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DE RUEHKI #0973/01 3101705
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FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8727
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KINSHASA 000973 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG
SUBJECT:   NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTS CRISIS PLAN TO DEAL 
            WITH CRISIS IN COUNTRY'S EASTERN REGION 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The National Assembly adopted on October 28 a 
non-binding plan for the DRC to deal with the crisis in eastern DRC. 
 (Note:  An unofficial embassy translation of the plan begins at 
para. 9.  End note.)  The plan proposes alternatives for political, 
military, and diplomatic dialogue between GDRC, CNDP, Rwanda and 
regional and international partners.  The plan suggests direct 
negotiations between the GDRC and CNDP (level undetermined), 
heretofore a redline for President Joseph Kabila.  The deployment of 
a multinational deterrent force to North Kivu under UN mandate is 
recommended in the plan, as is continued DRC security sector reform. 
 The Assembly plan calls for a renewed effort at regional economic 
cooperation and international monitoring of illegal mineral exports 
to choke off financing for armed groups.  The plan represents an 
important forward step in the evolution of the Assembly as an 
institution to be reckoned with.  Also, the plan may represent 
political cover for the GDRC to open discrete direct negotiations 
with Nkunda without sacrificing ground to hawks in Kabila's inner 
circle.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) The National Assembly, meeting in a special plenary session 
October 28, adopted a non-binding proposal to resolve the crisis in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  The crisis "exit plan" was 
conceived by the Executive Bureau of the Assembly as a continuum of 
the peace processes started in Lusaka, Pretoria, Luanda, and Sun 
City.  The plan places an emphasis on political and diplomatic 
dialogue, but incorporates military and economic considerations as 
well. 
 
¶3.  (U) The plan, after recounting the current positions of the GDRC 
and dissident general Laurent Nkunda's CNDP and noting the urgent 
need for action, proposes direct political and military dialogue 
between the GDRC and CNDP.  In exhorting the CNDP to honor its Amani 
Program commitments and follow the MONUC disengagement plan, the 
plan also calls for direct negotiations between the FARDC and CNDP 
via a MONUC-led Joint Military Committee.  The military dialogue 
would occur outside of the Amani framework, which the Assembly 
labels as "too bureaucratic." 
 
¶4.  (U) The plan proposes a political dialogue incorporating the 
GDRC, CNDP, armed groups, local North Kivu community leaders, and 
civil society. The goal would be a signed agreement, possibly at the 
AU in Addis Ababa or another suitable location, with the support of 
the GDRC, rotational presidency of AU, AU Commission Chair, UN, and 
EU.  The terms of the dialogue would be defined by a preparatory 
committee representing all the participants. 
 
¶5.  (U) In addition to direct political dialogue between the CDRC 
and CNDP, the proposal calls for a renewal of diplomatic dialogue 
between GDRC and Rwanda.  The pathway to the restored relations 
would include a review of the process initiated by the Nairobi 
Communique, reactivation of the Mobutu-era regional economic forum 
(CEPGL - "Communaute economique des pays des grand lacs" in French), 
DRC-Rwanda ministerial-level meetings, and a series of regional and 
international partner summits preceding a DRC-Rwanda head of state 
summit publicly announcing a program to resume diplomatic 
relations. 
 
¶6.  (U) The Assembly also endorsed the deployment, under UNSC 
mandate, of a multinational intervention force of the type utilized 
in 2003 during the Operation Artemis in Ituri District.  The purpose 
of the force would be to deter refractory armed groups and the force 
would be led by the UN with support from the EU, AU, SADC, and U.S. 
The plan cites progress towards peace as providing a window for the 
reform of the FARDC, which must prioritize the recruitment of 
competent, new soldiers and draw upon the institutional knowledge of 
highly trained ex-FAZ ("Forces armees Zairoises" in French) 
officers. 
 
¶7.  (U) The plan identifies three areas of economic focus to assist 
in resolving the crisis:  the need for emergency economic programs 
as presented in the Amani Program; the re-launching of CEPGL 
initiatives and other regional economic projects; and the 
application of illegal mineral export (coltane, cassiterite, and 
gold) monitoring measures by the international community.  The plan 
notes the material and economic benefit that armed groups derive 
from illegal exports and the need to monitor airport transit points 
in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Kenya.  The plan references the 
precedent of the UNSC sponsored monitoring measures applied in 
Sierra Leone to counter the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) trade 
in conflict diamonds. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Comment:  The genesis of the plan by the National Assembly 
represents a forward step in the continuing evolution of the 
institution and its relationship with the Presidency.  National 
Assembly president Vital Kamerhe of North Kivu is heavily invested 
 
KINSHASA 00000973  002 OF 005 
 
 
politically in the Amani process as a member of the Wise Men's 
Committee ("Comite des sages" in French) during the Goma Conference; 
his political interest in spearheading functional alternatives to 
the crisis cannot be discounted.  The statement by the newly 
confirmed GDRC government November 3 rejecting direct talks with 
Nkunda, which was criticized by several North Kivu deputies, would 
appear to signal a partial rejection of the Assembly plan.  However, 
and perhaps more likely, it may represent the creation of political 
cover for the GDRC to open discrete direct negotiations with Nkunda 
without sacrificing ground to hawks in the Kabila circle.  End 
Comment. 
 
