VZCZCXRO7790
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHGI RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1646/01 3151722
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101722Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2284
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001646 
 
DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C, NEA/ARP 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: URF SEEKS GREATER INPUT IN PEACE PROCESS; EXPLORES 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCE WITH SLA-UNITY 
 
REF A) KHARTOUM 1130 
B) KHARTOUM 1366 
C) KHARTOUM 1614 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: During an October 29 meeting, United Resistance 
Front (URF) political commissar Tadjadine Niam told poloff that the 
Darfur peace process will never gain traction if the international 
community keeps ignoring the rebel movements.  Niam decried the lack 
of consultation with rebels over the selection of Djibril Bassole as 
Joint Chief Mediator, questioned Bassole's suitability for that 
role, and complained he has done little to reach out to the 
movements during his four month tenure. (Note: Niam subsequently met 
Bassole for the first time in Tripoli on November 1 and told poloff 
that while the meeting was constructive, he was discouraged that 
Bassole has yet to decide on a course of action. End Note). In the 
field, URF Chairman Bahar Abu Gharda told poloff on November 5 that 
URF is engaged in continuing talks with SLA-Unity for a broad-based 
strategic alliance on negotiating positions, military operations and 
media outreach. Abu Gharda also reported frequent contact and good 
relations with SLM-MM. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On October 29, poloff met with Tadjadine Bechir Niam, 
political commissar of the URF and former JEM negotiator in Abuja. 
Accompanying Niam were London representatives of URF El Tahir Yahia, 
Bakhit Adam, and Mohammadain Hashim. (Note: URF was formed in April 
2008 as a coalition of five movements: the Justice and Equality 
Movement/Collective Leadership JEM/CL; SLA/Field Command of Adam 
Bakhit; SLA/Khamis Abdalla; the Arab-dominated United Revolutionary 
Forces Front URFF; and the National Movement for Reform and 
Development NMRD. URFF, Khamis Abdalla and several other groups 
and individuals have since reportedly abandoned the coalition, but 
URF leadership, which is drawn largely from JEM/CL. insists the 
coalition remains intact. End Note.) 
 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY "IGNORES THE MOVEMENTS" 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Niam complained to poloff that the international community 
"has exceeded its role" in the Darfur peace process by ignoring the 
rebel movements in a number of key decisions. "We can't recall any 
point when we were consulted about UNAMID deployment," he said. "We 
have serious reservations about Arab troops, because these 
governments have supported the GOS throughout the conflict." Nor had 
the rebel movements been consulted on the choice of Joint Chief 
Mediator Bassole, he said, adding that the continual change of 
mediators has contributed to the prolonging of the conflict. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Niam said that up to that point neither he nor anyone in 
URF had met Bassole, so there was little to say about him. But over 
the course of the meeting with poloff, Niam became increasingly 
critical of the selection of Bassole and the man himself. Bassole's 
francophone background was "not compatible with Sudan," and his 
history as a military man means "he's used to receiving orders from 
his supervisors," he said. He also complained that Bassole "is not 
consulting the movements, only the government," adding that he has 
yet to reach out to URF in the four months since he was appointed. 
"We don't hear his voice, or see any of his efforts," said Niam. 
 
¶5. (SBU) On November 7 Poloff spoke to Niam subsequent to his 
meeting with Bassole for the first time in Tripoli on November 1. 
Niam welcomed the chance for URF to brief Bassole on its positions, 
and emphasized that peace can only be achieved by engaging with the 
parties to the conflict. "We told him we were not pleased with his 
late start and failure to consult with all the parties," he said. 
Bassole was receptive, he continued, but remained in listening mode. 
"He didn't rule out anything," said Niam. "He told us he's still 
listening to all the players, and after that, he'll decide how to 
proceed." He also noted that Bassole appeared discouraged by a lack 
of willingness to negotiate on the part of the other rebel 
movements. 
 
URF: STAYING INTACT? 
------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Niam reported that staying intact is a continual struggle 
for URF, but it has managed to persevere despite several individual 
and group defections (Ref A). He blamed the international community 
for creating strong disincentives for rebel movements to unify, 
complaining that "URF is five movements in one, but you give us the 
same number of seats at the table as [Khalil Ibrahim's] JEM." 
Consequently, "the message you are sending is that you are more 
powerful if you split off," he said. He added that URF "has done its 
best" with regard to unification, but needs to be rewarded for its 
 
KHARTOUM 00001646  002 OF 003 
 
 
efforts. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Despite acknowledging its internal struggles, Niam claimed 
that URF was the strongest movement both politically and militarily, 
"because it is five movements in one." He stated that URF has 
cooperated on the ground with the SLA-Unity and is in contact with 
SLM-Minni Minnawi, but "strongly believes [Minnawi] has betrayed the 
cause" of the movements by signing the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 
with the government. Niam, who served as JEM negotiator at the DPA 
talks in Abuja, stated also that "we told him that we understood 
[the GOS] better than he did," but "now he has a better 
understanding of how they operate," referring to Minni's constant 
struggle for implementation of the DPA. Niam acknowledged the 
strength of Khalil Ibrahim's JEM movement, but told poloff that 
"he's not as strong as you think," noting how JEM has lost 
significant manpower and equipment since its May 2008 attack on 
Omdurman. He was dismissive of Abdul Wahid, calling him "puzzling 
and unpredictable." 
 
