VZCZCXRO9819
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0524 3181023
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131023Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0505
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0007
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 1066
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1407

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000524 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL LY SU KPKO UN AU EU CD
SUBJECT: EU READOUT OF FIRST DAY OF DAKAR ACCORD TECHNICAL TALKS IN 
N'DJAMENA 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  The EU Special Envoy for Sudan and Eastern Chad, AMB 
Torben Brylle, gave us NOV 13 a readout on the first day of the 
technical military experts talks that took place on NOV 12.  We 
inform addressees of its content in paras 2-5, below. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  The NOV 12 meeting was cut short and substantive work 
postponed to NOV 13 for the following reasons: 
 
-- The "new" concept paper (a sort of mission concept of operations) 
presented by Chad was not translated into Arabic and thus could not 
be consulted by the Libyan delegation.  Translation is now under 
way. 
 
-- The Gabonese and the Senegalese delegations were absent, 
scheduled to arrive Ndjamena NOV 13. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The meeting was nevertheless opened by FM Faki with very 
encouraging words on the planning process.  Libya, Sudan, and Chad 
all made opening statements expressing their intention and 
willingness to work towards the common goal. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The sense is that the planning, after many months, is 
taking some shape, and it appears that the Contact Group plenum, 
scheduled for NOV 15, will be able to adopt some coherent planning 
documents and also discuss in further detail the financing of the 
process.  It is not completely unlikely therefore that there will be 
an embryo of deployment, at least initially to the headquarters in 
Tripoli, within the next few months (something that will cost 
little).  There remains, however, some skepticism among observers 
regarding this process, the political willingness and motivation 
behind it, including the ability to finance it. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  The heightened motivation by Sudan, Chad, and the 
"regional states" that observers have noted at this time could come 
in part from their desire to "manage" the crisis themselves, which 
could undermine arguments for robust MINURCAT II and UNAMID 
deployments. 
 
¶6. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
 
NIGRO