VZCZCXRO1709
PP RUEHAST RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0291/01 3331339
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281339Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6075
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0644
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1199
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1139

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000291 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA 
JCS FOR J-5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR HAYES 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
EUCOM FOR J-5 
CENTCOM FOR J-5 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC NOVEMBER 26: GEORGIA JOINS CONSENSUS ON 
DECISION FOR MINISTERIAL 
 
REF: A. USOSCE 0274 
     ¶B. STATE 116705 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Georgia reluctantly joined consensus on a 
draft Ministerial decision that summarizes the FSC's 2008 
work and tasks it to submit progress reports to the 2009 
Ministerial.  At issue was a reference to the Georgia-Russia 
conflict in August 2008, which Russia wanted described as the 
Georgia-South Ossetia conflict.  The only language acceptable 
to all 56 pS was "the conflict in August 2008."  This action 
means that all FSC-related issues are closed and endorsed for 
transmission to Helsinki. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Maj Gen Paul Schafer, the director of strategy at 
U.S. European Command, offered a well-received presentation 
on the command's "strategy for active security."  In the 
working groups Germany proposed revisions to the Russian 
proposal for a single deadline for submission of Vienna 
Document defense planning information.  Estonia issued a 
revised draft decision for the agenda and modalities of the 
March 2009 cyber security workshop.  Washington, guidance is 
requested whether to join a UK-led "statement of concern" 
over new Russian visa procedures (see para 15).  End summary. 
 
Georgia Joins Consensus 
----------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Acting on last minute instructions from capital, 
Georgia (Giorgadze) announced it would reluctantly join 
consensus of the draft Ministerial Council decision on FSC 
issues (MC.DD/6/08/Rev.4).  At issue was the description of 
the FSC Security Dialogue earlier in the autumn session of 
the Georgia-Russia war in August 2008, which Russia insisted 
be described as the "Georgia-South Ossetia" conflict. 
Despite its continuing belief that Russia's invasion and 
continuing occupation of Georgia should be described as such, 
Georgia agreed to language that would simply commend the 
discussion in the FSC of "the armed conflict in August 2008." 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) Russia's (Ulyanov) response to Georgia's decision 
was cool, although it offered to continue the discussion at 
future meetings while objecting to the "tenor" of Georgian 
remarks.  The chair, Finland (Kangaste), predicted to USDel 
that Georgia would make an interpretive statement at the 
Ministerial in Helsinki the first week in December.  An 
accompanying FSC decision to forward the draft Ministerial 
decision to the Ministerial was adopted without discussion 
(FSC.DEC/15/08). 
 
EUCOM Strategy for Active Security 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Maj Gen Paul Schafer, USAF, the director of 
strategy, policy and assessments (J-5) at U.S. European 
Command, explained the command's "strategy for active 
security," which is designed to defend the U.S. while 
creating and maintaining an environment that supports the 
strategic interests of the U.S., its Allies, and partners in 
Europe, including the Russian Federation.  Schafer described 
potential threats in the EUCOM region, including terrorism, 
interruption of energy supplies, cyber attacks, and regional 
instability in the Caucasus, Balkans, Turkey, and the Levant. 
 
USOSCE 00000291  002 OF 003 
 
 
 He then explained how the continuing forward presence of 
U.S. forces, albeit greatly reduced from Cold War levels, 
coupled with enduring regional partnerships facilitate 
security cooperation, exercises and training, contingency 
planning and crisis response. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In response to questions from France and Germany, 
Schafer said EUCOM welcomed the EU's contributions to 
security in the region, noting the EULEX ("EU law 
enforcement") mission in Kosovo.  While EUCOM did not, he 
said, have extensive contact with OSCE, the command followed 
closely and supported the OSCE's work.  Schafer, in response 
to Finland, said EUCOM took the growing cyber threat 
seriously and worked with U.S. Strategic Command to deter and 
prevent cyber attacks. 
¶7. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) noted the EUCOM area of 
responsibility included the entire Russian Federation.  What 
did that mean for Russia and for EUCOM?  Schafer said the 
U.S. had organized its security strategy around geographic 
regions, each of which included a high-level commander who 
was meant to expedite communication and cooperation between 
the U.S. and a region's countries.  He noted that this 
arrangement also seemed to work well for the Russian defense 
ministry. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Ulyanov also observed that EUCOM had cooperated with 
and trained Georgia's military for many years, and that 
Georgia "had used that training not only in Iraq but also in 
South Ossetia."  Had EUCOM drawn any conclusions or made any 
changes in its cooperation with Georgia as a result of "the 
events in August?"  Schafer noted that Georgia had provided 
the third largest contingent to coalition forces in Iraq, 
after the U.S. and the UK.  As to the future, EUCOM would 
"look at the best way forward based on the circumstances." 
 
