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PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #3120/01 3162254
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 112254Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8699
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6320
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2295
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 0883
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 3243
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 4668
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 1454
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 7187
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUHPSAA/COMMARFORPAC
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHKO/USDAO TOKYO JA
RHMFISS/USFJ

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 003120 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOD FOR OSD/ASA/SEDNEY, HILL, BASALLA 
PACOM FOR J3, J5 POLAD 
USFJ FOR J00, J01, J5 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2023 
TAGS: MARR PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN ROLES, MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES 
WORKING GROUP 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer.  Reasons 1.4 (B) (D) 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: The bilateral Roles, Mission and Capabilities 
Working Group (RMC WG), co-chaired by Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Sedney and State Department Japan Office 
Director Russel, along with Deputy Director General 
counterparts from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and 
Defense, met in Tokyo on October 7.  Highlights from the 
three-hour meeting include: 
 
-- Bilateral Planning: The United States pressed for Japan to 
complete more site surveys sooner and to provide a timeline. 
MOD and MOFA indicated a greater understanding of the 
importance of accurate assumptions in planning.  They also 
acknowledged the usefulness of a plan execution matrix in the 
bilateral Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 5055. 
 
-- Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM): Japan reiterated 
support for the flexible activation of the mil-mil Bilateral 
Coordination Centers and stated the need for consideration on 
how to more flexibly activate the policy-level BCM entities. 
 
-- NEO: MOD agreed that early completion of surveys of ports 
and coordination with relevant ministries is important for 
NEO. 
 
-- Cluster Munitions (CM): MOD requested cooperation in 
preventing Japan's planned ratification of the Oslo 
Convention from forcing the Japanese government to ask USFJ 
to limit the storage or employment of CM in Japan. 
 
-- Training on Guam: Japan's Self Defense Forces are 
examining opportunities for conducting bilateral, JSDF-only 
joint service, and bilateral joint exercises on Guam. 
 
-- Information Sharing: Both sides agreed to establish an 
Executive Steering Group to oversee information sharing 
efforts and issues. 
 
-- Command and Control Working Group: The work is complete 
and the results will be fed into other working groups, 
incorporated into plans and validated during exercises. 
 
-- Capability Assessment Group: Work on the bilateral 
airpower assessment will continue with a workshop on 
capability-based planning, agreement on terms of reference 
and commencement of a six month study. 
 
-- Extended Deterrence: Japan wants continued dialogue to 
gain better understanding of U.S. policy and dissuade 
doubters in Japan.  The US-side indicated its unwavering 
commitment to meet its treaty obligations. 
 
Both sides agreed to hold the next RMC WG early in 2009.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (U) The bilateral Roles, Mission and Capabilities Working 
Group (RMC WG) met in Tokyo on October 7.  Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Sedney and State 
Department Japan Office Director Daniel Russel led the 
U.S.-side, which included participants from the Joint Staff, 
U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) and 
Embassy Tokyo.  Ministry of Defense (MOD) Deputy Director 
General for Defense Policy Ryutaro Matsumoto and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Deputy Director General for North 
American Affairs Koji Haneda co-chaired the Japan side, which 
included representatives from the Japan Joint Staff Office 
(JSO).  The following are highlights from the presentations 
and discussions during the meeting. 
 
Bilateral Planning Overview 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) USFJ presented a timeline for the bilateral updating 
of Contingency Plan 5055-09, due for completion in September 
¶2009.  Responding to DASD Sedney's inquiries, MOD DDG 
Matsumoto said that Japan is not considering any new roles 
and missions for the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) under 
the new guidance driving the update.  Turning to surveys of 
Japanese public and commercial airports and seaports, MOD 
representative said Japan had completed five surveys and 
would finish two more this year.  The data gained from these 
site surveys should be reflected in CONPLAN 5055.  The U.S. 
side pressed Japan to complete the surveys of the remaining 
airports and seaports as soon as possible and said the 
results of all port surveys need to be reflected in the 
CONPLAN.  The JSO J5 representative agreed with the point, 
and stated that this is necessary to fully realize the 
benefits of the planning process.  DASD Sedney reiterated 
past U.S. requests for a timeline for completion of the 
surveys but received no commitment from MOD and MOFA 
counterparts. 
 
Planning Assumptions 
-------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S) The United States highlighted for Japan the 
importance of realistic assumptions in the planning process 
and the important role policymakers play in developing these 
assumptions.  Incorrect or unrealistic assumptions will lead 
to faulty planning and poor operations.  The U.S. side 
suggested that assumptions in the CONPLAN 5055-09 planning 
process should be separated into those relevant for 
peacetime, situations in areas surrounding Japan (SIASJ) and 
the defense of Japan in war/conflict situations.  DDG 
Matsumoto described this as a very effective way to approach 
the assumptions, while cautioning that more study of the 
specific information, such as the authorization of strike 
options during SIASJ, is needed. 
 
