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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001416 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR USOECD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2018 
TAGS: ECON KCOR KJUS PGOV


SUBJECT: THE ANTI-CORRUPTION AND TRANSPARENCY SERVICE: AN 
UNDERWEIGHT ENTRANT IN THE ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORT 
 
ROME 00001416  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Elizabeth Dibble for reasons 1.4 
b and d  

¶1. (C) Summary. Italy abolished its Office of the High 
Commissioner Against Corruption in June 2008. The Berlusconi 
Government defended the closure as a cost-cutting move, and 
said the functions of the office would be subsumed by 
another, newly created GOI office, the Anti-Corruption and 
Transparency Service. Post recently visited the new office 
and came away with the impression that it does not have the 
capacity to be a major player in anti-corruption efforts. It 
is intended as a ""coordinating hub"", with only analytical and 
advisory responsibilities, and has no line authority over 
judicial or other relevant law and order institutions. End 
summary. 

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BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT AXES ANTI-CORRUPTION OFFICE, CREATES A 
NEW ONE 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Soon after returning to power, Silvio Berlusconi's new 
government raised eyebrows by abolishing Italy's Office of 
the High Commissioner Against Corruption.  This move took 
place in the midst of controversial (and eventually 
successful) efforts by Berlusconi to secure for himself 
immunity from prosecution while in office. Asked then by 
EMBOFFS about the closure of his office, Acting High 
Commissioner Ermanno Granelli said, ""this is an absurdity 
which will not only impair our ability to fight corruption in 
ItaQ but will tarnish our image further internationally."" 
Granelli implied that the government considered the High 
Commissioner Office to be an irritant and that it used budget 
cuts as an excuse to eliminate it. 

¶3. (SBU) The abolishment of the High Commissioner Office 
caught the attention of OECD officials involved in 
implementation of that organization's Qi-bribery 
convention. In July 2008 the OECD's Mark Pieth, the 
Anti-Bribery Working Group Chair for the past decade, wrote 
to the Italian government about ""recent changes to Italy's 
criminal legal system, which may have repercussions in the 
fight against the bribery of foreign public officials."" In 
his letter, Pieth went on to seek ""clarification on why the 
Italian Government has taken steps to abolish the office, and 
the impact that this may have on Italy's fight against 
corruption, including enforcement of the offense of bribing a 
foreign public official under the Italian Penal Code."" (Note: 
According to Italy's compliance review conducted by the OECD 
and published in March 2007, the abolished Commission was not 
empowered to pursue cases of foreign bribery falling under 
the Anti-Corruption Convention. Nevertheless, Pieth's concern 
was well-placed, in that weak efforts against domestic 
corruption cannot be expected to lead to stronger measures 
abroad. End Comment) 
 
¶4. (SBU) The GOI has responded to concerns about the 
elimination of the High Commissioner Office by stating that 
all of the functions of that office would be taken on by a 
new organization -- The Anti-corruption and Transparency 
Service (SAeT) which has been set up under the GOI's Minister 
for Public Administration and Transparency, Renato Brunetta. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
EMBASSY VISIT TO NEW ANTI-CORRUPTION OFFICE 
------------------------------------------- 
 

¶5. (C) In an effort to determine if the new organizatiQwill 
be effective, ECONOFF recently called on Magistrate Silvio 
Bonfigli, Deputy Director of SAeT.  SAeT personnel were 
helpful, and seemed enthusiastic about their new 
responsibilities, but the information they provided calls 
into question the ability of SAeT to have a significant 
impact on Italy's domestic corruption and ability to adhere 
to international committments: 
 
-- Limited advisory role: SAeT's three main activities under 
its mandate are mostly analytical and advisory. They include: 
1)  setting guidelines for the Italian public sector, 2) 
monitoring and mapping the risk of corruption within the 
public administration, and 3) drafting a national plan 
against corruption. 
 
-- Narrow public sector scope: SAeT's anti-corruption 
activities only cover the government sector. This narrow 
bailiwick excludes even members of Parliament (unless they 
perform a public administration role Qa government 
institution). Its mandate does not cover Italian private 
sector companies either.  As for enforcement of the OECD 
anti-bribery convention, Bonfigli explained that perhaps his 
organization might be able to do something in this areQ but 
only if the bribe payer is an Italian parastatal. However, he 
warned that this is only SAeT's interpretation of its 
mandate; it could be challenged by Italian parastatals who 
could claim that they operate in a private sector legal 
regime and are thus not subject to SAeT's public sector 
scope. 
 
-- Fewer resources: Its staff consists of 15 experts and two 
senior directors (vice the 60-person staff of the High 
Commissioner). 
 
-- Not much authority: SAeT does not have any supervisory or 
oversight authority over any other GOI anti-corruption 
institution.  SAeT will thus operate as a ""coordinating hub"" 
and hopes to ""delegate"" a lot of its work to other GOI 
institutions (the Carabinieri, customs, the Bank of Italy and 
others).  Given the storied independence of the Italian 
judiciary and the lack of line authority over institutions 
with potential anti-corruption mandates, it is difficult to 
see SAeT having much of an impact. 
 
-- Less independence than the former High Commissioner 
Office: While never very effective, the High Commissioner's 
Office appeared to enjoy some independence needed by an 
anti-corruption watchdog by virtue of the fact that it was 
funded by and reported to Parliament. SAeT, in contrast, has 
been placed under a Berlusconi government minister who 
reports to the Prime Minister. SAeT has no independent 
funding. 

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COMMENT:  SAeT UNLIKELY TO PUT A DENT IN ITALIAN CORRUPTION 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 

¶6. (C) In our work with the High Commissioner's Office, we 
had found that organization to be well-intentioned but 
largely ineffective. We went to SAeT hoping to find the 
beginnings of an organization that might be able to take 
effective action on Italy's pervasive corruption problem. 
There was some reason for hope: Minister Brunetta, under whom 
SAeT is operating, is by far the most energetic and 
aQessive of the GOI's reformers.  Our visit to SAeT, 
however, left us disappointed. Because of its reduced level 
of independence, smaller size, and more circumscribed 
bailiwick, we think SAeT is likely to prove even less 
effective than the organization that it replaced. 
SPOGLI