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Viewing cable 08MOSCOW3265, RUSSIA'S LIBERALS SCORN MEDVEDEV'S PROPOSED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW3265 2008-11-07 14:51 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO5931
RR RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #3265/01 3121451
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071451Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0664
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003265 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S LIBERALS SCORN MEDVEDEV'S PROPOSED 
ELECTORAL REFORMS 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Political liberal opposition leaders have 
rejected President Medvedev's proposed changes to political 
party laws as attacks against democracy and evidence of 
further consolidation of power in Russia.  The head of the 
only independent election monitoring organization painted a 
bleak picture of the current state of opposition politics in 
Russia, on which the changes proposed by Medvedev would not 
improve.  Post will report via septel on reactions from 
across the political spectrum to Medvedev's proposals.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Opposition liberal politicians have reacted sharply 
against changes to the political process Medvedev proposed 
during his November 5 annual address to Russia's upper 
legislative chamber, the Federation Council.  Among the 
changes that would directly affect opposition parties are 
proposals to: 
 
--  Extend the term of the president from four years to six 
and the term of Duma members from four to five years.  (Note: 
 It remains unclear if this would apply to the incumbent 
president and Duma members.  Differing opinions have been 
presented in the media, and undoubtedly will be debated when 
the changes, which have already been put into the form of 
draft legislation, are discussed in the Duma within the next 
two weeks.  End Note.); 
 
-- Allot one or two Duma seats for parties that receive 
between 5-7 percent of the vote (Note:  Based on the results 
of the December 2007 Duma elections, no other parties would 
have passed even the lower five percent barrier entitling 
them to a single seat in the 450 member Duma.  End Note); 
 
-- Abolish the use of cash collateral and lower the voter 
signature threshold for allowing parties to participate in 
elections and reduce the number of signatures needed to 
register candidates in both presidential and Duma elections 
(Note:  No parties used the cash collateral option in the 
2007 Duma elections or the 2008 regional elections, but this 
change likely targets Aleksandr Lebedev and other oligarchs 
considering political forays.  Currently 250,000 signatures 
are required to register a candidate for the Duma and two 
million for the presidential election.  End Note.); 
 
-- Institute term limits on political party leaders. (Note: 
This appears aimed at LDPR's Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and KPRF's 
Gennadiy Zyuganov, whose personal charisma have buoyed their 
parties to the 7 percent Duma threshold.  However, 
Zhirinovskiy told media on November 6 that he would accept a 
party leadership term limit since he is grooming his son to 
assume control of LDPR.  End note.) 
 
-- Allow the majority party in regional legislatures to 
nominate a candidate for governor and forward it to the 
president for approval (Note:  United Russia is the majority 
in 83 of Russia's 85 regional parliaments.  End Note); 
 
3.  (SBU) Leaders of liberal opposition parties quickly 
rejected Medvedev's proposed reforms.  At a November 6 press 
conference, organizers of Russia's new Solidarity movement 
blasted Medvedev's proposals as attacks against democracy and 
open political competition.  Yabloko party chairman Sergey 
Mitrokhin similarly issued a statement November 5 that his 
party "categorically objects" as unconstitutional Medvedev's 
proposal to extend the president's term of office from four 
to six years.  Garry Kasparov's United Civil Front (OGF) 
ridiculed the proposed changes as "nothing but a criminal 
plot for usurpation of power in Russia, as well as an attempt 
to distract public opinion from the emerging social and 
economic crisis in Russia."  Former PM and chairman of the 
Russian Popular Democratic Union (RNDS) Mikhail Kasyanov 
accused Medvedev of failing to admit that "all the 
foundations of the constitutional order have been destroyed" 
and that citizens have no ability to influence those in 
power.  He added that an extension of presidential or Duma 
terms would thus be the same whether it changes them to one 
year or 25-year terms.  Vladimir Ryzhkov, chairman of the 
unregistered Republican Party, predicted that Medvedev's 
moves are intended to prepare Putin for a return to the 
presidency in 2009.  The proposed changes, he added, would 
"further tighten control over the state machinery of civil 
society."  The reduced voter signature requirement for 
parties, Ryzkhov warned, would be irrelevant when the 
government can always decide arbitrarily to invalidate 
signatures submitted by an opposition party. 
 
4.  (SBU) Other political commentators joined the chorus of 
those questioning Medvedev's gambit.  Andrey Rikhter of the 
Institute on Media Law and Policy told us he believed 
Medvedev planned to use these proposals to position Putin for 
 
MOSCOW 00003265  002 OF 002 
 
 
a return to the Presidency, but said that most Russians would 
greet the idea calmly, as the idea of a Putin restoration had 
been under public discussion since his second term. The 
public "was adapted to the idea" although "they had forgotten 
about it in the past year or two."  Lilia Shibanova of the 
NGO Golos said that any rhetorical nods to democratic reform 
from Medvedev were merely "cosmetic."  She expressed 
dissatisfaction with the proposal on party registration, but 
said that it was "a good start for dialogue."  Nonetheless, 
she saw very few "real choices" among liberal opposition 
leaders, and painted a bleak picture of the current political 
environment. 
 
5. (SBU) Both Rikhter and Shibanova identified one bright 
spot in Medvedev's Federation Council speech: Medvedev's 
attack on powerful bureaucrats whom he accused of "destroying 
business" in the country.  According to Rikhter, Medvedev 
intends to take on entrenched bureaucratic power structures 
because of his frustration at their frequent refusal to 
implement federal GOR policy.  Rikhter said that local 
bureaucrats rule the country on a de facto basis, something 
unacceptable both to Medvedev and to civil society 
organizations.  Rikhter added that Medvedev's statements in 
favor of media freedom may go beyond mere lip service, as 
Medvedev specifically encouraged members of the media to 
criticize these same bureaucrats.  The centrist daily 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta on November 7 carried an article about a 
proposal to codify the amount of time journalists must wait 
to obtain information from civil servants; Rikhter believes 
that this may prove to be Medvedev's first blow against his 
bureaucratic opponents, as it will require them to provide 
information to the media on demand.  Shibanova also told us 
that this portion of Medvedev's speech gave her "hope," and 
said that under the current system she believed local 
authorities have too much power. 
 
6. (SBU) Commentary on Medvedev's proposals from across the 
political spectrum continues.  Post will report via septel on 
other perspectives on the speech and implications of the 
proposals it contained. 
BEYRLE