VZCZCXRO8344
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #2619/01 3291717
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 241717Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9302
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002619 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL IS
SUBJECT: USSC GEN. DAYTON'S NOVEMBER 18 MEETING WITH IDF 
CENTRAL REGIONAL COMMMANDER 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Summary: The United States Security Coordinator 
(USSC) LTG Keith W. Dayton and members of his staff met with 
IDF OC Central Command MG Gadi Shamni and members of his 
Command at Shamni's Neve Yaakov Headquarters on November 18. 
The USSC discussed the establishment of a base for the 
Palestinian National Security Forces, equipping Jordan 
International Police Training Center-trained Palestinians 
with Level II protective headgear, and raised the recent 
deportation of a Palestinian logistics officer because he 
held a Gaza ID as well as increased IDF daylight incursions 
into Jenin.  The USSC also asked about the level of 
coordination between IDF and PASF in Hebron, and IDF plans to 
relax access and movement in the West Bank.  The following 
provides the USSC's account of his meeting with MG Shamni. 
End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The USSC addressed the on-going issue of attempting 
to get the IDF to agree to a location within the Jenin 
Governorate for the establishment of a base for he 
Palestinian National Security Forces (NSF).  n response to 
the USSC's latest presentation on .S. views, MG Shamni asked 
how long the camp woud take to build if the IDF approved the 
Kfar Dan location.  MG Shamni explained that as the Central 
Command head, he had taken many risks in allowingthe PASF to 
operate more freely than in the past He then asked whether 
the USSC was willing to take a risk on the Kfar Dan location, 
stating: "If you are willing to take the risk, we will 
approve."  MG Shamni noted that such approval was conditional 
-- if the Palestinians continue to perform "in the manner 
they are now, if they don't put the "old" (non-Jordan 
International Police Training (JIPTIC)-trained) Palestinian 
forces in the camp, then we will allow them to occupy the 
camp once it is completed."  MG Shamni said if the 
Palestinians "go back to their old ways," then the IDF will 
not allow them to occupy the camp.  He asked if the USSC 
agreed; the USSC stated that he did. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The USSC then addressed the issue of the on-going 
inability to get the IDF to approve helmets for 
JIPTIC-trained Palestinians. The USSC pointed out that he was 
told the IDF-Israeli MOD had previously approved JIC Level II 
protective headgear -- a protection level that would prevent 
the penetration of 9mm rounds but not 5.56mm rounds (the 
standard IDF issue M-16 ammunition).  The IDF tested the 
helmet provided by USSC staff with 9mm, not 5.56mm rounds. MG 
Shamni acknowledged that they had previously agreed to allow 
the supply of Level II helmets but demurred that there was a 
misunderstanding on their part between themselves and the 
Israeli MOD, and that in any case, he no longer agreed. "You 
must understand, my non-uniformed special units use 9mm 
pistols and I need to provide for their safety," MG Shamni 
said.  He then stated that he couldn't approve helmets with 
the same level of protection that his forces use. He passed 
around an example of a helmet they would approve and then 
contradicted himself by pointing out that this was the same 
helmet his forces used and that he would approve their 
acquisition by JIPTIC-trained PASF units.  MG Shamni promised 
that his COGAT representative, BG Pauli Mordechai, would 
provide the USSC with the Israeli vendor information. (Note: 
The USSC is currently awaiting this information.  End note.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) The USSC raised the issue of the 2nd Special BN 
logistics officer who was deported to Gaza by the IDF because 
he was a Gaza ID holder. The USSC explained how greatly 
embarrassing it would be for Israel, the PA and the US should 
this individual, who was fully vetted by Israel, allowed to 
train in Jordan, and returned to the West Bank, fall into 
Hamas' hands and be publicly exploited for propaganda 
purposes, especially during the very time that the PA is 
conducting a security crack down on Hamas in the West Bank. 
The USSC told MG Shamni that he would like to see this 
individual returned as soon as possible and would also like 
to see some mechanism put in place that precludes such 
deportation of Jordan-trained PASF members to Gaza from 
happening again. MG Shamni agreed that he would do both and 
instructed his COGAT representative, BG Pauli Mordechai, to 
ensure that both issues were dealt with. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The USSC raised the Palestinian complaint that 
incidences of IDF daylight incursions in Jenin were on the 
rise. MG Shamni replied that "we're doing a lot not to 
embarrass them."  He noted an increase in Jenin-based 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) activity in the last two 
weeks.  MG Shamni said he had briefed the USSC in their last 
meeting on this activity, and had asked the USSC to tell the 
PASF to act.  He noted two main problems currently in Jenin: 
"the quick impact economic projects are not doing well and 
the Palestinians are not doing enough about the PIJ problem." 
 He reiterated the importance of acting upon intelligence as 
soon as it is received -- such intelligence could be passed 
to the USSC to check, but said "sometimes we have to (act) 
 
TEL AVIV 00002619  002 OF 003 
 
 
during the day time." 
 
