VZCZCXRO2175
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1669/01 3211219
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161219Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2322
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001669 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: THE CEASEFIRE THAT NEVER WAS - AERIAL BOMBING REPORTED IN 
DARFUR 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1651 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Multiple contacts from different rebel movements 
claimed that the Government of Sudan (GoS)  bombed areas of North 
Darfur from November 12-14.  UN sources told poloffs that the 
reports appear credible, though UNAMID has not yet independently 
verified these claims.  If true, these GoS actions constitute an 
almost immediate violation of the "unconditional ceasefire" 
announced by President Bashir on November 12 at the closing session 
of the Sudan People's Initiative (ref). Meanwhile, a Sudanese 
Presidential Advisor clarified that while the intention for a 
ceasefire is sincere, there is no mechanism yet to carry it out. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
MOST REBEL MOVEMENTS REPORT BOMBING 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2.  (SBU)  On November 15, SLA/AW Field Commander Ibrahim Al-Helou 
told poloff that several GoS Antonovs bombed the area northwest of 
Kutum (specifically naming the villages of Kurbia and Om Rahik) on 
November 12, 13, and 14.  Al-Helou claimed the bombing occurred 
between 7:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. and that approximately 10 bombs 
were dropped, injuring two children and killing one other.  (Note: 
AFP and Reuters later reported this same information citing Al-Helou 
as a source.  End Note.)   Al-Helou claimed that a GoS force of 
approximately 50 vehicles then moved through the area following the 
attack.  The force did not engage the local population, and Al-Helou 
claimed that the rebels did not want to attack the GOS force "as 
they were moving through a civilian area."  He said the GoS force 
came from Tine and then passed through Kutum and on into El-Fasher. 
Al-Helou called the announcement of a GoS ceasefire "propaganda 
motivate solely by the ICC threat," and vowed that SLA/AW will 
continue to fight the GoS. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  JEM, SLM/MM, and other SLA/AW contacts also reported 
bombing and significant GoS and militia movements in North Darfur. 
SLA/AW'S Abdulrahman Gadura told emboff via satellite phone on 
November 16 that the attack on Kurbia and Om Rahik left three boys 
wounded, one person dead, and two people missing. (Note:  These 
numbers roughly correspond to those provided by Al-Helou. End Note.) 
 SLA/AW's Muhammad Nimir also told emboff on November 16 that he 
personally witnessed the Antonov bombing on November 14.  Nimir also 
reported that two government helicopters circled the area after the 
attack, and GoS troops moved from Kutum to attack Dissa, Tarny, and 
Khazan Tunjur.  SLM/MM's Ali Traio also said that he had heard 
several reports about the incident from Minnawi's fighters in the 
region (though Traio was not able to give specific names or numbers 
of individuals involved.)  Local and international press also 
reported that representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement 
reported fighting and bombing in the area of Kutum and also along 
the Chad-Sudan border south of Tine. 
 
AND UNDSS REPEATS REPORTS AND BELIEVES THEY ARE CREDIBLE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶4.  (SBU)  UNDSS sources based in El-Fasher labeled the ceasefire as 
a "joke" and sarcastically noted that perhaps no one in Khartoum 
told the GoS commanders in Darfur about the ceasefire (Bashir's 
announcement has been widely reported locally).  UNDSS sources told 
poloff on November 16 that there have been significant troop and 
militia movements and several clashes within the last week.  This UN 
source repeated reports of fighting northwest of Kutum at Kurbia 
(between Ana Bagi and Abdel Shakur) on November 13 and 14 and said 
that the GoS and its militias have driven SLA/AW and SLA/Unity out 
of Tarny into the foot hills of Eastern Jebel Marra.  This source 
said another report from a UNAMID field assessment team claimed 
there was a "systematic clearing" of villages between Sarafaya (east 
of El Fasher) and Korma. Arab militia also reportedly moved from 
east of Kutum to a new position north of Kutum.  This militia, 
according to this report, also entered Kutum to purchase material 
for converting land cruisers to military "technicals" (i.e. 
purchasing green and brown paint and metal cutting tools.) 
 
