VZCZCXRO0286
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1716/01 3311259
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261259Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2412
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001716 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: GOSS RENEGOTIATES DDR AGREEMENT 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: In a letter to the UN dated November 16, GOSS Vice 
President Riek Machar withdrew GOSS agreement to a Demobilization, 
Disarmament and Reintegration program it had previously signed with 
the UN last June in Geneva.  Southern Sudan DDR Commission 
Chairperson William Deng Deng, in a conversation with ConGen Juba on 
November 24, blamed himself for the problem, saying that he had not 
properly coordinated information sharing within the GOSS, resulting 
in confusion over what the document committed them to do. 
Disagreements over how the donor funded Reintegration Trust Fund in 
the agreement is to be "co-managed" by the UN and GOSS subsequently 
stirred anger and suspicion within the GOSS over the role of the 
GOSS as a true partner in the process. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a letter to the UN dated November 16 GOSS Vice President 
Riek Machar withdrew GOSS agreement to a DDR paper signed by the 
GOSS Minister of Regional Cooperation with the UN last June in 
Geneva.  The letter laid out concerns about how UNDP and the GOSS 
are to "co-manage" a reintegration trust fund to be established by 
the donor community to fund the program.  According to a UN source, 
Machar insisted that clarifications needed to be made by UNDP to 
ensure that the GOSS is treated as an equal partner in the decision 
making process concerning the use of the money, and not as a 
"dependent client subservient to the dictates of a paternal UN 
organization." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Sources within the UN admitted to ConGen Juba on November 
24 that the problem is partly, in fact, of UNDP's making.  First, 
there are no UNDP representatives in Juba;  the program is 
administered by UNDP from Khartoum.  This Northern optic 
automatically raises suspicions on the part of the South, which were 
greatly magnified when it was discovered that the agreement 
presented to the GOSS in Geneva was missing language concerning the 
co-management (UNDP-GOSS) of the Reintegration Trust Fund that had 
been agreed to.  While it is said the omission was accidental, the 
GOSS was pressured in Geneva to sign the document anyway, which it 
reluctantly did with assurances that the error would be rectified. . 
 The missing language was subsequently  reinstated, but the damage 
to GOSS confidence in UNDP's intentions had already been done. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The misunderstanding resulted in senior GOSS leaders 
subsequently taking a much closer look at the agreement following 
the signing.  With their reservations aggravated by past perceived 
slights by UNDP and the suspicion that the dropping of the missing 
text had been intentional, GOSS doubts culminated in the Machar 
letter placing the agreement on hold while the GOSS seeks 
reassurances on exactly how the Reintegration Trust Fund is to be 
"co-managed".  The GOSS is also asking for   clarification on its 
role  as an equal partner in the program.  The GOSS  complained that 
the UNDP is using too much of the Trust Fund to build up its own 
capacity instead of using the money to build up GOSS capacity. 
 
¶5. (SBU) UN sources told ConGen Juba on November 24 that they were 
hopeful that the situation could be remedied to everyone's 
satisfaction and the program put back on track.  They promised to 
get back to ConGen Juba with additional updates as new meetings are 
held to address GOSS concerns. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Comment: Once again the GOSS has demonstrated that its lack 
of experience as a national entity and its thin managerial capacity 
at the top lead it to make mistakes.  First, there was the admitted 
lack of coordination of information sharing within the GOSS by the 
SSDDRC Chairman, followed by a GOSS minister once again allowing 
himself to be pushed to sign an agreement that did not meet his 
expectations (reminiscent of how the GOSS got into trouble with the 
census agreement.)  This was followed by a senior leadership 
decision to renege on the signing pending demands for further 
assurances and clarifications; in short, a renegotiation of the 
agreement.  This is not how a mature government operates, but it is 
the reality of the circumstances of the Government of Southern 
Sudan.  Those who deal with it must be prepared to have the patience 
to seek comprehensive buy-in and help the GOSS    do its  homework. 
So far the DDR program snafu has mostly been an internal matter that 
has not raised much attention.  One hopes  it can be fixed before 
any real damage is done to donor willingness to fund the 
Reintegration package in the agreement, and before relations between 
the GOSS and UNDP are further strained. Given its financial straits 
and the lack of real economic alternatives in the South, the GOSS 
needs to cultivate rather than alienate these international 
partners. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment Continued: UNMIS DDR Chief Adrian Verheul told 
polchief on November 23 that he was confident the concerns of the 
GOSS could be addressed, and appeared eager to work with UNDP and 
the GOSS to resolve the problem.  As the first phase of the DDR 
program is in the interests of the GOSS (assisting war-wounded and 
 
KHARTOUM 00001716  002 OF 002 
 
 
demobilizing those veterans who are past retirement,) we anticipate 
that the GOSS will eventually allow the program to go forward. 
However there is little appetite in the North or the South to cut 
deeper into the SAF and SPLA and demobilize the 160,000 troops 
(80,000 on each side) that are called for in the CPA. 
 
FERNANDEZ