VZCZCXRO0122
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1658/01 3181514
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 131514Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2306
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001658 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION: THE WAY 
FORWARD 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1499 
B) KHARTOUM 987 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization 
and Reintegration (DDR) Chief told 
CDA Fernandez that the program will begin in Blue Nile state but 
will be postponed from 2008 to 2009.  Both agreed that Blue Nile is 
the best location to begin, and further agreed that the 
international donor community is suffering from "Sudan Fatigue" 
which may negatively impact donor funding for disarmament. End 
Summary. 
 
Postponement of DDR in the Blue Nile 
------------------------------------ 
¶2. (SBU) On November 12, Adriaan Verheul, Chief of the Integrated 
United Nations Unit for Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) met with CDA Fernandez to discuss progress and 
obstacles to the DDR process.  Verheul announced a postponement of 
the program's launch in Blue Nile state from the end of 2008 until 
mid-2009.  Both agreed that it is preferable to wait until the 
conditions are right "to ensure DDR has a success story."  Verheul 
stated that the timing wasn't right and DDR should follow an 
agreement of downsizing, but no downsizing agreement or process 
exists. Only estimates exist, and without a fully fleshed out 
program, continuing to push for DDR objectives is "putting the cart 
before the horse." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Verheul explained other reasons for the program delay among 
them the lack of a legal agreement for land from the government and 
the lack of resources as the commission has yet to appoint a staff 
or provide funding.  Verheul stated that with the lack of resources 
the job is "almost impossible," and added "the UN didn't get its 
planning right".  He said the UN didn't start its planning process 
until six months ago so planning for required resources and the 
timing to allow the resources to move into place is lacking.  He 
stated the reason the planning didn't take place was an increased 
emphasis on Darfur and a lack of belief that the DDR program could 
take place, given political realities in Sudan (ongoing conflict in 
Darfur and a desire to be prepared for conflict in most other 
areas). 
 
Blue Nile: Case Study in How to Do it Right 
------------------------------------------- 
¶4. (SBU) Both CDA Fernandez and Verheul agreed the Blue Nile state 
is the perfect location to start the program as a test case.  The 
local governor, the SPLM's Malik Agar, has "a good track record and 
has developed a trusting relationship with Khartoum".  Blue Nile is 
isolated, and its stagnant economy led to a militarized population, 
but some development is now occurring in the state.  However the 
SPLA and SAF have either maintained or increased their numbers, 
beyond what is actually required, and there are troops which should 
not be required at this point.  These factors make Blue Nile well 
placed for troops to make a transition to other professions.  CDA 
observed, "If the program is successful in the Blue Nile it can be 
used as an object lesson on how to do it right."  Verheul added that 
the Nuba-based SPLA is the next priority before June or July 2009. 
 
 
"Sticker Shock" and "Sudan Fatigue" 
----------------------------------- 
¶5. (SBU) Verheul voiced concern that "Sudan fatigue" has set in, and 
the international donor community is less likely to continue to 
donate funds to DDR if the current climate of questions regarding 
the political of the CPA parties will remaining unanswered.  Donors 
have raised questions about transparency and downsizing that 
currently can't be answered.  The fact that the SPLA is spending 1.6 
billion (USD) a year on armament suggests they are not seriously 
ready to start a demobilization process.  The CDA noted concerns in 
the South that the SAF and Misseriya nomadic Arab tribes continue to 
arm, and they may take advantage of DDR resources to use the program 
as "a revolving door."  Verheul acknowledged that the donor 
community and the UN may finally say "enough is enough" as they 
examine their fiduciary responsibilities.  Verheul said his interim 
goal is to maintain the process until the timing is right. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Verheul recommended the U.S. and UN take a tiered approach 
in speaking with the donor community on funding requirements. 
Instead of presenting a final price tag up front and risking 
"sticker shock," the group should be given funding numbers just for 
the first three target areas of Blue Nile, Kordofan and Abyei.  The 
CDA agreed and warned that both parties must be careful when 
approaching the host-nation government as they are "proud and 
stubborn" and should be treated carefully.  He recommended that 
First Vice President Salva Kiir be provided a better understanding 
 
KHARTOUM 00001658  002 OF 002 
 
 
of what still needs to be done for the program to be successful. 
The CDA also recommended Sudan's expectations on financial 
management of the program require further explanation as the 
international donor community is not ready to unilaterally hand over 
the reins of a substantial budget. 
 
Are we Buying Peace or is it Blackmail? 
--------------------------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) When the current planning budget of more than $1 billion 
USD is presented to UNHQ in New York, Verheul is worried he will 
lose EC, British and Dutch, and other critical bilateral donors if 
the "hardest questions" (outlined above) are not adequately 
answered. Without the backing of these countries, traditionally the 
financial and moral the backbone of most effective DDR programs, the 
program may lose up to 60 million USD that has already been pledged, 
not to mention political backing.  Verheul suggested he might sway 
donors by stating that "peace comes with a price" but expressed 
concern this might sound like moral blackmail. 
However he expressed hope that if these three donors can be 
appeased, others will follow suit.  He said pledges would be 
accepted with whatever strings donors may attach, as obtaining the 
funding will be the principle step in keeping the program alive. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶8. (SBU) Verheul is correct in noting that, absent political will 
from the Sudanese parties themselves, there is little hope of 
success for his ambitious DDR program, especially with both sides 
wary of renewed conflict.  He is right to start small with a pilot 
project in strategic Blue Nile state, then move to programs in 
volatile Southern Kordofan and Abyei. 
 
FERNANDEZ