¶9.  (U) Unofficial embassy translation of exit plan follows. 
 
Begin unofficial embassy translation: 
 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
National Assembly 
 
EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO CRISIS EXIT PLAN ADOPTED AT THE 
PLENARY SESSION OF WEDNESDAY 29 OCTOBER 2008 
 
October 2008 
EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO CRISIS EXIT PLAN 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In light of the events that our population in the East of the 
country are currently living, it can be said, one the one hand, that 
history repeats itself, and on the other, that they represent the 
last obstacle in a long process that began in Victoria Falls on 8 
August 1998, went through the Lusaka, Pretoria, Luanda, and Sun City 
Agreements, up to the elections. 
 
In either case, there is no need to be pessimistic or defeatist. 
Problems in North Kivu are not much more complex than those that 
were seen at other times in Boende, Lisala, Kabinda and Kabalo, when 
the plans being implemented were called the Kampala Disengagement 
Plan and the Sub-plans of Harare.  As those of the past, the current 
problem can also be untangled through political and diplomatic 
dialogue. 
 
Thus, in its plenary session of this Wednesday 29 October 2008, 
devoted exclusively to the crisis in the East, the National Assembly 
has just adopted the present Crisis Exit Plan. 
 
¶A. PLAN SPECIFICS 
 
¶I. Emergency humanitarian plan 
 
The situation on the ground has degraded badly these last few days, 
causing a veritable humanitarian catastrophe.  This calls for a 
general mobilization on both national and international levels. 
 
Available statistics indicate that at least 50 children die each day 
in camps for displaced persons, not counting adults, especially 
pregnant women and the elderly, who perish from lack of basic 
medical care.  Others, especially children, die from lack of food 
and potable water. 
 
This picture takes on apocalyptic tones when we receive information 
describing attacks on camps where people displaced by war were 
assembled, i.e. defenseless civilians, who are now dispersed in the 
bush and in the forest, at the mercy of all sorts of diseases, wild 
animals, weather, and are thus exposed to unimaginable violence and 
suffering.  This is genocide in all but name. 
 
We will never say it loud enough: in North Kivu, there are nearly 
two million internally displaced people who are without assistance 
right now.  This situation is five times worse than Darfur! 
 
In this context, the question to be asked is how many displaced 
people, how many deaths, in short, how many casualties will it take 
to turn the International Community's attention to the tragedy that 
is taking place today in North Kivu, in Ituri, Haut-Uele and 
Bas-Uele? 
 
A large-scale humanitarian plan is now more urgent than ever. 
 
II. Background on the Government and CNDP Positions 
 
¶1.  CNDP Position 
 
-- direct negotiations with the Government outside the AMANI Program 
and outside the country. 
 
KINSHASA 00000973  003 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶2.  DRC Government Position 
 
-- the CNDP must unconditionally implement the resolutions of the 
Goma Conference which include a statement of commitment to which it 
freely subscribed; 
 
-- the AMANI Program remains the only framework for discussion and 
for resolving the conflict in North Kivu; 
 
-- no direct political negotiations between the Government and the 
CNDP; 
 
-- the CNDP must adopt the disengagement plan and apply it 
scrupulously. 
 
¶3.  Compromise Positions 
 
Here, the objective is to bring both camps toward a median position 
so that there is no clear winner and loser.  This position requires, 
therefore, concessions on both parts. 
 
a. Concessions of both parties 
 
-- Concession on the part of CNDP: 
Return to the AMANI Program; 
Adopt the disengagement plan. 
 
-- Concession on the part of the Government: 
On the one hand, accept military and political dialogue with the 
CNDP, and on the other hand, accept diplomatic dialogue with 
Rwanda. 
 
 
III. Military Dialogue 
 
Discussion between the FARDC and CNDP Operations Commanders in the 
presence of MONUC, with a view to: 
 
-- obtain a cease-fire; 
-- explore all possible modalities to make the disengagement 
effective; 
-- set up joint verification mechanisms. 
 
Note: Keeping in mind the experience of the Kampala Disengagement 
Plan, a permanent military dialogue should be maintained in order to 
avoid possible misunderstandings.  To do this, a Joint Military 
Commission (JMC) shall be established, chaired by MONUC and the two 
Operations Commanders from the FARDC and CNDP. 
 
This formula has the advantage of being at the same time effective 
and pragmatic, and to restrict the problem to a strictly military 
context, thus removing it from the AMANI Program which has become 
too bureaucratic.  It also offers more guarantees to the parties in 
conflict. 
 
To be clear, the Joint Military Commission that will arise from this 
dialogue will set up a realistic calendar to which all parties will 
commit to accept. 
 