Update on Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM) 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶5.  (S) Following up on the flexibility Japan had previously 
shown on the activation of the mil-to-mil Bilateral 
Coordination Centers, the United States stressed that 
flexibility is also needed in activating the more 
policy-oriented BCM structures, especially the Joint 
Coordination Group (JCG), that include relevant ministries 
and agencies (RMA) besides MOD and MOFA.  Using those agreed 
upon BCM structures to bilaterally coordinate on matters that 
RMA's have jurisdiction over, such as airspace, frequency 
allocation or access to ports, will be critical during 
peacetime on the road to a contingency and during the 
transition to SIASJ or a wartime environment. 
 
¶6. (S) MOD, after describing the political realities and 
legal guidelines they are operating under, agreed that crisis 
situations reduce timelines and increase the need for greater 
information flow.  While politics and legal grounds may 
prevent the activation of the BCM prior to declaration of 
SIASJ, which MOD DG Matsumoto acknowledged as a problem, 
preparation and coordination needs to happen before, not 
during, a crisis.  He reiterated his support for the early 
activation, including during peacetime, of the mil-mil BCC 
that will allow for coordination between U.S. forces and the 
JSDF.  DDG Matsumoto said more work needs to be done on 
figuring out how to utilize the JCG and coordinate on policy 
without the full standup of the BCM.  MOFA DDG Haneda agreed, 
highlighting examples of how early RMA involvement and 
coordination on contingencies is critical.  Both the U.S. and 
Japan acknowledged the process will be reviewed and improved  
during CONPLAN 5055 revision and exercised during the KEEN 
EDGE-09 exercise. 
 
Plan Execution Matrix 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) The United States explained why a plan execution 
matrix, encompassing unilateral and bilateral political 
decision points, would be an important part of CONPLAN 5055. 
Clear understanding of the decision points, especially those 
relevant to the transitions from peacetime, to SIASJ, to 
wartime, will allow military planners to forecast paths 
forward.  The matrix would not be a commitment to a specific 
timeline or to specific decisions.  JSO expressed concern 
with how the matrix would reflect the political uncertainty 
inherent in Japanese decision making.  DASD Sedney noted that 
uncertainty in general is both the challenge of and purpose 
for planning, with the goal being to reduce, or at least 
recognize, the uncertainty.  MOFA DDG Haneda commented that a 
matrix would be a useful tool to reduce the unpredictability 
in decision making during contingencies. (NOTE: JSO had been 
hesitant to fully take on this tasking proposed by USFJ 
without policy-level acknowledgment and approval, as many of 
the decision points are outside of JSO control.  By gaining 
MOFA and MOD tacit approval, JSO should now be able to move 
forward with developing the matrix in concert with USFJ.  End 
note.) 
 
Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (S) MOFA presented an overview of the bilateral work to 
develop standard operation procedures to handle NEO. While a 
good amount of the work is the purview of MOFA and State, 
more interaction between USFJ and JSDF on NEO, especially 
during mil-mil exercises, would be beneficial to the process. 
 USFJ confirmed that NEO will be part of the KEEN EDGE-09 
exercise.  DASD Sedney noted that NEO, which will start well 
before a SIASJ, involves complicated processes (gaining 
access to ports, coordinating U.S. and JSDF force flows 
supporting unilateral and bilateral missions, etc.) that 
overlap military, government and local activities.   Having 
site surveys of ports completed as soon as possible is 
critically important to NEO and Japan's Transportation of 
Japanese Nationals Operations (TJNO) operations, DASD Sedney 
pointed out.  MOD DDG Matsumoto agreed on the need for 
completion of the site surveys and coordination with Japan 
Coast Guard, police and fire authorities, and local 
governments sooner rather than later. 
 
Cluster Munitions (CM) 
--------------------- 
 
¶9. (S) MOD reviewed the likely timeline for Japan's signing 
and ratification of the Oslo Convention banning CM, its plans 
for replacing the lost capability and concerns how these 
efforts could cause the Diet to question USFJ's storing CM in 
Japan.  Submitting a budget request for alternative weapons 
and systems that purportedly equal the effect of CM will 
cause some Diet members to question USFJ's need for CM to 
defend Japan.  This could result in the Government of Japan 
being forced to request the United States to remove CM from 
Japan or to limit their employment on Japanese territory. 
MOD and MOFA want to prevent this situation and seek to 
exchange information with the United States at the mil-mil 
level and then develop a way forward to deal with the Diet 
and public pressure.  USFJ offered that it is not possible to 
fully replace the capabilities afforded by CM with 
alternative measures. By giving up this capability Japan is 
therefore ceding a role and mission to the United States. 
One way to not get trapped into the Diet scenario MOD laid 
out is to publically state that Japan gave up CM for 
humanitarian reasons and is now reliant on U.S. forces to 
fill the capability gap created. 
 
