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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 14 USUN NEW YORK 001019 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CD CDG PARM PREL UNGA
SUBJECT: 63RD UNGA/FIRST COMMITTEE (UNFC): DAY FIVE AND SIX 
OF THEMATIC DEBATE - CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 
 
 This is UNFC-7 
 
--------------------- 
C1 Days 5 and 6 10-20 and 10-21 of Thematic Debate on 
Conventional Weapons - Summary 
--------------------- 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: The First Committee on Disarmament and 
International Security conducted its thematic debate on 
conventional weapons from October 20 to 22.  On October 20, 
the Chairperson of the Governmental Group of Experts (GGE) on 
an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) opened the debate. 
Representatives from the following states then spoke: France 
on behalf of the European Union (EU), Brazil on behalf of the 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and Associated States, 
Indonesia on behalf of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), 
Barbados on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), 
Haiti on behalf of the Central American Integration System 
(SICA) and Mexico, and Denmark. 
 
¶2. (U) During the morning of October 21, the Chairperson of 
the Third Biennial Meeting of States (BMS3) on small arms and 
light weapons (SA/LW) opened the debate.  Representatives 
from the following states then spoke: Ireland, Chile, Japan, 
South Africa, Pakistan, Jordan, Argentina, Jamaica, Mali, 
Kazakhstan, Norway, Fiji, Finland, and New Zealand. 
 
¶3. (U) During the afternoon session of October 21, the 
Chairperson of the Governmental Group of Experts (GGE) on 
conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus opened the 
debate.  Representatives from the following states then 
spoke: Russia, Lithuania, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, 
Sweden, Australia, Cuba, Indonesia, Mozambique, Thailand, 
Turkey, Republic of Korea (ROK), Canada, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Uruguay, Israel, United Kingdom, Tanzania, and Burkina Faso 
on behalf of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS).  In a right of reply, Syria responded to Israel's 
statement that it supplied arms to Hezbollah.  Syria argued 
that Israel continued to violate the Lebanese border and had 
brought terrorism to the Middle East. 
 
--------------------- 
10-20, Day 5 - Chair of the GGE ATT, France on behalf of the 
EU, Brazil on behalf of MERCOSUR and Associated States, 
Indonesia on behalf of the NAM, Barbados on behalf of 
CARICOM, Haiti on behalf of SICA and Mexico, and Denmark. 
¶4. (U) The Chairperson of the GGE on an ATT, Roberto Garcia 
Moritan of Argentina, highlighted the instruments the GGE 
considered important for an ATT, namely the guidelines 
adopted in 1996 by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the 
2001 UN Program of Action (PoA) on SA/LW.  The GGE considered 
the feasibility of an ATT from different perspectives.  It 
added that the GGE was the first opportunity that the UN had 
to analyze the possibility of such an instrument.  The GGE 
urged states to adopt national systems and domestic controls 
that apply strict standards but added that international 
agreements would be necessary to implement them. 
 
¶5. (U) Egypt stated that it believed an ATT might be a very 
useful initiative.  It advocated continued discussion with 
the "authors," including the United Kingdom, on the issue. 
It expressed hope that the language remained close to that of 
the GGE.  Russia also spoke, stating that it believed the 
question of arms trade regulation was very complicated and 
called for further, balanced steps to be taken.  It also 
stated that achieving consensus should remain a priority. 
 
¶6. (U) France on behalf of the EU: Called on states to commit 
national legislation to address illicit trade of SA/LW.  The 
EU expressed support for the Third Biennial Meeting of 
States' (BMS3) efforts in implementing the action program. 
It regretted, due to the attitude of one delegation (Iran), 
that the BMS3 report had to be adopted by a vote.  The EU 
called on states to implement fully the UN PoA on SA/LW.  It 
deemed the 2007 GGE report on SA/LW "substantial" and added 
that states should adopt its conclusions.  The EU reiterated 
support for an ATT, as well as the need to establish a UN 
working group on that issue.  The EU expressed support for 
expanding, by categories, the Register of Conventional Arms 
to include purchase information, production and national 
allocations, as well as SA/LW as a separate category. 
¶7. (U) Brazil on behalf of MERCOSUR and Associated States: 
Stated that transparency and confidence building measures 
(TCBMs) were an important way to boost world security.  It 
reiterated its support, since the 59th UN General Assembly 
(GA), for the Argentinean resolution on confidence building 
measures (CBMs) in the conventional weapons field.  MERCOSUR 
called for a follow-up mechanism on the UN PoA on SA/LW.  It 
welcomed Palau's signing of the Ottawa Convention.  MERCOSUR 
noted the GGE report on an ATT and added that there was 
growing support to establish standards to regulate arms 
trade. 
 
