VZCZCXRO2430
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #1004/01 3181042
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 131042Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8769
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001004 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT:   INTERNATIONAL FACILITATION MEETING 
            WITH FORCE COMMANDER BABUKAR GAYE 
 
KINSHASA 00001004  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Representatives from the International 
Facilitation (IF) and MONUC Force Commander Gaye met on November 11 
in Goma to discuss various issues.  EU Special Representative 
Roeland van de Geer provided a brief overview of the Nairobi Summit, 
emphasizing that the IF will support Obasanjo's efforts.  Force 
Commander Gaye lamented that there is no effective FARDC and that we 
are paying the price for the failure to implement security sector 
reform (SSR).  The international community must devise an emergency 
plan for SSR and work together to implement it, in an effort to 
rebuild totally and mentor strongly the FARDC.  MONUC's Alpha Sow 
said that it was very important that the IF maintain the progress 
achieved with other armed groups in the Kivus and not abandon the 
Amani program.  It appears clear that Nkunda is building coalitions 
in Ituri, specifically with the Popular Front for Justice in Congo 
(FPJC).  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Representatives from the International Facilitation (IF) 
and MONUC Force Commander Gaye met November 11 in Goma to discuss 
various current issues.  (Note:  Gaye returned to the DRC November 7 
to once again command MONUC forces following the abrupt departure of 
his successor, Spanish General Vicente Diaz de Villegas.  End note.) 
 EU Special Representative Roeland van de Geer gave a brief overview 
of the Nairobi Summit, stressing that the IF will support Obasanjo's 
efforts.  Van de Geer said there are two essential elements for a 
peace plan:  Obasanjo needs to be able to force both sides to accept 
a ceasefire and the GDRC needs to provide a path, such as the 
Kamerhe plan, to provide some perspective, especially to the FARDC. 
However, Bernard Sexe, French Poloff in Goma, questioned how there 
could be a political solution:  Nkunda wants power, and what 
legitimate regime could accept this? 
 
¶3.  (SBU) General Gaye opined that the Actes d'Engagement would 
never be implemented.  He also lamented that there is no effective 
FARDC and that we are paying the price for the failure to implement 
security sector reform (SSR).  The international community must 
devise an emergency plan for SSR and work together to implement it, 
in an effort to rebuild totally and mentor strongly the FARDC.  This 
will require a certain amount of cajoling and gentle pushing with 
the MoD.  Furthermore, the CNDP must merge with the FARDC and 
afterwards commit to take on the FDLR.  Standing by the current 
model, which does not allow integrated CNDP soldiers to remain in 
the Kivus, is untenable.  Gaye's personal opinion, which, he 
stressed, was not MONUC's position, is that CNDP soldiers should be 
represented on a proportional basis in all the integrated brigades. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Van de Geer agreed that the lack of coordination among 
international donors on SSR is a serious problem.  He identified the 
U.S., South Africa, Angola, France and Belgium as all serious about 
SSR, but said that the last Round Table was a failure and that he 
will put more pressure on the international community to coordinate 
in this area. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) MONUC's Colonel Cunliffe (UK) mentioned that early views 
on the new Minister of Defense are not encouraging, and that he is a 
hardliner.  He also raised the idea of using the key sector lead 
approach as was done in Afghanistan.  He explained that in 
Afghanistan, for example, the EU had the lead in military justice 
reform while the U.S. had the lead on army reform.  This does not 
mean that the lead nation is the only one involved in any given 
activity, but that other interested states would fall behind the 
lead and coordinate with them. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) MONUC's Alpha Sow said that it was very important that the 
IF maintain the progress made with other armed groups in the Kivus 
and not abandon the Amani program.  All of the work with those 
groups could unravel if we are not careful, he added. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Concerning the FDLR, General Gaye reiterated that the 
containment strategy, which calls for four zones of operation to 
contain the FDLR coupled with protecting the population against 
reprisals, is still valid.  The problem is that several battalions 
must still be trained by MONUC and those that are trained must be 
equipped.  MONUC is ready to provide food, but intelligence and 
psychological operations support is still needed for the FARDC to be 
effective. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Sow maintained that the GDRC's commitment to fight the 
FDLR is weak.  Soldiers are consistently diverted to fight the CNDP 
and the FARDC has consistently violated the ceasefire.  Sow 
suggested that, if the CNDP and the FARDC are kept in their 
respective corners, MONUC could take care of the FDLR.  In Gaye's 
opinion, the GDRC is facing a crisis, which it is managing with its 
heart rather than with its mind. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) IF members, including USAID TDY officer, noted that Nkunda 
 
KINSHASA 00001004  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
is building coalitions in Ituri, specifically with the Popular Front 
for Justice in Congo (FPJC).  Sharif, the ex-FNI commander who leads 
the FPJC, is a known associate of Bosco.  There is evidence of some 
financial flows to the FPJC via Bosco.  Furthermore, FPJC rhetoric 
and military strategy are virtually identical to those of the CNDP. 
 
BROCK