VZCZCXRO5736
PP RUEHAST RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0280/01 3251320
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201320Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6053
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0640
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1195
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1135

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000280 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA 
JCS FOR J-5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR HAYES 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
EUCOM FOR J-5 
CENTCOM FOR J-5 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC NOVEMBER 19: GEORGIA ISOLATED ON MINISTERIAL 
DECISION 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Georgia could not agree to language in the 
draft Ministerial decision describing the Security Dialogue 
discussion of the August conflict.  Georgia is willing to 
continue negotiations.  The EU and the U.S. restated their 
opposition to a Russia proposal for an embargo of heavy 
weapons to Georgia.  Delegations, including Russia, 
apparently are waiting for instructions on the latest version 
of a revised Code of Conduct Questionnaire.  End summary. 
 
FSC Issues MC.DD 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Georgia (Giorgadze) reported it was unable to join 
the apparent consensus at 55, including Russia, on the latest 
revision of the draft Ministerial decision on FSC issues 
(other than SALW and stockpiles of conventional ammunition) 
(MC.DD/6/08/Rev.4).  Giorgadze said the language in OP1 tic 2 
describing the Security Dialogue discussions of the August 
Russia-Georgia war, "the armed conflict in August 2008," did 
not capture the fact that these discussions had concerned 
"armed conflict between, among, or including participating 
States of the OSCE." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Giorgadze noted that, although much time in the 
Security Dialogue had been spent in discussing the April 
downing of a Georgian UAV over Abkhazia by a Russian fighter, 
Georgia was not insisting on any reference to this in the 
decision.  However, the reference to the August conflict 
should be accurate, independent of questions of blame or 
responsibility for starting the war.  Georgia is willing to 
continue negotiations over the language.  The chair indicated 
it may call an additional meeting before delegations leave 
for the Helsinki Ministerial. 
 
EU Supports Rev.4 
----------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) France (Simonet), on behalf of the EU, reported that 
it fully supported Rev.4 of the draft decision 
(FSC.DEL/180/08).  Separately, Georgia informed it was almost 
ready to support a further revision of OP1 tic 2 proposed by 
the chair that would have deleted all reference to the August 
conflict, but was dissuaded from doing so by the UK and 
Germany who believed this would have been conceding too much 
to Russia. 
 
Russia Charged Georgia with "Over-Politicizing" 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) reported that Rev.4 was acceptable, 
including the German-proposed OP3 language on 2009 progress 
reports and the OP1 tic 2 reference to the "armed conflict in 
August 2008."  Ulyanov charged Georgia was trying to 
"over-politicize" the draft decision by imposing its version 
of the August events on others.  Georgia wanted language that 
implies the August conflict was exclusively between it and 
Russia, yet this was "patently untrue."  Rather, from its 
outset and for the last fifteen years, the conflict has been 
between Georgia and South Ossetia.  It was Georgia that chose 
to escalate this conflict in August by its massive use of 
force against Tskhinvali.  Russia was forced to intervene to 
reimpose peace and stability in the region. 
 
 
USOSCE 00000280  002 OF 004 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Ulyanov conceded that, ideally, "everyone's views" 
would be reflected in the decision, but this was not 
realistic.  The decision deals with many issues, not just the 
August conflict, which is why Russia supports the compromise 
language put forward by the chair.  The Rev.4 language does 
not threaten any of Georgia's security interests and Georgia 
should not jeopardize and the decision should not be 
sacrificed because of the Georgia issue. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Switzerland (von Arx) aligned with the EU position. 
Von Arx noted that the 2009 FSC chairs, France, Georgia, and 
the UK, will need ministerial guidance.  He urged delegations 
to work for consensus and warned that the FSC discussions 
could have an impact on the Geneva talks on the Georgia 
situation.  Luxembourg (Pilot) agreed, and observed a good 
compromise requires both sides to be "equally frustrated." 
 
Cyber Security Workshop Agenda and Modalities 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Russia supported the draft agenda and modalities for 
the March 2009 cyber security workshop.  Ulyanov said the 
document was well-drafted and Russia intended to provide a 
keynote speaker with further details to follow.  Germany 
(Schweizer) supports the draft in principle although it will 
provide some drafting suggestions.  Germany also will provide 
a speaker.  The U.S. (Silberberg) reported it had provided 
drafting suggestions to the sponsors and also intended to 
provide speakers.  Austria (Eischer), a sponsor with Estonia 
and Lithuania, promised to consider all comments and urged 
participating Sates to consider extra-budgetary contributions 
to pay for the workshop. 
 
Arms Embargo on Georgia 
----------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) noted that talks in Geneva on the 
situation in Georgia led to its proposal for an embargo of to 
Georgia (FSC.DEL/ 155/08/Rev.1).  Concerned states must 
prevent a destabilizing accumulation of arms that can lead, 
as they have already, to the outbreak of conflict.  Russia 
wanted to prevent Georgia from acquiring arms that could be 
used for "offensive" purposes; these were described in OP1 
and were drawn from the OSCE Principles Governing 
Conventional Arms Transfers and the OSCE Document on SALW. 
They include: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, 
large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack 
helicopters, warships, and missiles/missile-launchers 
including MANPADS. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Ulyanov stressed that all participating States 
needed to fulfill the political commitments reflected in 
these OSCE documents.  Although these were "major" documents, 
they have not worked well for the last several years as many 
pS simply do not abide by their principles. 
 