¶8. (U) Indonesia on behalf of the NAM: Called on states to 
provide assistance to strengthen the implementation of the UN 
PoA on SA/LW and advocated its early and full implementation. 
 The NAM also expressed support for the full implementation 
of the international marking and tracing instruments.  The 
NAM urged states to provide assistance to land mine clearance 
operations, victim rehabilitation, and access to technology, 
among other things.  It noted both the Cluster Munitions 
Convention (CMC) and the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (CCW) but did not explicitly express support for 
either. 
 
¶9. (U) Barbados on behalf of CARICOM: CARICOM called for 
greater transparency in arms trade and expressed support for 
strong arms trade regulation in that regard.  CARICOM 
reiterated its commitment to implementing the 2001 UN PoA on 
SA/LW.  It lamented an increase in drug trafficking and crime 
in the region, noting the closure in Barbados of the regional 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).  It added that 
reopening the office would signify a recommitment to 
combating those issues. 
 
¶10. (U) Honduras on behalf of SICA and Mexico: SICA expressed 
support for the UN PoA on SA/LW, as well as for the BMS3.  It 
highlighted its July 2007 Biennial Meeting outcome document 
advocating the need for a follow-up mechanism on the UN PoA 
on SA/LW.   It also expressed support for the UK resolution 
proposing establishing a group to discuss the issue, and 
eventually, to create an ATT.  SICA urged the donor community 
to provide technological and financial support to finalize 
de-mining tests and victim assistance.  (NOTE:  Member States 
include Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and Panama.  END NOTE.) 
¶11. (U) Denmark: Stated that it supported the ATT initiative 
and added that an absence of arms trade regulation continued 
to contribute to conflict and terrorism. Denmark emphasized 
that it supported the adoption of an ATT within the UN 
system, while respecting states' rights to possess weapons. 
Denmark called on states to prevent arms transfers that could 
contribute to violations of humanitarian law.  It welcomed 
the work and recommendations of the GGE on that issue and 
called for establishing an open-ended working group. 
 
--------------------- 
10/21, Day 6 - Chair of the BMS3 on SA/LW, Ireland, Chile, 
Japan, South Africa, Pakistan, Jordan, Argentina, Jamaica, 
Mali, Kazakhstan, Norway, Fiji, Finland, New Zealand, Chair 
of the GGE on conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus, 
Russia, Lithuania, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, 
Sweden, Australia, Cuba, Indonesia, Mozambique, Thailand, 
Turkey, Republic of Korea (ROK), Canada, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Uruguay, Israel, United Kingdom, Tanzania, and Burkina Faso 
on behalf of ECOWAS 
--------------------- 
 
¶12. (U) The Chairperson of the BMS3 on SA/LW, Dalius Cekuolis 
of Lithuania, stated that states agreed on the importance of 
regional approaches (e.g., meetings) on PoA implementation. 
He also called for establishing the United Nations Office for 
Disarmament Affairs' (UNODA) PoA Implementation Support 
System and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research's (UNIDIR) database to enhance information exchange 
and build national capacities.  He highlighted the need for 
national reporting, better use of civil society expertise, 
and bridging the New York and Geneva disarmament communities. 
 
 
¶13. (U) He stated that states agreed to implement 
recommendations of the GGE on illicit brokering and to use 
end-user certification/verification to address that issue. 
On stockpile management and surplus disposal, he stated that 
states agreed to focus on enhanced cooperation and compile 
lessons learned.   Concerning the International Tracing 
Instrument (ITI), he stressed the need for record keeping. 
 
¶14. (U) Ireland: Reviewed the main provisions of the CMC, 
referring states to the following web site: 
http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/conventi on.asp.  It 
praised the consensus adoption of the CMC.  Ireland quoted UN 
Secretary General (SYG) Ban Ki-moon, stating that the UN is 
ready to assist states to implement the Convention.  It urged 
its rapid entry into force. 
 
