VZCZCXRO0192
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1714/01 3311139
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261139Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2409
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001714 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF EAID ECON ASEC KPKO UNSC SU
SUBJECT: ABYEI ADMINISTRATION AFTER TWO WEEKS: SO FAR, SO GOOD 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1585 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  According to the UN Head of Office for Abyei, 
the new Abyei Administration has made a good start since its arrival 
in the area two weeks ago.  The Administration has drafted a budget, 
but is still not receiving the oil revenues promised in the Roadmap 
Agreement.  It also is preparing for the annual Misseriya cattle 
migration, which is starting early this year.  Relations between the 
Ngok Dinka and Misseriya remain tense after the May fighting.  The 
Joint Integrated Police Unit (JIPU) is seeking to establish its 
presence throughout the Abyei Roadmap area, but also is seriously 
under-resourced.  IDPs displaced in May are returning, but only very 
cautiously.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Good Start After Two Weeks 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2.  (SBU) In a conversation with econoff on  November 23 and during 
a briefing to the AEC Three Areas Working Group November 24, UN Head 
of Office for Abyei Christine Johnson provided an update on Abyei 
Roadmap agreement implementation and the initial progress of the 
Abyei Administration.  Johnson credits the Abyei Interim 
Administration with making good progress, given it has been there on 
the ground only two weeks.  She reported that SPLM-appointed 
Administrator Arop Mayok and his NCP-appointed Deputy, Rahama al 
Nour, appear to cooperate well, at least in public.  (According to 
another source, Mayok and al Nour are old acquaintances who get 
along well together.)  The two have traveled through the Roadmap 
area, making direct contact with traditional leaders, who had begun 
to lose confidence in the Administration during the lengthy delay 
between their appointment and arrival on the scene (reftel).  The 
Administration also began to focus immediately on what Johnson 
called its "core areas" of responsibility:  budget, security, and 
the provision of social services. 
 
A Budget, But Still No Revenues 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶3.  (SBU) An early Administration priority was drafting a budget; in 
fact two - an immediate emergency budget and a 2009 budget. 
According to Johnson, the drafting process focused on key areas such 
as health, education, and social welfare.  With technical support 
from the UN and from Bearing Point advisors, working groups for each 
of these areas drafted the corresponding budget section.  The 
exercise brought the Abyei Administration into working contact with 
the international NGOs on the scene, and the SPLM together with the 
NCP.  The finished drafts now must be approved by the Abyei Council. 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Although the Administration has drafted a budget, it still 
is living hand-to-mouth, according to Johnson, begging supplies from 
traders in the town market place.  Oil revenues allotted to the 
Administration and the local population by the Abyei Protocol and 
the Roadmap still are not being disbursed.  The reason for the delay 
remains unclear.  (Note: Separately, NCP negotiator Dirdeiry Ahmed 
Mohammed, claimed to polchief November 26 that the money has indeed 
been disbursed, but that the Administration does not have the 
capacity to spend it yet.  We tend to believe Johnson, and will 
continue to press the GOS on the status of the funds. End note.) 
 
An Early Challenge - the Misseriya Cattle Migration 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶5.  (SBU) One of Mayom's first acts was to appoint Deputy 
Administrator al Nour to deal with the annual winter (dry season) 
migration of al Nour's fellow Misseriya cattle herders through Abyei 
to the grasslands in Bahr al Ghazal further south.  Johnson reports 
that the migration has begun early this year, and has already 
reached Abyei's northern boundaries.  The Abyei Joint Integrated 
Unit (JIU) is deploying to provide security.  She said that while 
the cattle ("hundreds of thousands") are moving, the Misseriya 
herdsmen are waiting, on the instructions of their traditional 
leaders. (According to Johnson, the cattle move spontaneously in 
search of fresh grass and the herders travel along with them.) A 
major issue for the SPLM will be if and how the Misseriya are armed 
for the migration. Anything other than small arms is likely to cause 
problems. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Negotiations also are underway between the Misseriya and 
the SPLA on the conditions for the herders' movement south of the 
1956 border.  The Misseriya seek to bring their weapons along or 
receive guarantees of security from the SPLA, while the SPLA demands 
the herdsman come south unarmed.  Johnson believes that a compromise 
will be reached along the lines of prior years, with herdsmen 
allowed to bring a limited number of weapons with them (on the order 
of two automatic rifles per cattle camp) for self-defense. 
Dirdeiry, who is Misseriya, told polchief he would travel to 
Southern Kordofan next week to meet with community leaders to 
attempt to prevent conflict this year and discuss the terms of that 
 
KHARTOUM 00001714  002 OF 003 
 
 
migration, along the lines of what Johnson described (the migration 
through South Kordofan parallels the one through Abyei).  Dirdeiry 
and SPLM SG Pagan Amun traveled together to the Abyei region last 
year to mediate several conflicts. 
 