Training on Guam 
---------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) PACOM presented an overview of training areas and 
types of bilateral, unilateral, single service and joint 
training opportunities that are and will be available on 
Guam.  The JSO presentation focused on three types of 
training ) bilateral exercises (service oriented), JSDF-only 
joint service exercises, and bilateral joint exercises.   The 
JSDF will focus on bilateral first and then expand to joint 
and joint/bilateral in the future.   Functionally, the JSDF 
would like to focus on force deployment, electronic warfare, 
ballistic missile defense and TNJO (Transportation of 
Japanese Nationals Overseas), with each training event being 
approximately seven days long, occurring three times a year 
and taking place on U.S. facilities.  PACOM responded that 
the prospect for Japan to train at Guam largely depends on 
the scale of the exercise.  PACOM advised that the training 
on Guam would be viewed as an augment to the bilateral 
training currently conducted on Mainland Japan and Okinawa, 
and that the United States fully expected the JSDF to 
maintain and modernize mainland training ranges. 
 
Information Sharing Roadmap 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11.  In response to Japan's early request to establish an 
Information Sharing Roadmap Working Group, the United States 
proposed forming an Executive Steering Group (ESG) that PACOM 
J5 and OSD/Japan Desk would co-chair on the U.S. side. The 
ESG would take stock of the full range of information 
currently being shared, take up issues that are not yet being 
handled, and attempt to resolve issues that current bilateral 
entities cannot solve.  The ESG will not present formal 
reports to the RMC WG but can refer issues to the group. 
Japan accepted the counterproposal and said it would name its 
leadership soon. 
 
Space Policy 
------------ 
 
¶12. (S) After reviewing changes in Japan's ability to use 
space for security purposes as a result of the Fundamental 
Space Law passed in May 2008, MOD introduced its priorities: 
 
-- Strengthen intelligence functions 
-- Increase its technology base and technological cooperation 
with civilian space entities 
-- Evaluate possibilities to field assets and technology, 
such as early warning satellite, signal intelligence 
satellites, compact reconnaissance satellites and sensor and 
jamming resistant technologies 
-- Coordinate with the United States on the use of space 
 
MOD has representatives in the Cabinet Secretariat's Space 
Development Strategy Headquarters that are developing a Basic 
Space Plan.  Internally, MOD is developing guidelines and 
policy preferences to be ready for the bureaucratic 
reshuffling that is expected.  These efforts will influence 
the drafting of the Mid-Term Defense Plan and the review of 
the National Defense Policy Guidelines.  DASD Sedney noted 
that space policy is definitely an RMC issue, as new 
capabilities will affect bilateral roles and missions. 
Coordination and cooperation also provide opportunities for 
progress on information sharing and information security, 
DASD Sedney stated. 
 
Command and Control (C2) Working Group 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) JSO reviewed the results of the C2 WG.  These 
results will feed into other working groups and bilateral 
activities, get incorporated into plans and be validated 
during exercises.  USFJ noted that the structure identified 
by the C2 WG presents a range of options, is not meant to be 
restrictive, and both countries' commanders have the ability 
to modify it based on real life circumstances. 
 
Capability Assessment Group (CAG) 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) The United States previewed the road forward for the 
CAG's work on airpower: a weeklong workshop by Booz Allen on 
capability based assessment and planning in October; 
agreement on a Terms of Reference for the CAG Airpower 
Assessment Group; and the start of a six-month airpower study 
in November or December.  The JSO said the Japan Maritime 
Self Defense Force is eager to begin a maritime capabilities 
assessment. 
 
Extended Deterrence 
------------------- 
 
¶15. (S) During a separate session attended by a limited 
number of Japanese participants, MOFA explained that extended 
deterrence is critical to Japan and hence Japan would like 
input into U.S. policy considerations.  Japan is concerned 
about any shifts in policy that might occur during political 
leadership transitions in either country, especially given 
the deteriorating nuclear situation around Japan as North 
Korea continues to develop capabilities and China expands its 
arsenal.  There are some in Japan that are discussing 
indigenous nuclear development in Japan, partly due to a lack 
of confidence in the U.S. extended deterrence.  By ensuring 
better understanding of U.S. policy and plans, we improve the 
Japanese government's ability to allay these fears and build 
more trust of extended deterrence.  As such, MOFA and MOD are 
looking forward to continued dialogue with the Department of 
Defense.  DASD Sedney stated that the U.S. policy of extended 
deterrence has applied to Japan for decades.  The U.S. is 
committed to meeting treaty obligations to Japan and allies. 
This U.S. commitment remains strong as does its intent to 
maintain capabilities, political and military, that will 
allow it to carry out these obligations. 
 
¶16.  (U) DASD Sedney's staff and EAP/J Director Russel 
cleared this cable. 
SCHIEFFER