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Viewing cable 08OTTAWA1424, OTTAWA HOSTS LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES INFORMAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08OTTAWA1424 2008-11-07 16:37 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ottawa
VZCZCXRO5960
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBZ RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHDU RUEHFL RUEHGI RUEHIK
RUEHJO RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHPOD RUEHRN
RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHOT #1424/01 3121637
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071637Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8702
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 1709
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1380
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3383
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0258
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 001424 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM EAID ZI CA
SUBJECT: OTTAWA HOSTS LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES INFORMAL 
MEETING ON ZIMBABWE 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Canada hosted an informal meeting of 
like-minded countries on Zimbabwe in Ottawa on October 30. 
Delegates agreed that MDC and ZANU-PF are in the midst of a 
power struggle to which there is no easy solution in sight. 
Several countries expressed concern at the Like-Minded 
Group,s limited ability to influence a resolution to the 
current stalemate.  Participants acknowledged the limited 
range of options the international community has available 
and agreed that the best course of action is to be guided by 
what MDC is willing or able to achieve through the 
negotiations and to facilitate MDC,s effectiveness where 
possible.  There was also consensus that conditions on the 
ground are deteriorating rapidly.  The U.S. proposed 
development of a consensus on benchmarks and continued 
engagement with regional leaders, emphasizing the interests 
of the region in resolving the crisis.  Broad agreement 
emerged that the international community would be in a 
position to provide additional calibrated assistance as soon 
as credible governmental partners emerge.  Canada undertook 
to write a paper laying out short-term options for a 
diplomatic strategy and public diplomacy messaging based on 
the meeting,s outcome, as well as to debrief South Africa on 
the proceedings of the conference.  Canada,s Ambassador in 
Harare promised to debrief both MDC and ZANU-PF leaders on 
the broad sense of the meeting.  The Harare Fishmongers Group 
was tasked to continue operationalizing the principles for 
reengagement.  Conferees agreed on the need more fully to 
engage the African Union (AU) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) in resolving the crisis and on 
the efficacy of broadening the negotiating structure to 
include the AU.  End summary. 
 
Update on Situation 
------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Canadian Ambassador to Harare Barbara Richardson and 
UK Ambassador to Harare Andrew Pocock opened with overviews 
and discussion of recent political developments in Zimbabwe. 
Richardson urged conferees to judge whether and when to 
re-engage with Zimbabwe on the basis of democratic outcomes 
in the currently stalemated talks among MDC leader Morgan 
Tsvangirai and ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe.  MDC interlocutors 
have no faith in Thabo Mbeki as a mediator, according to both 
Pocock and Richardson.  ZANU-PF and Mbeki view the deadlock 
as related to only one issue, control of Home Affairs, said 
Pocock.  MDC, on the other hand, objects to ZANU,s 
unilateral actions including appointments of governors, 
ministerial designations, continuing intransigence, and 
ongoing violence by ZANU-PF supporters and militias, 
according to Pocock.  All parties want a SADC Summit, he 
said, and Mugabe in particular is comfortable with such 
plenary meetings, given his past ease in dividing and 
conquering the SADC countries. 
 
Policy Issues and Responses 
--------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) The U.S. delegation briefed on the humanitarian 
situation and responded to the Chair,s request for 
discussion of policy responses and diplomatic activities. 
Currently over one million are in need of food assistance, 
but the situation is much more complex, as basic services in 
Zimbabwe collapse after years of mismanagement.  There is 
currently an appeal in place by the WFP and the UN, and it is 
Qcurrently an appeal in place by the WFP and the UN, and it is 
critical that donor countries reconsider their pledges as the 
crisis deepens.  In addition, access continues to be an issue 
that requires donor -- but particularly UN -- attention. 
Although the GOZ ban on NGO activities has been lifted, there 
continue to be instances of local government interference in 
the distribution of assistance based on need.  Also, actions 
taken by the GOZ in the financial arena are having a negative 
impact on NGO abilities actually to deliver assistance. 
 
