VZCZCXRO7257
PP RUEHIK RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHKV #2224/01 3150956
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 100956Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6705
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 002224 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/UMB, EEB/OMA 
TREASURY PLEASE PASS TO TTORGERSON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON ETRD PGOV XH UP
SUBJECT: NBU STABILIZES HRYVNIA, BUT FURTHER WEAKENING NECESSARY 
 
REF: A) KYIV 2198 AND PREVIOUS 
     B) KYIV 2207 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The hryvnia has stabilized in the past week as a result of 
the National Bank of Ukraine's new policy to sell unlimited amounts 
of dollars at an exchange rate that it resets daily.  The strategy 
is probably draining the NBU's reserves, which stood at $31.9 
billion on October 31, but the NBU is not saying by how much.  The 
central bank has adopted additional harsh measures to stabilize the 
hryvnia.  It has ordered banks to buy and sell dollars in an 
extremely tight range, drastically reduced the amount of money that 
Ukrainians can transfer abroad, and ordered the closing of the 
country's ubiquitous foreign exchange kiosks as of January 1, 2009. 
The NBU faces strong political pressure to keep the hryvnia stable, 
and to even allow it to appreciate, and the measures may well be 
necessary in the short term to prevent further runs on banks. 
Ukraine must allow the hryvnia to depreciate, however, if it is to 
seriously tackle the ballooning current account deficit.  The IMF is 
aware of the policy trade-off that the NBU is facing, and believes 
that the current policies can only be a short-term solution that 
will ultimately need to give way to more exchange rate flexibility. 
Looking forward, the NBU faces significant challenges if tries to 
manage an orderly depreciation when politicians and popular 
sentiment may be calling for just the opposite. End summary. 
 
NBU Stabilizes Exchange Rate, For Now 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The National Bank of Ukraine's (NBU) heavy handed efforts 
to stabilize the hryvnia are working, at least for the moment. 
Since late October, the NBU has issued a daily statement announcing 
its willingness to sell unlimited amounts of dollars at a 
pre-determined rate.  Each day, the NBU has reset the rate downwards 
to allow the hryvnia to appreciate gradually.  The strategy has 
worked:  before it implemented the policy, the hryvnia crossed the 7 
UAH/$ mark briefly.  It traded at about 6.20 UAH/$ on the fist day 
of the NBU's new strategy, and at 5.81 UAH/$ on November 6.  Rates 
in the interbank market, and at the retail level in the many foreign 
exchange kiosks on the streets of Ukraine's cities, have largely 
mirrored the rate set by the NBU. 
 
But At What Cost? 
------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) The willingness to satisfy market demand has probably 
drained the reserves of the NBU.  It is unclear, however, how many 
dollars the central bank has lost implementing the strategy.  As of 
Oct. 31, reserves were $31.9 billion (down 14.9 percent in October 
and from a high of $38 billion earlier this year), but that was 
before the NBU implemented the current policy in earnest.  It has 
not announced how many reserves it needed to sell to maintain the 
policy since Oct. 31. 
 
NBU Reduces Forex Market to That of An Agent 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Accompanying the strategy are new, harsh administrative 
measures that, taken together, reduce the role of Ukraine's foreign 
exchange market to an agent that executes transactions at prices 
determined by the NBU.  On November 5 the NBU issued a resolution 
requiring banks to resell any dollars they buy at precisely the rate 
set by the central bank.  Banks may purchase dollars at a rate no 
lower than three percent below the official NBU rate.  In addition, 
banks are not allowed to hold inventories of dollars for their 
trading operations.  All dollars purchased from the NBU must be 
resold on the same day, or the next day at the latest.  Taken 
together, these measures mean that all dollar transactions in 
Ukraine -- either between banks, between banks and clients, or on 
the street -- are locked into a tight corridor dictated by the NBU. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The NBU took this latest step after banks routinely resold 
dollars purchased from the central banks with a markup, which ranged 
anywhere from 5 to 30 percent in the last week, depending on demand. 
 Analysts have pointed out that such markups simply imply that the 
correct dollar rate is somewhat higher than the rate set by the NBU, 
but the central bank is determined to compel the market to trade at 
rates that it, the NBU, believes are necessary to stabilize the 
currency. 
 
NBU Also Caps Transfers 
----------------------- 
 
KYIV 00002224  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) The NBU announced other measures as well.  Companies 
wishing to purchase dollars had already been required to document a 
need for the currency before buying.  Now, companies must use the 
purchased dollars within five days or resell the dollars on the 
interbank market.  In addition, Ukrainian residents are now limited 
to transferring from 15,000 UAH to 75,000 UAH (about $2,500 to 
$12,500) abroad each month.  Before the change, residents could 
transfer 15,000 UAH abroad daily. 
 