¶6. (SBU) The USSC indicated it would not be necessary to 
check intelligence as MG Shamni has his full trust. The USSC 
asked that at a minimum, the IDF inform the Palestinians of 
the reasons why they are doing what they are doing to 
minimize misunderstandings. MG Shamni replied that the IDF 
would do so, and suggested the Palestinian population "feels 
better about their daily life."  He said the Palestinians 
told him that one of the reasons why President Abbas is 
acting more assertively is that the PASF are doing things 
they have never done before.  According to MG Shamni, the 
Palestinians said until relatively recently they couldn't 
enter the Jenin refugee camp, or "a time when Arafat couldn't 
enter without being shot at -- now they can go in anytime 
they want to." 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Central Command Judea and Samaria Division 
Commander, BG Noam Tibon interjected that the Palestinians 
"have to deal with the PIJ -- the first mission is to deal 
with terror."  MG Shamni told the USSC that in instances of 
day light incursions, it was he and BG Tibon who decided when 
to act, not the local IDF commanders.  He noted that the IDF 
takes great risks in order to minimize embarrassing the 
Palestinians -- this includes accelerating missions at the 
expense of increasing the likelihood of IDF casualties.  This 
leaves the IDF vulnerable to potential questions from the 
public and political leadership regarding why a mission was 
not conducted more slowly, with less risk to IDF soldiers. 
"We take risks again, thinking about the embarrassment (to 
the Palestinians) -- we're not playing for a tie, but are 
willing to take a risk," MG Shamni said. (Note: When queried 
by the USSC, relevant PASF sources stated that they did not 
see a rise in PIJ activity in Jenin.  Additionally, USSC 
staff officers queried a panel of Israeli Shin Bet 
Palestinian-focused analysts on the question of an upsurge in 
PIJ activity in Jenin, and was told that their sources and 
analysis did not support this assertion.  End note.) 
 
¶8. (SBU) The USSC raised the issue of a recent IDF incursion 
into an area that PASF forces were operating near Hebron and 
asked about the state of coordination between the IDF and 
PASF in the area.  In response, MG Shamni stated the USSC was 
referring to the Wadi-al-Hireh, and said he decided to act 
because it was important.  MG Shamni said the IDF informed 
the Palestinians in order that there would be "no reason we 
would collide."  "We spoke about Hebron before;  Hebron is 
not Jenin," MG Shamni said.  He noted that the IDF and PASF 
must operate differently in Hebron and "some things (the 
PASF) do well and some things they don't."  BG Tibon stated 
that the IDF coordinates with the PASF face-to-face in Hebron 
because "things are not easy there -- it is such a small 
place to operate."  MG Shamni stated that while cooperation 
was good, they had one problem with the hotline between the 
IDF and the PASF. He note that the IDF wants the PASF to 
place the hotline in a centrally-located command post, but 
the PASF has yet to comply. The USSC told MG Shamni that his 
Canadian contingent was working with the Palestinians to make 
this happen. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The USSC briefed MG Shamni on the US Department of 
Justice-led Judicial Project and told him that in the coming 
weeks, individuals from Justice would be on the scene to help 
and advise Palestinian judges and prosecutors in an attempt 
to initially address this hole in the security spectrum. MG 
Shamni agreed that this was a good idea and encouraged the 
USSC to find a way to help train Palestinians in 
interrogation methods. "They had it before but have lost this 
(skill) and need it badly," MG Shamni said. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Addressing the overall level of PASF proficiency, 
MG Shamni said the IDF was "very pleased with the way they 
are functioning," and that they would assess a way forward in 
the next two to three weeks.  He said the PASF are "very 
determined against Hamas," but there is still room for 
improvement.  MG Shamni described coordination with the IDF 
as "very good, very frank -- they are not cheating like they 
used to, and this is a big change."  He said the USSC has 
"succeeded in putting something into them," and added that 
the IDF is putting forth great efforts as the IDF believes 
they can do more.  MG Shamni suggested the main problem now 
is "a lack of transparency." He said the PASF expects the IDF 
to cooperate with them on intelligence, but the PASF must 
first function with more transparency to get more 
intelligence.  "We ask them to share with us their 
investigation reports so that we can help them build a big 
picture -- in some cases we and they have, but they need to 
be more transparent," MG Shamni said.   He noted that 
Tirawi's General Intelligence group hasn't changed much since 
his supposed departure -- "we're starting to see changes, but 
they are not there yet." MG Shamni noted that the PASF had 
 