¶15. (U) Chile: Praised the Oslo process for having concluded 
with the CMC's adoption.  Chile added that it supported the 
regional conferences on cluster munitions and mentioned the 
upcoming conference in Quito, Ecuador, to take place before 
the CMC signing in December.  It also praised progress toward 
pursuing an ATT, noting that it had co-sponsored the 
resolution establishing an open-ended working group on that 
issue. 
 
¶16. (U) Japan: Highlighted the adoption of the BMS3 report 
and stated that the PoA Implementation Support System would 
be very helpful, noting that it had donated $48,000 to the 
1998 United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms 
database.   Japan advocated the need to establish 
international standards, highlighted its participation in the 
GGE meeting on an ATT, and noted its co-sponsorship of the UK 
resolution proposing further discussion of that issue.  Japan 
stated that it had been working to universalize the Ottawa 
Convention and added that it had donated $51 million to 
contribute to victim assistance. 
 
¶17. (U) South Africa: South Africa welcomed the BMS3 outcome 
and called on states to implement fully the UN PoA on SA/LW. 
South Africa stated that the Mine Ban Convention conference 
in November would entail requests for extension to clearance 
deadlines and called on states planning to request extensions 
to redouble their de-mining efforts. 
 
¶18. (U) Pakistan: Recalled that the first UNGA Special 
Session on Disarmament (SSOD-I) Final Document deemed global 
military expenditure a waste of resources and lamented the 
continued existence of such expenses.  Pakistan stated that 
there was a need to address trade in SA/LW but added that it 
should not divert focus from the impact of trade in combat 
aircraft, aircraft carriers, airborne and early warning and 
control systems, missile defense, etc.  It advocated the 
Treaty on Convention of Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) as a 
model for pursuing military security agreements in other 
regions.  Pakistan suggested that the UN Office for 
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) could register arms information 
and added that that could serve as an early warning system. 
 
¶19. (U) Jordan:  Introduced a draft resolution on the Ottawa 
Convention, noted that Australia and Switzerland were 
cosponsors, and stated that it included only procedural and 
technical changes.  Jordan called on the international 
community to provide more resources for mine clearance and 
victim assistance.  It stated that it had destroyed all of 
its anti-personnel mine stockpiles in 2003 and hoped to meet 
its treaty obligations by 2009. 
 
¶20. (U) Argentina: Introduced a draft resolution on an ATT. 
Argentina emphasized that the resolution recognized UN 
Charter Article 51 concerning states' rights to individual or 
collective self-defense in the event of armed attack, as well 
as states' rights to buy and sell weapons for defense needs. 
 
¶21. (U) Jamaica:  Stated that it implemented measures (e.g., 
a police anti-trafficking unit) over the past four years, 
with the assistance of U.S., UK, and French officials, to 
assist in combating drugs and crime.  Jamaica called on the 
developed states to assist developing states with 
implementing the UN PoA on SA/LW.  It expressed support for 
an ATT and advocated that it address the export, import, and 
transit of all conventional arms, including components, 
ammunition, and technology for their manufacture. 
 
¶22. (U) Mali: Stated that it set-up a framework for 
transboundary cooperation to exchange intelligence on 
criminal groups.  Mali added that it would soon host a 
conference in Bamako at which states can reaffirm their 
commitment to establishing peace and security in the region 
and to discuss the common problems they are facing (e.g. 
terrorism, drug trafficking, etc.). 
 
¶23. (U) Kazakhstan: Highlighted that it has provided 
information to the UN Register of Conventional Arms since 
¶1992.  Kazakhstan noted that it introduced a new law on 
export control last February.  Kazakhstan stated that its 
Parliament was finalizing the ratification process of the CCW 
and added that while it was not a signatory of Protocol II; 
it would comply with its provisions after its entry into 
force.  Kazakhstan also noted that it hosted a joint UN-EU 
regional seminar on promoting CCW universality in Central 
Asia last September. 
¶24. (U) Norway: Welcomed the adoption of the CMC and 
cautioned that cluster munitions could easily reach the 
magnitude of the land mine problem.  Norway added that it 
would work with other states parties on CMC implementation 
and universalization.  It advocated that mine clearance 
deadline extension requests should be well documented. 
Norway reconfirmed its support for the UN PoA on SA/LW and 
stated that it has provided financial support for its 
implementation. 
 