4.  (SBU) The U.S. head of delegation suggested that policy 
responses include supporting MDC,s position while providing 
strategic technical assistance to strengthen the MDC,s 
ability to engage ZANU-PF in negotiations.  Such assistance 
could address deficiencies in messaging and communications. 
In response to the three scenarios presented in the 
Fishmongers, report, the U.S. suggested that the most likely 
would be weak reform initially.  Ultimately, assistance would 
also be needed to build the capacity of the strategic 
governing structure of the office of the Prime Minister, 
parliament, and local government if a transitional governing 
 
OTTAWA 00001424  002 OF 003 
 
 
arrangement is to yield results.  The U.S. also urged 
continued engagement with regional leaders, emphasizing the 
interests of the region in resolving the crisis.  While most 
delegations stressed the centrality of South Africa to 
resolving the current impasse, the U.S. pointed out the 
important role to be played by Tanzania and the potential of 
expanding the negotiating structure to provide for a more 
active role on the part of the AU.  The U.S. also proposed 
development of a consensus on benchmarks; while it was clear 
that all delegations support the broad principles for 
reengagement, it would be equally important to agree on what 
constitutes success in a calibrated approach to 
re-engagement.  Early opportunities include cessation of 
violence, appointing the PM and his deputies, submission and 
repeal of key legislation in parliament, and appointing a new 
governor of the RBZ.  Change at the RBZ was among the 
economic steps that the Fishmongers' Group emphasized needed 
to come early. 
 
5. (SBU) Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade Director General for Africa Janet Graham 
outlined Canada,s three-pronged approach: continued 
humanitarian support to avert crisis conditions; pushing for 
an African-led approach to solve the political stalemate; 
and, strong public condemnation of human rights abuses by the 
Mugabe government and ZANU-PF affiliated militias.  Pocock 
again urged donors to support MDC as it sets the terms for 
negotiations, chief among them control of the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe and the retirement or firing of the police 
commissioner. 
 
Donors Await Credible Government 
-------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The discussion of re-engagement scenarios was 
chaired by Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
Director General Nadia Kostiuk, and began with a report 
prepared by the Harare Fishmongers' Group.  African 
Development Bank (ADB) Senior Advisor Graham Stegmann said 
the ADB will continue its new emphasis on helping fragile 
states to reform and strengthen.  It has no plans, however, 
to re-engage with Zimbabwe until a credible governmental 
partner emerges that reflects the will of the people of 
Zimbabwe.  Stegmann noted that progress and reform in 
Zimbabwe will depend on credible people assuming important 
roles within a new government and pursuing a real reform 
agenda.  He said Zimbabwe,s economic recovery challenges are 
compounded by a lack of understanding among all political 
leaders of the true damage that Zimbabwe,s economy has 
sustained. 
 
7. (SBU) Stegmann commented that a recovery program must have 
the full buy-in of all parties to achieve real momentum.  He 
noted that donors will likely look for early signs of 
credibility by the new government, including appointment of a 
respected figure as the head of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
(RBZ) and an early audit of the RBZ.  The ADB can offer 
expertise in agriculture, water, sanitation, infrastructure, 
accountability operations, and lines of credit for exporters. 
 Zimbabwe must repay its arrears to the ADB as a 
pre-condition for technical assistance and lines of credit, 
which is a non-negotiable pre-condition, according to 
Stegmann.  The ADB has no funding to help forgive Zimbabwe,s 
arrears to the bank (although the delegation requested 
Qarrears to the bank (although the delegation requested 
contributions to the ADB,s Fragile States Facility, which 
could fund arrears clearance).  Immediate flashpoints between 
donors and the new government are likely to be land reform, a 
timetable for lifting of sanctions, and investor protections. 
 