 
IV. Political Dialogue 
 
-- Examine the CNDP's list of grievances 
 
-- The location will be determined according to constraints of the 
moment, and, if not held in DRC, this dialogue may be held in Addis 
Ababa, seat of the African Union, or in Dar Es Salaam, this year's 
Chair of the African Union; 
 
-- In addition to the Government and the CNDP, these talks will 
include the participation of delegates of armed groups of various 
axes, as well as representatives of grassroots communities and civil 
society; 
 
-- A political compromise shall be adopted and signed by these 
representatives in the presence of the President of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the then-President of the African Union, the 
President of the African Union Commission, and representatives of 
the United Nations and the European Union; 
 
-- A Joint Preparatory Committee will be set up to prepare and 
elaborate the terms of reference of this dialogue. 
 
¶V. Diplomatic Dialogue 
 
KINSHASA 00000973  004 OF 005 
 
 
 
-- Evaluate the Nairobi Process; 
 
-- Launch the CEPGL by designating three representatives for the 
DRC, in accordance with the Goma Conference; 
 
-- Begin the process to normalize diplomatic relations with Rwanda, 
following the steps below: 
 
¶1.  Symbolic restitution of the Rwandan Embassy building, located on 
Avenue de la Justice, currently occupied by squatters; 
 
¶2.  Meeting between the two Foreign Affairs Ministers, which shall 
end with a simple statement of intent to normalize diplomatic 
relations; 
 
¶3.  Quadripartite meeting in the presence of delegates from the 
United States and the European Union, between the DRC, Rwanda, the 
United Nations and the African Union, to explore mechanisms to 
reinforce the Nairobi Plan as achieved by operation Kimia; 
 
¶4.  Preparatory meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers for a 
Mini-Summit of the DRC and Rwandan Heads of State; 
 
¶5.  Mini-summit of the Presidents of DRC and Rwanda, facilitated by 
the African Union or the United Nations Secretary General; 
 
¶6.  As the outcome of this Summit, a solemn statement shall be 
published announcing a program to reestablish diplomatic relations. 
 
 
VI. Deploying an Artemis-type intervention force 
 
Guaranteeing the success of the military, political and diplomatic 
dialogues will require a strong commitment of the International 
Community, headed by the United Nations, the European Union, the 
African Union, the SADC and the United States of America. 
 
We think that adopting a Security Council Resolution creating 
Artemis-type special force in the East will constitute a dissuasive 
challenge to the persistent groups in North Kivu and South Kivu 
provinces in particular, and in the Great Lakes region in general. 
 
VI. Economic Development 
 
To maximize the plan's chances of success, the poverty that 
underlies the violence in the Sub-Region must be addressed.  Thus, 
concomitantly with the military, political and diplomatic work, the 
rapid launching of development projects to use the manpower that 
will be made available by demobilization is essential. 
 
On this topic, the Goma Conference had elaborated an Emergency 
Development Plan taking into account the need to establish a healthy 
economy completely under the control of the state. 
 
VII. Restart of CEPGL 
 
In the same order of ideas, wishing to consolidate the peace and 
stability in the Great Lakes Region, it will be necessary to restart 
economic projects of common interest. 
 
The projects to be restarted include: 
 
a. BDGEL; 
b. exploitation of methane gas (SOCIGAZ); 
c. construction of Ruzizi III; 
d. roads and telecommunications. 
 
IX. Measures to control the illicit exploitation and 
commercialization of coltan, cassiterite and gold 
 
It has been established that the ex-FAR Interahamwe and all armed 
groups obtain supplies, among other things, from the illicit 
exploitation of cassiterite, coltan and gold.  Therefore, measures 
to control and certify these materials are essential.  The 
International Community will have to establish surveillance posts in 
export areas of DRC airports, and transit areas in Rwanda, Burundi 
and Kenya airports.  This is nothing new, for the Security Council 
had at one time taken analogous measures against "blood diamonds" in 
Sierra Leone to cut off RUF rebel supplies. 
 
To make this measure successful, the Federation of Congo Businesses 
and other employer organizations of the transit countries mentioned 
above will have to be involved, by making their affiliates aware of 
the evils of this illicit precious metals "blood" trade, under 
 
KINSHASA 00000973  005 OF 005 
 
 
penalty of prosecution and severe sanctions.  The International 
Community, however, with disconcerting complacency, takes into 
account import statistics of these countries. 
 
Great works will also have to be carried out in Ituri, Haut-Uele and 
Bas-Uele to eliminate all the demobilized combatants currently 
roving in these areas. 
 
¶X. National Army Reform 
 
Applying the peace plan will thus allow the State seriously to work 
on the meteoric rise of a professional and dissuasive Army capable 
of protecting the lives and goods of people living on Congolese 
territory. 
 
This vast reform of the Army will focus on recruiting young soldiers 
according to criteria such as physical aptitude, civic values and 
patriotism. 
 
Officers trained in military schools of higher education, who served 
in the national army in the Zaire era, and are currently inactive 
(commonly called ex-FAZ), will also be called upon. 
 
Peace, or at least a similarly intervening respite, is essential to 
the in-depth reform of the Army. 
 
Kinshasa, October 29, 2008 
 
Vital KAMERHE 
 
End unofficial embassy translation. 
 
BROCK