VZCZCXRO3712
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0910/01 3231416
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 181416Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9332
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1259
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000910 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/RPM, L/EUR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2018 
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR ECON EPET CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS:  ROC CONDEMNS TURKISH NAVY HARASSMENT IN 
ITS EEZ 
 
REF: A. URBANCIC-FITZPATRICK EMAIL OF 11/14/08 
     ¶B. ANKARA 1986 
     ¶C. NICOSIA 813 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (U) This cable contains an action request -- please see 
Paragraph 9. 
 
¶2.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Cypriot Foreign Ministry on November 14 
summoned the Ambassador to protest Turkey's alleged same-day 
harassment of two RoC-contracted vessels conducting seismic 
exploration in waters Cyprus considers part of its exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ).  MFA Permanent Secretary Nicolas Emiliou 
made no specific request of the Ambassador during the 
20-minute meeting, but, "given your relationship with 
Turkey," implied the USG should caution Ankara that such 
behavior was unacceptable.  The Ministry intended to summon 
ambassadors from the other P-5 nations to conduct similar 
briefings later in the evening, he added.  On November 15, 
the UK High Commissioner in Nicosia informed the Embassy that 
London was prepared to demarche Ankara and even issue a 
public statement in support of the RoC maritime claims. 
Turkish and T/C contacts long have warned the GoT would take 
steps to prevent RoC-sponsored mineral exploration as long as 
the Cyprus Problem remained unsettled.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------ 
You Must Come...Urgently 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) MFA Permanent Secretary (D-equivalent) Nicolas 
Emiliou urgently summoned the Ambassador the afternoon of 
November 14 (Ref A).  In his usual somber tone, the MFA 
diplomat informed that there had been an incident hours 
earlier off the southwest coast of Cyprus.  There, two 
scientific vessels, respectively flying Panamanian and Sierra 
Leonian flags, were conducting seismic research on behalf of 
the Republic of Cyprus.  They were approached by one or two 
Turkish Navy ships and, under orders to depart the area or 
otherwise face unspecified but serious consequences, 
eventually retreated into RoC territorial waters.  "The act 
represented the culmination of provocative Turkish behavior 
that had commenced when Cyprus signed a maritime delimitation 
agreement with Lebanon, but was the first time Turkey 
directly interfered with ongoing Cypriot activities," Emiliou 
asserted.  Other recent provocations included Turkish 
live-fire military exercises in 2007 just outside RoC 
territorial waters that endangered civilian maritime and air 
traffic. 
 
¶4.  (C) A signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), the Republic of Cyprus had rights to resource 
exploration and exploitation in its EEZ, Emiliou continued 
(Ref B).  The incident had occurred well within its exclusive 
zone, only 27 nautical miles off the island.  Turkey 
maintained its own maritime claims that far exceeded those 
stipulated in the UN convention, however, and was 
aggressively arguing the spot in question lay on its 
continental shelf.  Emiliou noted that the Turkish MFA 
website carried thinly-veiled threats warning Cyprus not to 
survey in the area.  Further, on October 8 the Turkish Navy 
had warned Cyprus directly to halt exploration activities 
(NFI).  Turning again to the November 14 incident, the GoT 
vessels had further violated international law by not 
identifying themselves, the MFA diplomat alleged.  One had 
gotten close enough to the research ships to show its hull 
number -- F927.  The Turkish captain had threatened 
(presumably by radio) unspecified action should the civilian 
vessels not retract their equipment and depart the area, 
Emiliou continued.  They did, and retreated to RoC 
territorial waters.  (Note:  DoD sources were unable to place 
the Turkish naval vessel "F927" in the area on November 
13/14.  The frigate F240 was off the southeast coast of 
Cyprus shortly beforehand, however, and conceivably could 
have steamed westward to intercept the exploration vessels.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
High-level Instructions to Engage 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) RoC President Demetris Christofias himself had 
ordered the MFA to demarche UN P-5 embassies immediately upon 
word of the incident, Emiliou noted.  The U.S. was first in 
 