8. (SBU) The World Bank,s Peter Nicholas said the Bank 
strongly endorsed the analysis of the ADB on the problems 
facing Zimbabwe as well as the rules for re-engagement in 
Zimbabwe by international financial institutions.  Once a 
credible government partner exists, the World Bank stands 
ready to provide humanitarian assistance, analytical policy 
support, and programs to treat and combat HIV/AIDS, said 
Nicholas.  The Bank is working on proposals to make available 
a $5 million fund for coping and survival mechanisms as well 
as a $10 million grant for maize seed purchase and 
distribution, tightly integrated with the FAO,s global 
program. 
 
9. (SBU) Unlike the ADB, the World Bank has funding set aside 
to assist in the clearance of Zimbabwe,s arrears, but the 
 
OTTAWA 00001424  003 OF 003 
 
 
new GOZ will need to become HIPC-eligible to gain access to 
the Bank,s special arrears clearance program.  Nicholas 
highlighted that the Bank has gained important experience in 
several other countries in security sector reform, including 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, and it stands 
ready to help implement those best practices in Zimbabwe.  In 
an apparent plea against benchmarks for reengagement, UNDP,s 
Zimbabwe technical director Mark Simpson cautioned that 
Zimbabwe, like all fragile states in transition, can and will 
perform well and poorly simultaneously after it makes the 
transition to a post-Mugabe government.  He said donors must 
manage their own expectations in this light and make their 
domestic constituencies understand the disjointed dynamic of 
reform. 
 
10. (SBU) CIDA Acting Director General Louise Clement said 
the donors must align their goals with those of the new 
government when it comes.  She emphasized the important role 
of Zimbabwean civil society in crafting benchmarks for the 
new government.  Canada will remain cautious on re-engaging 
in Zimbabwe and will likely advocate that many of the 
Like-Minded Group,s benchmarks should be viewed as 
pre-conditions for further steps and deeper re-engagement 
with the new government.  Canada recognizes the need for 
flexibility in managing the fluid nature of reform with a new 
government, said Clement, but Canada does want the group to 
agree on minimal standards for deeming benchmarks as having 
been met.  She urged the conference to task the Fishmongers' 
Group with further work on benchmarks and minimum 
expectations for a new government. 
 
11. (SBU) Sweden,s Ambassador to Zimbabwe Sten Rylander 
seconded the Canadian proposal to task the Fishmongers' Group 
on benchmarking and minimum standards.  Sweden will step 
forward with short-term humanitarian relief but cautioned 
that it will be "quite strict" in requiring progress on 
benchmarks in return for long-term recovery assistance. 
Rylander also reiterated Sweden,s offer to host a donor 
conference at the appropriate time.  He urged caution in 
pushing for early elections once a transitional government is 
in place. In Sweden,s estimation, early elections often do 
more harm than good.  Germany,s representative Zimbabwe desk 
officer Kristina Jonek said the group should take a 
step-by-step approach ("we will deliver when you deliver") 
and agreed with France,s advocacy for a pragmatic approach 
to dealing with Zimbabwe. 
 
12. (SBU) The UK will judge any new government by what it 
does, not by who it appoints, said Ambassador Pocock.  He 
urged the group to consider ways to support the MDC, civil 
society, and the parliament as they stand up to Mugabe and 
ZANU-PF.  The international community must engage African 
leaders and publics intensively and at every level to achieve 
a shared analysis of the situation in Zimbabwe and secure 
agreement on a common path forward, said Pocock.  South 
Africa is the key player in applying outside pressure, said 
Pocock, and, unless it can be prodded to move from analysis 
to action, we have "no hope" of bringing about change in 
Zimbabwe.  Pocock also urged the conference to begin planning 
for worst case scenarios to manage the consequences of 
failing to solve the crisis.  Those consequences include: 
Qfailing to solve the crisis.  Those consequences include: 
final middle class flight; final infrastructure collapse; 
potential internal conflict or civil war; and, large 
increases in displaced persons, both internally and 
regionally. 
 
13. (SBU) Countries and organizations attending the October 
30 Meeting included Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States, African Development Bank, European Commission, UNDP, 
and the World Bank. 
 
14.  (U)  AF/S has cleared this message. 
 
Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at 
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada 
 
WILKINS