 
Cyber Security Workshop 
----------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Estonia announced it had "taken account" of all the 
suggestions it had received on the draft decision for the 
agenda and modalities of the March 2009 cyber security 
workshop (FSC.DEL/177/09/Rev.1).  Russia informed it lacked 
instructions and asked for more time to study the proposal. 
The chair said it wanted the decision adopted before the end 
of the autumn session on December 17 and will reissue the 
paper as a chair's draft decision. 
 
Single Deadline for Defense Planning Information 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Russia announced that it had received suggestions 
from Germany on the proposal for a single deadline for 
submission of Vienna Document defense planning information 
(FSC.DEL/494/07/Rev.3/Corr.1).  The edits would align the 
proposal more closely with the text of the Vienna Document. 
Russia will issue a revised draft to take account of these 
suggestions shortly.  (FSC.DEL/494/07/Rev.4) 
 
AIAM Agenda 
----------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The chair urged adopting of the French-authored 
 
USOSCE 00000291  003 OF 003 
 
 
agenda and modalities for the 2009 Annual Implementation 
Meeting (FSC.DEL/179/08).  The paper will be reissued as a 
chair's draft decision.  No delegation made comment. 
 
Code of Conduct 
--------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Belarus wants to substitute the Helsinki Final Act 
for the existing reference to the UN Charter in the third 
paragraph of the preamble to the draft decision on an update 
of the Code of Conduct questionnaire (FSC.DD/14/08) and 
include a new paragraph in the preamble on the indivisibility 
of security. (FSC.DEL/186/08)  Denmark and Sweden immediately 
signaled concern over deletion of the UN Charter language. 
The chair recalled that the UN Charter reference was included 
to capture the concerns of some delegations for gender issues. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Colonel Anton Eischer (Austria), the FSC Code of 
Conduct coordinator, announced his intention to turn to the 
third "cluster," "supplementary proposals," while awaiting 
further developments on the Code questionnaire.  Germany 
(Schweizer) applauded this, noting its own supplementary 
proposal for regular review of the Code. 
 
Vienna Document Inspectors' Visas 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU The UK (Gare) proposed to NATO delegations they 
issue a "statement of concern" over a recent change to 
Russian visa procedures for Vienna Document inspectors that 
would affect the UK, Canada, and the U.S., as well as some 
other participating States.  Russia now requires visas be 
obtained from a Russian consulate in the inspecting state if 
it will use points of entry (POE) other than Moscow, St. 
Petersburg, or Kaliningrad (refs A and B). 
 
¶15. (SBU) Gare suggested that paras 88 and 121 of the Vienna 
Document 1999 allow the receiving state to change the POE 
even after the inspecting state has designated one.  This 
might mean a UK inspector intending to enter Russia via 
Moscow could be denied entry if Russia were to change the POE 
to, e.g., Volgograd, which would require a visa issued in 
London rather than the "plane-side" visa available in Moscow. 
 Mission requests Washington indicate if it would be 
interested in joining the "statement of concern." 
 
Next Meeting 
------------ 
 
¶16. (SBU) The next meeting of the FSC on December 10 will 
feature Security Dialogue presentations by Ambassador Jorge 
Urbina, chairman of the UN Security Council Committee 
established under Resolution 1540, and Ambassador Lubomir 
Kopaj, the OSCE project coordinator in Ukraine, on 
rehabilitation of areas affected by explosive remnants of 
war.  There will be no FSC meeting on December 3 because of 
the Ministerial Council meetings in Helsinki, December 1-5. 
SCOTT