NICOSIA 00000910  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
line, owing to its close relationship with Ankara. "We know 
you support Turkey's eventual European Union accession," he 
continued, "and this is unacceptable behavior for an aspiring 
EU state."  Cyprus recently had felt pressure to "show more 
understanding" on opening additional EU Acquis chapters, 
specifically Energy.  Yet acts of aggression like this 
incident were exactly the reason the RoC was blocking -- and 
would continue to oppose -- green-lighting those negotiations. 
 
¶6.  (C) President Christofias had no intention of allowing 
the maritime incident to derail current Cyprus Problem 
negotiations with Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, 
Emiliou assured.  Clearly, however, this type of unwarranted 
aggression did not contribute to a constructive environment 
for the talks.  "We believe your assistance here is vital," 
Emiliou concluded. 
 
------------------- 
Others Get Involved 
------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) On November 15, resident UK High Commissioner Peter 
Millett contacted the Ambassador to relay London's latest 
thinking on the dispute.  As a fellow UNCLOS signatory which 
sided with Cyprus in this EEZ dispute, HMG was prepared to 
demarche the Turks in Ankara, Millett relayed.  It also stood 
ready to voice public support for Cyprus's right to exploit 
its economic zone, although it would not state specifically 
where exactly the EEZ lay.  Further, the UK did not 
countenance Turkey's claims that all eastern Mediterranean 
littoral states potentially had rights in the disputed area, 
making a multilateral delimitation imperative.  (Note: 
separate reporting from London indicated the Brits would take 
a soft line with the Turks -- watching developments and 
urging restraint -- while the French, at London's behest, 
would push harder.  Highlighting Paris's talking points was 
an admonition that Turkey's saber-rattling over maritime 
resource exploitation could not come at a worse time for its 
own EU accession path and the still-nascent Cyprus 
negotiations.) 
 
-------------------------- 
Comment and Action Request 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) With both sides having drawn their lines in deepest 
red, the November 14 incident comes as no great shock. 
Turkish Cypriot "officialdom" and resident Turkish "Embassy" 
contacts long have reported that any attempt by the Republic 
of Cyprus to exploit mineral resources in "contested" waters 
would be opposed, with force if necessary.  Conversely, Greek 
Cypriots vehemently contend they have law on their side, 
stemming from the RoC's accession to UNCLOS, their successful 
negotiation of delimitation agreements with Egypt and Lebanon 
(although Beirut has yet to ratify the latter), and public 
support from powers like the United States.  On the related 
issue of the Energy chapter of the EU Acquis, the RoC has 
shown no intention to budge until Ankara backs down on 
maritime exploration and exploitation. 
 
¶9.  (C) We recommend that the U.S. take the middle ground, 
urging restraint and dialogue and cautioning the sides to 
compartmentalize the dispute to prevent it from harming the 
Cyprus talks.  Longer-term, however, we will need Department 
guidance on balancing the Republic of Cyprus's EEZ claims 
with those of Turkey.  A Houston-based, midsize oil and gas 
firm already has won a 2007 RoC tender to explore for oil and 
gas in a bloc to Cyprus's southeast, and likely will be 
conducting additional seismic testing in the spring.  Last 
week in Las Vegas, the RoC announced the opening of bidding 
for a dozen additional offshore blocs, some of which hold 
great promise (Ref C).  We expect the company will request 
the USG to defend its commercial interests in the disputed 
waters.  ACTION REQUEST:  1) Language we can supply to the 
RoC as the official view on the status of its EEZ, even if 
the U.S. view is that some of the waters are in dispute.  We 
propose to deliver that language to the RoC as an aide 
memoire.  2) The guidance should also take into account the 
likelihood that U.S. companies may request USG assistance in 
defending their commercial interests in these areas. 
Urbancic