NBU To Shut Down Kiosks 
----------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) To further control the market, the NBU also announced that 
foreign exchange kiosks, ubiquitous throughout Ukraine and the place 
where most ordinary citizens exchange money, must close on January 1 
at the latest.  Thereafter cash transactions will only be 
permissible at bank counters.  Kiosks not owned by banks are 
regulated by another state agency.  By all accounts, the kiosks are 
currently well-regulated, and they are fully subject to the 
country's anti-money laundering and terrorism finance regimes. 
Hence the NBU action cannot be justified by the need to improve 
supervision of the kiosks. Instead, they are a clear attempt to 
broaden NBU control over the cash foreign exchange market, and will 
certainly be unpopular among Ukrainians, who can now exchange money 
seven days a week at kiosks co-located in grocery stores and other 
retail outlets.  It will also increase costs for banks, many of 
which will have expand their opening hours to service clients who 
now use kiosks. 
 
An Estimated $50 Billion Cash Now In The Country 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Both the NBU and analysts have argued that the recent surge 
in bank withdrawals and sharp devaluation of the hryvnia was driven 
primarily by ordinary Ukrainians anxious to protect their savings 
from inflation and further devaluation.  On November 5, however, the 
NBU reported that Ukrainian residents only purchased a net $938 
million of the $4.1 billion sold by the NBU in October.  Some 
commentators are now claiming that subsidiaries of foreign banks 
eager to repatriate dollars were among the biggest buyers.  In any 
case there is universal acknowledgement that ordinary residents 
launched a run on banks after the Prominvestbank affair broke (ref 
B).  The NBU reported that residents withdrew $1.78 billion from 
banks in October, or 11.3 percent of their total deposits.  Nervous 
residents withdrew hryvnia from their bank accounts and exchanged 
them into dollars.  (Note: The country director of a large foreign 
company told us that his chief treasurer led the charge among his 
employees; the nervous treasurer encouraged his colleagues to 
withdraw their money from banks "before it was too late."  The news, 
coming from someone they naturally considered to be an expert on 
money manners, prompted employees to desert their desks and dash to 
their banks, we were told.  Separately, a vice president of Nadra 
Bank told us that his bank has no available safe deposit boxes after 
a recent surge of interest from retail clients. End note).  Most of 
those dollars are still in Ukraine, in the form of cash kept in bank 
safe deposit boxes or literally stuffed under mattresses.  It is 
estimated that up to $50 billion of dollar cash may now be in the 
country, which would be nearly enough to cover Ukraine's expected 
external financing need in 2009. 
 
Political Pressure TO Stabilize Exchange Rate 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The NBU clearly expects that freezing the hryvnia into a 
tight range is necessary to restore confidence in both the currency 
and the banking system.  A continued weakness could prompt further 
runs on bank deposits, cause some banks to collapse, and quickly 
undermine the confidence that the $16.5 billion IMF support plan 
approved on November 5 is supposed to provide.  The NBU's actions 
also reflect the sensitivity that the exchange rate has in Ukraine, 
and the political pressure that the central bank is facing.  During 
the hryvnia's recent slide, all political parties openly criticized 
the NBU for not taking decisive actions to stabilize the currency. 
Politicians of all colors, including President Yushchenko, continue 
to call for a stable exchange rate.  On November 6 Oleksandr 
Shlapak, first deputy head of the Presidential Secretariat, even 
assured Ukrainians that the hryvnia would remain at around 6 UAH/$ 
in 2009. 
 
Comment: NBU Faces Policy Dilemma 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The NBU is not only stabilizing the currency, but even 
pushing it to appreciate gradually in nominal terms.  The NBU may be 
thinking that nominal appreciation is necessary in the short run to 
 
KYIV 00002224  003 OF 003 
 
 
reestablish trust in the currency.  It may work, but if confidence 
does not return quickly then the strategy could cause a severe drain 
on the NBU's reserves.  Dictating the exchange rate could also lead 
to the rebirth of a black market for dollars, which has all but 
disappeared in Ukraine in recent years.  Most importantly, the NBU 
actions could soon conflict with other monetary policy goals.  The 
hryvnia needs to depreciate, both in nominal and real terms, if 
Ukraine is to seriously combat its swollen current account deficit. 
Freezing the rate at current levels will actually cause the hryvnia 
to appreciate in real terms because local inflation is far higher 
than dollar inflation.  The IMF is aware of this policy dilemma, and 
believes that the NBU's current stabilization measures can only be a 
short-term remedy to reestablish confidence and prepare the economy, 
and society as a whole, for what needs to come next: namely more 
exchange rate flexibility and managed further depreciation. 
Allowing the hryvnia to depreciate may become very difficult, both 
politically and psychologically, for Ukraine.  End comment. 
 
TAYLOR