¶25. (U) Switzerland: On an ATT, it stated that the 
appropriate next step was to establish an open-ended working 
group.  Switzerland called on states to submit information to 
the UN Register of Conventional Arms and noted that the 
number of states providing information on imports and exports 
of light weapons has increased.  Switzerland noted the Ottawa 
Convention resolution, as well as challenges associated with 
meeting mine clearance and stockpile destruction deadlines. 
 
¶26. (U) Austria: Noted a project on the "Elaboration of a 
Legal Instrument for the Control of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in Central Africa," as well as the development and 
administration of training courses on stockpile management in 
Africa and the Balkans.  On cluster munitions, Austria stated 
that it adopted a law banning their use.  Austria highlighted 
its financing of projects (1.6 million Euros) relating to 
anti-personnel mines in Africa and southeastern Europe. 
¶27. (U) Colombia: Expressed support for the BMS3 and noted it 
implemented measures on the issue within the framework of the 
International Tracing Instrument (ITI).   Colombia called on 
states to honor their commitments pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1540.  It praised the GGE on an ATT and 
reiterated that it should reflect, under UN Charter Article 
51, states' rights to individual or collective self-defense 
in the event of armed attack, and to buy and sell weapons for 
defense needs. 
 
¶28. (U) Nigeria: It lamented rising military expenditures in 
light of increasing global poverty and highlighted the 1978 
SSOD-I calling for a reduction in military spending.  Nigeria 
noted the report of the GGE on an ATT and the BMS3 report to 
consider a PoA on SA/LW.  Nigeria quoted former U.S. 
President Eisenhower: "Every gun that is made, every warship 
launched, every rocket fired, signifies in the final sense a 
theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are 
cold and are not clothed."  It added that those words 
remained true today. 
 
¶29. (U) Belarus:  Established a system of state control on 
trade, use, and destruction of SA/LW.  Belarus also stated 
that under the auspices of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), it is implementing a project on 
SA/LW storage.  Regarding meeting its Ottawa Convention 
obligations, it lamented that it still faces the challenge of 
disposing of more than 3 million PFM1 mines and called on the 
international community for assistance. 
 
¶30. (U) Fiji: Welcomed the establishment of an open-ended 
working group on an ATT.  It urged member states for 
increased transparency and confidence building measures 
(CBMs) on registering conventional arms and reporting 
military expenditures.  Fiji stated the need for a follow-up 
mechanism on the UN PoA on SA/LW, and in particular, the 
acquisition of SA/LW by non-state actors. 
 
¶31. (U) Finland:  Stated that the adoption of the BMS3 
outcome document was a sign of progress and welcomed the 
recommendations of the GGE.  It expressed support for the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) convention 
on small arms and hoped it would soon enter into force. 
Finland stated that it expressed support for an ATT and for 
the GGE consensus report on that issue. 
 
¶32. (U) New Zealand: Stated that it would sign the CMC in 
December.  On the CCW, it stated that it continued to have 
reservations regarding the current approach being taken in 
the GGE on cluster munitions.  It reiterated its "strong" 
support for an ATT.  New Zealand called on states parties of 
the Ottawa Convention to provide assistance to states that 
would have difficulty meeting deadlines. 
¶33. (U) The Chairperson of the GGE on conventional ammunition 
stockpiles in surplus, Michael Hasenau of Germany, warned of 
the threats that poorly managed stockpile management pose, 
such as compromising peacekeeping operations.  He also spoke 
on how to attain successful stockpile management, such as the 
use of physical security systems to discourage loss or 
diversion.  He stated that the GGE recommended the 
implementation of training to develop "national skill" for 
stockpile management and added that those measures could be 
undertaken at the local, regional, and international levels. 
He said that the GGE believed that the international 
stockpile management guidelines would be useful to facilitate 
international cooperation.  In addition, the GGE urged states 
to pursue legislation governing stockpile management. 
 
