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Viewing cable 08MANAGUA1367, NICARAGUA: ATLANTIC COAST ELECTIONS OUTLOOK

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MANAGUA1367 2008-11-07 23:00 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXRO6275
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #1367/01 3122300
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 072300Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3358
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//J2/J3/J5// PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 001367 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN KRAAIMOORE 
DEPT FOR USOAS 
DEPT FOR DRL AND INR/IAA 
STATE PASS USAID 
USAID FOR CARDENA, KITE, BATALLE 
NSC FOR GARCIA 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA: ATLANTIC COAST ELECTIONS OUTLOOK 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 1329 
     B. MANAGUA 520 
     C. MANAGUA 419 
 
Classified By: Amb. Robert J. Callahan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
.1. (C) SUMMARY: On October 23, 24 and 25, EmbOff met with 
candidates and political contacts from Nicaragua,s North 
Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) and South Atlantic 
Autonomous Region (RAAS) to assess the conditions for 
municipal elections scheduled for November 9, 2008 and 
January 18, 2009 (See REF B and C).  The Sandinista (FSLN) 
campaigns are generally well organized and financed, while 
opposition political parties lack financial resources and 
have fought with each other.  However, as the Election Day 
approaches, there is a growing movement to unite 
pro-democracy forces around one candidate in order to defeat 
FSLN candidates.  END SUMMARY 
 
Churches Try to Be Neutral in the RAAN 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2. (C) On October 23, EmbOff traveled to Puerto Cabezas and 
met political, religious, NGO and community leaders to assess 
the conditions for the January 18, 2009 municipal elections. 
(The elections in the RAAN were postponed until January, 
nominally because of reconstruction difficulties arising from 
last September's hurricane damage, but actually because of 
Sandinista political maneuvering.)  Although the campaign had 
not started officially, our contacts told us that the 
candidates were already campaigning. In private meetings with 
the influential Moravian and Catholic churches, leaders 
expressed their neutrality in the elections, but also their 
fears that the probability for fraud is high, especially in 
the absence of outside election observation. They also 
believe that unless there is an alliance between democratic 
parties, the FSLN will win in Puerto Cabezas, Waspam and 
Prinzapolka in spite of the corrupt practices and general 
loss of confidence that have plagued current administrations 
(see REF A). 
 
RAAN Election Tricks by the FSLN 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
3. (C) A poll conducted on October 20 by the Central American 
University (UCA) found that the Puerto Cabezas municipal 
votes for mayor would be as follows: 40% to FSLN; 8% to 
Yatama; 27% ALN; and 19% to PLC.  The poll predicted that the 
FSLN would win even though the people are upset with the 
government and current FSLN mayor (see REF A).  Candidates 
explained that the FSLN was ahead in the polls because it was 
buying votes and because the democratic candidates were 
fighting among themselves.  One candidate confirmed that he 
witnessed Citizen Power Councils (CPC) members buying votes 
for the FSLN, offering leading citizens amounts up to 
C$10,000 ($500 USD) from purported Venezuelan sources. 
Another election trick by the FSLN and Yatama was to invite 
people to large dinners to buy their loyalty.  Candidates 
also revealed that Yatama-FSLN National Assembly Deputy 
Brooklyn Rivera has tried to manipulate the Moravian church 
vote by holding meetings with pastors and asking them to pray 
for President Ortega to have "15 more years." 
 
Potential Alliances in the RAAN 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4. (C) The PLC candidate for mayor in Puerto Cabezas, Osornio 
"Blas" Coleman, runs his own radio station and is respected 
for his service as a Contra in the 1980s against the 
Sandinistas.  However, many of our contacts said that Blas is 
"not a politician" and has had trouble gathering support for 
his candidacy.  Others explained that the ALN candidate for 
mayor was ahead among democratic parties because the ALN was 
still incorrectly associated with Eduardo Montealegre. (NOTE: 
In the 2006 presidential race the ALN candidate Montealegre 
routed all other candidates in Puerto Cabezas and is still a 
popular figure in the region. END NOTE)  The ALN candidate 
also has more personal resources to run his campaign  (he 
owns a successful fishing business) and the ALN campaign 
 
MANAGUA 00001367  002 OF 002 
 
 
headquarters are centrally located in Bilwi.  Dr. Kenneth 
Serapia of indigenous party PAMUK said that the party lacks 
resources to mount an effective campaign, but needed to 
participate in this election to preserve the party.  The PRN 
candidate expressed his willingness to renounce to form a 
unity ticket with the PLC, but the ALN and PLC candidates had 
not agreed upon who would lead the alliance.  In Waspam, 
there was a unity alliance between the PAMUK, PLC and ALN 
candidates and it was ahead in the polls over the FSLN 
candidates.  In Prinzapolka, there was no movement to form a 
unity alliance and the FSLN was ahead of other parties. 
Close Embassy contacts told us that after the November 9 
municipal elections in the rest of the country, there would 
be more pressure on the opposition to form a unity alliance 
in Puerto Cabezas and Prinzapolka. 
 
Moving to Unity in RAAS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
5. (C) On October 24, EmbOff traveled to Bluefields, the 
regional government center of the RAAS (where elections will 
be held on November 9, with the rest of Nicaragua minus the 
RAAN) and a traditional stronghold for the PLC.  EmbOff met 
with Bluefields Mayor Luis Gutierrez, RAAS Governor Yadira 
Flores, RAAS Regional President Lourdes Aguilar (all three 
are members of the PLC), as well as Bluefields mayoral 
candidates Dr. Howard Bacon from the PLC, and Dane Hodgson 
from ALN.  Polls claim that the vote was split evenly between 
the FSLN candidate and the PLC and ALN candidates.  Dr. Bacon 
is a member of the Vamos con Eduardo movement (VCE) and 
joined the PLC with Montealegre. Dr. Bacon explained that six 
of the VCE candidates that were slated for strategic 
positions in the city council had been replaced on the ballot 
by PLC members loyal to ex-president Aleman, which means that 
if he wins, he would not have the full support from council 
members.  The ALN candidate, who is from Corn Island, told us 
that he had not received any financial support from the 
central party and financed his campaign through a loan 
against his home.  He was willing to renounce his candidacy 
and support the PLC candidate if they would retire the debt 
against his home.  On November 6, the Corn Island ALN mayoral 
candidate announced that he would renounce and support the 
PLC candidate in order to unify the democratic vote and 
defeat the FSLN candidate. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
6. (C) The municipal elections are widely seen as a 
referendum on President Ortega and the Sandinista party. 
This is also true in Nicaragua,s Atlantic coast; however, 
the democratic vote is fractured between PLC, ALN and 
regional parties.  Without unity in several key races, the 
FSLN could capture the vote, perhaps even expand its control 
in the RAAS, which has historically been under Liberal 
governance. 
CALLAHAN