EU: Embargo Unnecessary 
----------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) France, on behalf of the EU, referred to its 
earlier statement on the proposal, which declared that the EU 
complied with OSCE and other international norms pertaining 
to arms transfers; the embargo was therefore unnecessary 
 
USOSCE 00000280  003 OF 004 
 
 
(FSC.DEL/170/08) . 
 
U.S. Will Continue to Support Georgia 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) The U.S. (Silberberg), drawing on remarks made by 
Under Secretary of Defense Edelman and Assistant Secretary of 
State Fried (PC.DEL/763/08), noted that Georgia, as a 
sovereign country, should have the ability to defend itself 
and to deter renewed aggression.  The U.S. has provided 
training and equipment to Georgia to help its 
counter-terrorist efforts, initially within Georgia and later 
as part of the multinational coalition in Iraq.  The U.S. and 
NATO had, in the wake of the August conflict, offered Georgia 
assistance in rebuilding its infrastructure and military. 
The U.S. will continue to carefully and responsibly consider 
Georgia's needs in these areas. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Georgia (Giorgadze) agreed with Russia that the 
region was still tense, but the better response would be for 
Russia to allow international observers into the regions it 
and its South Ossetian allies occupy.  Russia was itself had 
broken its political commitments by providing heavy weapons 
to South Ossetian and Abkhazian separatists.  Giorgadze 
repeated his earlier call for an independent international 
investigation of the August war and the events leading up to 
it.  He recalled that a UN investigation of the April UAV 
shoot-down had concluded that a Russian military aircraft was 
responsible but Russia, despite its avowed support of the UN, 
still refused to acknowledge responsibility. 
 
Russia Attacks U.S. Position 
---------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Russia responded that there was no evidence that 
Russia had supplied heavy arms to South Ossetia.  If it had, 
Ulyanov reasoned, South Ossetia would not have needed 
Russia's help in August.  No one quibbled with the U.S. 
assertion that Georgia had a right to defend itself, but 
Georgia had used its arms instead to commit aggression. 
Noting that the U.S. had provided counterterrorism training 
to Georgia, Ulyanov said this proved "the road to hell was 
paved with good intentions" as Georgia used the training to 
attack Russian peacekeepers and innocent South Ossetians. 
Ulyanov repeatedly demanded to know if the U.S. was saying 
there were some political commitments it need not uphold?  As 
for the UN investigation of the UAV incident, Russia was 
still waiting for evidence withheld by Georgia. 
 
AIAM Agenda and Modalities 
-------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) France, the incoming FSC chair, circulated a draft 
decision for the agenda and modalities of the 2009 Annual 
Implementation Assessment Meeting (FSC.DEL/179/08).  Simonet 
said that the meeting of Heads of Verification (HOV), held on 
the eve of the AIAM in 2008, would likely be held at the end 
of the year as part of the annual information exchange.  This 
change was in response to the request of some pS. 
 
¶16. (SBU) The UK (Gare), concurred with Simonet's schedule 
proposal and noted it would be the FSC chair in the autumn 
2009 session.  Switzerland also supported holding the HOV 
 
USOSCE 00000280  004 OF 004 
 
 
meeting late in the year. 
 
Code of Conduct Questionnaire 
----------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Only Ukraine commented on the draft update of the 
Code of Conduct Questionnaire by supporting in full the 
latest version (FSC.DD/14/08).  Separately, the Code 
coordinator, Colonel Anton Eischer (Austria) told USDEL that 
he and most delegations were waiting on Russia before 
deciding how to proceed.  U.S. proposals pertaining to 
question III.1.3 on ensuring public access to information 
about the integration of armed forces into civil society and 
use of the word "measures" in the Questionnaire are still 
under consideration. 
 
MANPADS in Cyprus 
----------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) The Czech Republic announced it was prepared to 
assist the Republic of Cyprus in destroying surplus MANPADS. 
The Secretariat is developing a unified response to Cyprus's 
earlier request. 
 
SCA Coordinator Report 
---------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Lieutenant Colonel Nils Peterson (Denmark), the FSC 
stockpiles of conventional ammunition coordinator, announced 
the OSCE and UNDP legal staffs had reached agreement on 
mechanisms to resolve earlier difficulties in transferring 
funds between the two organizations when engaged on joint 
projects.  Peterson said this agreement would allow MONDEM 
(Montenegro demilitarization) joint projects to be completed. 
 
Next Meeting 
------------ 
 
¶20. (U) The next FSC meeting will be on November 26 and 
feature Major General Paul Schafer, USAF, the U.S. European 
Command director of strategy and plans, who will address in 
the Security Dialogue the command's "Strategy for Active 
Security." 
FINLEY