¶34. (U) Russia: Stated that the 2001 small arms and light 
weapons (SA/LW) UN program of action (PoA) report failed to 
address important issues, such as the need for end-user 
certificates.  Russia advocated halting production of SA/LW 
on the basis of expired licenses, checking storage of those 
weapons, tightening control on their re-export, and 
introducing a ban on SA/LW to non-state end-users.  Russia 
criticized the GGE for not addressing whether an arms trade 
treaty (ATT) was practically feasible.  It agreed with the 
GGE's recommendation that it address the issue gradually. 
Russia argued that the "appropriate European mechanisms," 
such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), were malfunctioning.  It expressed intent to 
develop the UN Conventional Arms Register, however, it added 
that the Caucuses crisis called into question the 
practicality of such a measure. 
 
¶35. (U) Lithuania: As the President-designate of the Second 
Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V, it stated 
that the July Meeting of Experts had implemented a firm but 
flexible framework for international cooperation.  Lithuania 
stated that it would present the meeting's recommendations at 
the Conference in November.  It added that establishing an 
Implementation Support Unit would secure continuity and 
stability of states' support. 
 
¶36. (U) Trinidad and Tobago: Commended the GGE on ATT for 
exploring a comprehensive legally binding treaty to regulate 
arms.  Trinidad and Tobago stated that the GGE's report 
served as a sound basis for future efforts to address the 
issue.  It called for an ATT consistent with the UN Charter 
and international human rights and humanitarian law. 
 
¶37. (U) Sweden: Introduced a draft resolution on the CCW. 
Sweden reviewed the purpose of the CCW and stated that it was 
a tool to respond to humanitarian crisis.  Sweden noted U.S. 
ratification of CCW protocols and the amendment to Article 1. 
 
¶38. (U) Australia: Australia stated that it would make 
further contributions to the United Nations Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS) clearance of cluster munitions in Lebanon. 
It reiterated its support for an ATT and welcomed the report 
of the GGE on an ATT.  Australia called on states to ensure 
that their national measures (e.g., internal controls) were 
of the highest possible standards. 
 
¶39. (U) Cuba: Reiterated its support for the UN PoA on SA/LW 
and advocated states' rights to manufacture, import, and 
possess SA/LW in accordance with UN Charter Article 51.  It 
noted that the report of the GGE on an ATT highlighted the 
need for step-by-step consideration.  Cuba argued that for 
almost five decades a military superpower (the United States) 
had subjugated it to a policy of hostility and aggression. 
For that reason, Cuba argued, it was impossible for it to be 
a state party to the Ottawa Convention, as it needed such 
weapons to preserve its territorial integrity. 
 
¶40. (U) Indonesia: Welcomed the Third Biennial Meeting of 
States (BMS3) outcome and stated that it would continue to 
facilitate meetings in its region.  Indonesia expressed 
support for an ATT, provided that it respected states' rights 
outlined in UN Charter Article 51.   It added that it 
supported establishing an open-ended working group on an ATT. 
 Indonesia noted that it had fulfilled phase one of its 
Ottawa Convention obligations last February.  It highlighted 
that it co-hosted a workshop on the Convention's 
implementation and universalization in Bali. 
 
¶41. (U) Mozambique: It stated that it had done its best to 
clear land mines but that constraints on financial resources 
remained a burden.  As a result, Mozambique noted that it 
submitted a request to extend the mine clearance deadline to 
¶2014.  It added that it recently approved a national Mine 
Plan of Action for 2008 to 2012, aiming to eradicate mines 
and return people to their homes. 
 
¶42. (U) Thailand: It stated that it cleared approximately 63 
percent of the total mine-suspected areas and added that this 
year it set aside approximately $41 million to that end. 
Thailand noted the early October deaths of two Thai Army 
Rangers that occurred when they stepped on anti-personnel 
mines during a routine patrol.  It stated that it suspected 
the mines were of foreign origin. 
 
¶43. (U) Turkey: Expressed support for the BMS3 and 
highlighted its recommendation to establish a follow-up 
mechanism to the PoA.  It noted the international 
organizations' visit to the Turkish Munitions Disposal 
Facility and the Rehabilitation and Health Care Center for 
Mine Victims.  As of September 30, Turkey stated that it 
needed to destroy 1,980,109 anti-personnel mines, while 
underscoring that it had already destroyed the fuses of all 
those stockpiled. 
¶44. (U) India: Stated that it would contribute significantly 
to the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States.  India added that 
it would continue to pursue a ban on anti-personnel mines 
that addresses states' legitimate defense requirements.  It 
reiterated its proposal for a dialogue to consider a new and 
strengthened format of the CCW.  India also stated that it 
hoped for productive discussions in the November GGE meeting 
on cluster munitions in Geneva. 
 