BUILDUP A LONG TIME IN THE MAKING 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶5.  (SBU)  On November 13, visiting UK military officers (returning 
from El-Fasher and Nyala) told poloff that even before the 
ceasefire, SAF continued to push rebels further northwest from 
El-Fasher into Kutum. (Comment: Given the  concentration of rebels 
in this area, it is not surprising that the GoS chose to bomb sites 
around Kutum regardless of how poor the timing of such attacks were 
following the announced ceasefire.  End Comment.)  According to 
these sources, SAF continues to hold the crescent-shaped belt from 
Malha to El-Fasher to Kabkabiya.  SAF also occupies oases in North 
Darfur used by JEM during their movement to Omdurman in May 2008. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001669  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Rebel leaders previously told emboffs that SAF and 
militia movements and activities did not correspond with an 
impending unilateral ceasefire.  SLA/AW and SLA/Unity contacts 
reported earlier during the week of November 9 that SAF conducted 
operations and built up its forces in Simanga, Furdu, Bir Maza, Nat 
Geiza, and near Jebel Marra. SLA/AW's Nimir stated that GoS bombing 
was aimed at intimidating the vulnerable population in Jebel Marra 
and distracting SLA/AW from large SAF movements.  SLA/AW's Gaddura 
also told emboff that the bombing south of Jebel Marra and in the 
areas of Dar Eisa, Jebel Eisa, and Malha continued throughout the 
week of November 9.  Gaddura claimed that the GoS was not only 
building up its presence in its military camps, but also entering 
many villages and civilian areas. 
 
¶7. (SBU) CDA Fernandez met with Presidential Advisor Abdallah Ali 
Masar on November 16 and pressed him on the ceasefire question. 
Masar frankly admitted that the ceasefire is indeed "immediate and 
unconditional" once there is a mechanism in place and it is accepted 
by others. So it is not exactly in place yet. CDA harshly criticized 
this explanation, noting that "his advisors have done President 
Bashir a tremendous disservice by having him announce this without 
an enforcement mechanism, making him sound like a liar." Masar 
agreed that without such guarantees in place it would be imposible 
to ascertain if the rebels were in violation, which rebel groups, 
and whether SAF was fighting bandits (as the regime claims in this 
current round of skirmishing) or rebel movements and innocent 
civilians. Masar asked for American and UN help in showing that 
Sudan was sincere about a ceasefire. CDA Fernandez promised to 
respond within the week after consultations with Washington. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Masar, an influential Darfuri Arab civilian instrumental in 
the founding of the janjaweed, added that the Sudanese were worried 
that both UN/AU Chief Mediator Bassole and DDDC lead Abdul M}hamad-Q2h!d good$intejioNs Rw4 m!ck c!xasaty" |nr{i@boTh {keplcQ 
Dm|laQ waph(t`i reb{k/i-D"Ns%~-YbXejubaHal.7s$Q]Quyk#tzy,p4uS \$fGQpKe,YQvUud+Epe;"PQ&E},!?HJY_3QbSyfoq?o press President Bashir 
on this and related issues. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
¶9.  (SBU)  Multiple sources from different rebel movements (not to 
mention the UN's own reporting) give credibility to the claims that 
aerial bombing did occur following the ceasefire announcement on 
November 12.  It also appears as though the GoS has already admitted 
to some level of military activity in the region, as local press 
reported that SAF spokesman Brigadier Osman Al-Agbash said that SAF 
did conduct operations against bandits near Kurbia.  This appears to 
come directly from the GOS' playbook, as it made similar claims of 
tackling banditry on UNAMID's behalf in Birmaza and Diza in early 
September, (claims that were later proven false both by UNAMID's and 
its own actions on the ground.)  Senior GoS officials will also 
likely tell UNAMID and Western diplomats that Khartoum's central 
command did not give its military commanders in Darfur notification 
of the ceasefire or the permission to carry out the attack. 
However, SAF's use of Antonovs would require a senior-level decision 
within its military structure, so any such claims at lack of 
notification are most likely false.  Furthermore, given the news 
coverage, publicity, and significance of Bashir's much-touted 
speech, it is not plausible that these military commanders would not 
have known about the ceasefire.  Skepticism regarding Bashir's 
ceasefire appears to have been well-founded, and we expect that 
Darfur could witness increasing levels of violence in the period 
leading up to potential negotiations and a likely ICC indictment, 
due in part to GOS attempts to strengthen its position prior to 
negotiations.  Darfur rebels appear to be in a somewhat weakened 
state at the moment, due to a lack of supplies from Chad during the 
rainy season and possibly owing to attrition.  CDA Fernandez and 
polchief will travel to El Fasher during November 18-19 to discuss 
possible cease-fire modalities and other monitoring mechanisms with 
UNAMID.  They will also meet with senior GOS officials during 
November 16-17 to press the regime on adherence to the cease-fire. 
 
FERNANDEZ