop exercise was the major 
revelation, as it brought to focus the very real 
issues that would have to be confronted while states 
were trying to balance combating the threats of 
today's world with maintaining the legal norms that 
make our societies worth preserving.  There was a 
tremendous spirit of collegiality among the several 
hundred people assembled, which spoke well of what 
they had accomplished together, and what these 
continuing efforts could accomplish still. 
 
MCCORMICK