¶45. (U) Republic of Korea: Noted that it joined CCW Protocol 
V which entered into force for the ROK in July 2008.  It 
added that it contributed to GGE discussions on cluster 
munitions.  It welcomed the report of BMS3 to consider the UN 
PoA on SA/LW.  It added that the report would serve as a 
valuable guide to point the way forward for implementation of 
the PoA and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI). 
 
¶46. (U) Canada: Expressed support for the BMS3 outcome, the 
GGE report on an ATT, and the draft resolution calling for an 
open-ended working group on ATT.  It also welcomed the ROK's 
draft resolution on illicit brokering.  Canada called on High 
Contracting Parties to the CCW to participate in the final 
week of negotiations on cluster munitions.  It noted that it 
provided $50 million to "mine action." 
 
¶47. (U) Cote D'Ivoire: Noted the 2006 creation of an ECOWAS 
convention that stipulated control over SA/LW production. 
Cote D'Ivoire stated that it would heartily welcome an ATT. 
It added that the ECOWAS convention could serve as a guide to 
the international community as it contained many principles 
of an international ATT.  Cote D'Ivoire warned that if the 
international community did not address illicit trade in 
SA/LW, it would continue to preclude sub-Saharan Africa from 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
 
¶48. (U) Uruguay:  Stated that it had a set of laws related to 
the production, import, export, transit, and re-transfer of 
SA/LW.   Uruguay noted that it had destroyed 35,000 illegal 
weapons between 1998 and 2008.  It highlighted that it 
organized a national seminar to discuss a new arms law that 
concluded with a commitment from all Uruguayan parties to 
submit it as soon as possible.  Uruguay reaffirmed that it 
would sign the Cluster Munitions Convention (CMC) in 
December. 
 
¶49. (U) Israel: Warned that Hezbollah, supported by Iran, has 
armed itself since 2006, and that Hamas is following closely 
in its footsteps.  Israel lamented the transfer of arms from 
Iran and Syria to Hezbollah, and called on the international 
community to address the transfer of arms to terrorists.  It 
highlighted its export control system, which it stated met 
standards set by the international supplier's regime.  Israel 
expressed support for the BMS3 outcome but regretted that a 
consensus could not be reached due to Iran's protest.  It 
added that Iran was the biggest supplier of arms to 
terrorists in the region. 
 
¶50. (U) United Kingdom: Stated that it had already taken 
practical steps to implement the CMC and reiterated its 
support for the Ottawa Convention.  It regretted that member 
states could not adopt by consensus the UN PoA on SA/LW but 
added that those that rejected it did so because of the 
process and not the content.  The United Kingdom reaffirmed 
support for an ATT, noting that some states were questioning 
the need for such a treaty.   However, it emphasized that 
"the time for an arms trade treaty is long overdue." 
 
¶51. (U) Tanzania: Warned that illicit trade in SA/LW has 
affected the entire African continent and could "suck in" the 
developed world.  Tanzania highlighted the link between 
development and security, noting the current financial 
crisis.  It lamented that Security Council resolution 1653 
(2006) had not accomplished its goal of disarming the Great 
Lakes region. 
 
¶52. (U) Burkina Faso on behalf of ECOWAS: Stated that the 
effects of the illicit trade in SA/LW in West Africa were 
evident and highlighted the ECOWAS convention established to 
address that issue.  ECOWAS advocated pursuing a legally 
binding treaty to regulate arms trade, which it argued would 
reduce conflict and promote human rights and democracy. 
¶53. (U) Right of Reply: Syria: In response to Israel's 
statement that Syria facilitates arms trade to Hezbollah, 
Syria stated that the border commission and Lebanese 
officials denied that there were arms transfers.  Syria 
accused Israel of violating the border and of dropping more 
than a million cluster munitions in Lebanon.  Syria also 
argued that Israel had brought terrorism to the Middle East. 
Khalilzad