TEL AVIV 00002619  003 OF 003 
 
 
investigated a Hamas militant in Nablus and made an arrest 
that led to the capture of 16 M-16s that were stolen or taken 
from dead IDF soldiers. (Note: Shamni failed to mention that 
they may have been acquired from Israeli criminal or via 
individual IDF criminal sources.  End note.) MG Shamni said 
the PASF must return the M-16s.  He also noted that he is 
under considerable pressure and criticism from "settlers, 
pundits, and politicians" for "being nice to the 
Palestinians."  MG Shamni asked the USSC about future 
training plans and time tables for the deployment of newly 
JIPTIC-trained PASF forces. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The USSC briefed MG Shamni on the outlook for the 
remainder of the year and asked him about his plans for 
relaxing "access and movement" within the northern West Bank. 
MG Shamni told the USSC that he would remove "many things 
soon."  He noted the start of the Economic Conference in 
Nablus, and hoped this will "change the environment."  MG 
Shamni suggested the IDF would follow the conference with 
"more things that will ease the lives of the population -- 
changes within certain check points; some regulations will 
change."  He suggested the Palestinians "will feel the 
difference."  He added that he was working closely on all 
aspects of this with his military and political counterparts 
to gain their support so they would not oppose these upcoming 
changes. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The USSC repeated a question that Secretary Rice 
had asked General Jones: where should the next phase take 
place within the West Bank?  MG Shamni told the USSC that the 
IDF wanted to avoid pressure, and that they would find a 
solution to this with the Palestinians. He noted that they 
are currently discussing the merits of the two models of 
Jenin and Hebron.  "Which is better: the Jenin model where 
you might have two or three (Palestinian) battalions stuck in 
a small patch, or perhaps the Hebron model?" MG Shamni asked. 
 He suggested the advantage of the Hebron model is that PASF 
forces can move from "place to place -- it is much more 
effective."  He opined that Hebron might be the better model, 
and added that "nobody can arrest him for being naive." 
 
¶13. (SBU) The USSC asked MG Shamni how his soldiers had been 
successful at keeping the PASF separated from the settlers in 
Hebron. MG Shamni replied, "We designed this to keep them 
apart, we give the settlers a good feeling of protection and 
security with visible IDF forces and we drew the right lines 
for the Palestinians to operate. We are happy that the 
Palestinians are not crossing them. If they did, it would be 
a problem. I should say, my challenge, not problem." 
 
¶14. (SBU) The USSC passed on the PASF complaint-request that 
they be allowed to establish further Palestinian check-points 
in the Bethlehem area in order to stop Palestinian 
Hebron-based criminals from fleeing there, without having 
these check points being closed down by local IDF commanders. 
BG Tibon told the USSC that he would instruct his local 
brigade commander to consult with the Palestinian commander, 
Colonel Suleiman, in order to come to a working 
understanding. The USSC then asked Shamni about recent 
Israeli activities at the Container Check-Point and asked 
that Shamni share the details of that with the Palestinians 
in order to avoid misunderstandings. Shamni told the USSC 
that they were making improvements to the facilities that 
would benefit the Palestinians and that he would keep them 
fully informed. 
 
¶15. (SBU) The USSC told MG Shamni that PASF commanders told 
him they see no increase in the activities of PIJ. He asked 
if Shamni would share something with him that he could use to 
better influence the Palestinians to take a closer look at 
this issue. Shamni told the USSC that he would do so directly 
in a near term meeting with Palestinian Police Chief, MG 
Hazem Attalah, and Palestinian Advisor, Hassan A-Sheikh. BG 
Tibon interjected, "when it comes to terror, we will take 
care of it." MG Shamni then told the USSC that the overall 
trust and confidence was changing. "During our meetings with 
them, there is no frustration. We used to see a certain 
moment when (frustration) would come out.  Now they are much 
more concentrated on their mission." BG Tibon stated that the 
international community must push for a working Palestinian 
economy -- "the main issues for the Palestinians are economy, 
economy, economy." 
 
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