THOUGHTS ON FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Niam stated that URF was not rejecting the Qatar 
Initiative, but has not yet committed because of reservations about 
the Arab League. URF is nonetheless developing comprehensive 
positions for negotiations on all issues in consultation with its 
members who are spread out across "13 to 17 branches" across the 
world, including Germany, the UK and the US.  (Note: It is 
noteworthy that in bragging about the supposed number of URF branch 
offices worldwide, Niam did not have a precise number in mind, which 
seemed to cast doubt on his claim. End note.) He stated that URF's 
final positions would remain secret until they are presented at the 
negotiating table, but they include the familiar demands for one 
region, a vice presidential slot for Darfur, and fair and equal 
representation for Darfuris in the civil service and executive body, 
particularly in prominent ministries. "We don't want to end up in 
the Ministry of [Culture, Youth and Sport] or [Water and Irrigation 
Resources]," he said. He also cited the reform of the state security 
apparatus as a key agenda item, calling for a clear mission 
statement and reduced role for the SAF and the dissolution of the 
Central Reserve Police. While he reaffirmed URF's commitment to a 
united, democratic Sudan, he warned that moderate voices were losing 
ground in Darfur. "A new voice is emerging calling for 
self-determination," and this demand will be increasingly difficult 
to quell, he said. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Niam stated that it is the intention of the GOS that really 
matters for bringing peace to Darfur, rather than any particular 
initiative. Without the will of both parties, he said, peace talks 
are "like a doctor treating a patient. He might relieve the 
symptoms, but he can't kill the disease." He stated that while Ali 
Osman Taha has shown a willingness to solve the Darfur crisis, there 
were doubts about his authority to deliver and implement a deal. 
Conversely, while Presidential advisor Nafie Ali Nafie will "fight 
until the last drop of blood" against any solution  reached by Taha, 
such an agreement would be strongly supported by the GOS, he said. 
But the most preferable interlocutor for the NCP, according to Niam, 
is Salah Ghosh. Recalling his days as a JEM negotiator, Niam said 
that "with Ghosh you can reach an agreement within an hour. He will 
tell you up front what he can and can't give you, and whatever the 
outcome you'll know he'll enforce it." 
 
¶10. (SBU) With regard to civil society involvement in the peace 
process, Niam was largely indifferent to ongoing the Sudan People's 
Initiative, but cautioned the international community against 
putting civil society on the proverbial pedestal. "The NCP has and 
will continue to co-opt civil society movements within Sudan," he 
said. "It is better for the movements to deal directly with the 
government." To this end, he was quite adamant that civil society 
groups ought not to participate in peace talks, arguing that the NCP 
will ensure that only pro-government civil society groups are 
present at negotiations and this will result in the government 
having "two voices at the table." He further pointed out that 
neither of the successful talks in Navaisha (CPA) nor Asmara (ESPA) 
featured representatives from civil society. "There is no precedent 
for this," said Niam. 
 
UPDATE FROM THE FIELD 
--------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) On November 5 poloff spoke via satellite phone with URF 
Chairman Bahar Abu Gharda, who was in the field.   Abu Gharda noted 
that URF has continued to coordinate closely with SLA-Unity on 
 
KHARTOUM 00001646  003 OF 003 
 
 
military matters since their forces fought side by side to repel the 
SAF military offensive in North Darfur in September (Ref B). He 
stated URF and SLA-Unity are also engaged in advanced discussions 
for a broad-based strategic alliance. "We will later declare joint 
positions on negotiations, media and military matters," he said. Abu 
Gharda noted that URF has also been in frequent contact with 
SLM-Minni Minnawi, and maintains good relations on the ground with 
the latter.   "We have an understanding that when peace talks are 
complete, we will work closely together for the future of Darfur," 
he said. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Abu Gharda confirmed that there is a large buildup of GOS 
forces in North Darfur (Ref C), stating that within the past several 
days there has been a major  mobilization of Janjaweed near Diza. 
(Note: Many Janjaweed have now been integrated into the Border 
Intelligence Forces of the SAF or the Central Reserve Police of the 
Ministry of Interior, the latter of which is escorting both UNAMID 
and WFP convoys. End Note). He also reported that on November 4 URF 
forces in South Darfur conveyed to him that GOS helicopters painted 
white to resemble UN aircraft (but with no UN markings) flew over 
their positions in what he described as a reconnaissance mission. 
(Note: The SAF have  been accused in the past of disguising military 
aircraft as humanitarian ones, and according to the tri-partite 
agreement signed by GOS, UN, and AU, the GOS agreed to stop this 
practice. End Note.) 
 
¶13. (SBU) Comment: Niam's repeated claim that URF is the most 
powerful rebel movement due to the fact it represents "five 
movements in one" simply doesn't hold water, as URF is a collection 
of second-tier rebel factions whose military strength and scope was 
in question even before the recent rash of defections. But it 
nonetheless represents one of the larger non-signatories, at least 
nominally, and if Bassole convinces them to commit to talks in Doha, 
this could be an important first step in building momentum and 
legitimacy for the Qatari Initiative. This should not be too 
difficult a task, given URF's desire to stay relevant and its 
apparent preparations for eventual negotiations. As to URF's 
potential alliance with SLA/Unity, such a partnership could simplify 
the peace process and should be encouraged. But it could just as 
easily be negated by ongoing internal strife within SLA/Unity. 
 
¶10. (U) Embassy London cleared this cable prior to transmission. 
 
FERNANDEZ