A Longer-Term Challenge - Dinka-Misseriya Reconciliation 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶7.  (SBU) Johnson said that a longer term issue will be 
reconciliation between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya in the aftermath 
of the May fighting.  The Dinka remain bitter about looting by 
Misseriya during and after the outbreak of fighting in Abyei in May. 
 Johnson said that for their part, the Misseriya are very unhappy 
and insecure.  Both Misseriya herdsman and younger Misseriya are 
unhappy with their tribal leaders.  She described the situation as 
volatile. 
 
Establishing Security 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
¶8.  (SBU) UNMIS now is able to patrol throughout the Roadmap area, 
but so far the SAF continues to refuse it permission to move north 
(outside) of the provisional boundary established in the Roadmap. 
Such access is important because that is where contact between Dinka 
and Misseriya is most common and, therefore, violent clashes are 
most likely to erupt.  Johnson said she is more concerned about 
events outside the Roadmap boundary spilling over, than about 
problems within the area itself.  While UNMIS Sector IV can maintain 
security in Southern Kordofan to the east, she described Meriam to 
the west as a "blind spot," and especially worrying because it 
borders Darfur. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Johnson reported that the Joint Integrated Police Unit 
(JIPU) is working to establish a three-level security system in the 
Roadmap area.  First, it has identified six villages outside of 
Abyei town where it plans to establish stations.  The second level 
will be to institute mobile patrolling in the countryside, 
especially to the north, where trouble is most likely to breakout 
between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya.  The third level will be to 
establish a reaction team to respond quickly to incidents.  This 
will include an information element to dispel rumors and 
misinformation.  Johnson said that minor incidents frequently are 
blown out of proportion as word spreads, leading to potentially 
dangerous confrontations. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Johnson praised both the JIU and JIPU the leadership, but 
said that serious problems, especially lack of resources, continue. 
Both units lack communications equipment and vehicles (the JIPU, 
shockingly, has only one vehicle.)  Johnson said the JIU appears on 
its way to slowly making up its shortfalls through bilateral 
donations.  The JIPU, however, remains seriously under resourced and 
constrained in its ability to carry out its mission.  Both the JIU 
and JIPU continue to be seriously under-funded by the GoS in 
Khartoum. 
 
Pushing for a Final Troop Withdrawal 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶11.  (SBU) An additional issue is the continued presence of SPLA 
military police in Agok to the south and a SAF unit reputedly 
providing security in the Difra oil field to the north.  Each uses 
the presence of the other as an excuse to remain.  Administrator 
Mayok is trying to persuade the SPLA unit to make the first move and 
withdraw. 
 
IDPs Returning, But Slowly 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶12.  (SBU) Johnson said that the tens of thousands displaced by the 
May fighting are returning to Abyei, but very gradually.  The IDPs 
are very conscious of the tenuous security situation and have been 
cautious about going home.  She said that many families appear to be 
keeping multiple options open.  While one family member remains in 
Agok with school-age children, another may return to Abyei to 
reclaim land, while a third may travel to Juba or elsewhere in 
search of work.  In sum, Johnson concluded, we are not at a stage 
where IDPs can be returned to Abyei en masse.  A better approach is 
to create an environment - security, infrastructure, social services 
- conducive to voluntary IDP returns, and let people decide for 
themselves when to do so. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
¶13.  (SBU) Johnson's report that the Abyei Administration is up and 
running is welcome news.  Abyei has been without an administration 
for three years and, therefore, without government services, 
development assistance, and security.  Arop Mayok and company appear 
to be seeking to address these issues quickly.  However, their work 
and that of the UN continues to be hampered by their own limited 
capacity, and by GoS resistance and foot-dragging, notably in terms 
 
KHARTOUM 00001714  003 OF 003 
 
 
of disbursal of the agreed oil revenues and refusal to allow UNMIS 
to patrol the potential trouble area north of the roadmap boundary. 
Although the danger has lessened, Abyei remains a potential 
flashpoint between the NCP and the SPLM.  The risk of confrontation 
will increase as the migration season progresses and other political 
factors such as the ICC, elections planning, and border demarcation 
- not to mention the announcement of the result of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration on Abyei's borders, anticipated in June 2009, 
come into play.  This volatile combination of sensitive issues 
promises to make 2009 a potentially especially destabilizing year 
for Abyei and Sudan, which will need to be managed carefully by the 
Sudanese and the international community. 
 
ERNANDEZ