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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1645, SLM/MM SECRETARY GENERAL ON SPI, QATAR, AND PARTY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1645 2008-11-10 14:43 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO7585
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1645/01 3151443
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101443Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2282
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001645 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SLM/MM SECRETARY GENERAL ON SPI, QATAR, AND PARTY 
RE-ORGANIZATION 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1580 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On November 9, Ali Hussein Dausa, the new 
Secretary General of the Sudan Liberation Movement of Minni Minnawi 
(SLM/MM,) told CDA Fernandez of his recent efforts to improve and 
re-organize the movement.  Dausa shared his skepticism about the 
Sudan People's Initiative (SPI) and the desire for independent 
SLM/MM representation in future peace negotiations.  Dausa also 
stated that division within the National Congress Party is more 
complicated than a simple personality clash between leading NCP 
members. END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU)  The following members of SLM/MM visited CDA Fernandez at 
the U.S. Embassy on November 9: 
 
- Ali Hussein Dausa, SLM/MM Secretary General 
- Ali Traio, SLM/MM MP 
- Busina Abdalla, SLM/MM Social Committee 
- Abu Obeida Al-Khalifa, SLM/MM State Minister of Environment 
- Ahmed Abdallah Abdallah 
- Eisa Omar 
- Ahmed Abdalla 
- Mustafa Jumeil 
 
RE-ORGANIZING SLM/MM 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
3.  (SBU)   Ali Hussein Dausa opened the meeting by conveying 
congratulations for President-elect Obama and passing a letter to be 
delivered to him from Minni Minnawi (septel).   Dausa then provided 
a lengthy review of recent SLM/MM activity since he took up his 
position as Secretary General.  (Note:  In a large public 
celebration on October 24, SLM Chairman Minni Minnawi froze the 
participation of Secretary General Mustafa Tirab and named Ali 
Hussein Dausa as the new acting Secretary General, reftel.  End 
Note.)  Dausa said that SLM/MM recently conducted a full-day media 
workshop for some of its members on November 3.  Under Dausa's 
leadership SLM/MM will also conduct a financial review of its 
operations and seek to become more transparent with its budget and 
expenditure.  Dausa reported that he will focus on the internal 
cohesion of the movement and improving the information flow between 
SLM/MM's central offices in Khartoum and the threestates of Darfur. 
 
 
SUDAN PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND QATAR 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4.  (SBU)  Dausa stated that SLM/MM has participated in and 
cooperated with the Sudan People's Initiative.  While he thought the 
SPI's open forum for discussion was positive, some of its debates 
were less than constructive.  The issue of establishing one region 
for all of Darfur, stated Dausa, was particularly contentious. 
Dausa said that SLM/MM believes that a referendum on the issue of 
one state is the only solution to this debate, and yet, some members 
of the NCP have already moved away from that.  "It is very difficult 
for us to participate in anything where the DPA is not the basis of 
our discussion," stated Dausa.  Dausa emphasized that SLM/MM should 
have its own representatives independent of the Government of 
National Unity in any future negotiations (unlike what the NCP 
insisted on in Libya in October 2007).  Dausa said that SLM/MM is 
concerned that "Qatar will end up canceling the DPA rather than 
adopting it as the basis for future negotiations." In this scenario, 
one moribund Darfur accord (the 2006 DPA) is replaced by another, 
grander but stillborn agreement secured by Qatari money but never 
implemented. 
 
LITTLE PROGRESS ON THE DPA 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5.  (SBU)  SLM/MM representatives reported that there has been 
little progress in DPA implementation since the September 19 
agreement between Minnawi and Vice President Taha.  The NCP has only 
agreed to implement the easiest and most superficial elements of the 
DPA.  Most importantly the DPA's outstanding financial obligations 
remain unfulfilled in addition to legal and constitutional changes. 
They said that contrary to the DPA and the September 19 agreement, 
the NCP has also not accepted more SLM/MM representatives into 
senior state, federal, and diplomatic positions, stated Dausa. 
SLM/MM representatives added that it is becoming increasingly clear 
that the NCP's overall position is against further implementation of 
the DPA.  Despite what he described as a lack of DPA progress and 
his skepticism over the SPI, Dausa expressed optimism about SLM/MM's 
future, asserting that SLM is one of the few parties that can change 
the political landscape of northern Sudan. 
 
DIVISION AND WEAKNESS IN THE NCP? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
KHARTOUM 00001645  002 OF 002 
 
 
6.  (SBU)  Dausa and his colleagues stated that division within the 
National Congress Party (NCP) is more complex than a personality 
conflict between Vice President Taha and Presidential Assistant 
Nafie Ali Nafie.  In general, Nafie appears to be against SLM/MM and 
the DPA and Taha is more amenable toward both.  However, each of 
these NCP leaders has his own agenda.  These different agendas 
directly compete with SLM/MM interests.  Abdalla asserted that 
irrespective of these particular leaders, Sudan is a still a police 
state run by military leaders basing their authority on a distorted 
Islamic agenda.  Dausa said that Sudan's financial troubles 
(particularly affected by the plummeting price of oil) are at least 
partially responsible for division in the GoS over the DPA.  The 
threat of an ICC indictment against Bashir, a looming financial 
crisis, and CPA timelines for elections and democratic 
transformation are all factors affecting SLM/MM and the status of 
the DPA, stated Dausa, and could lead to a major crisis in Sudan in 
early 2009, an eventuality that the regime fears. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
7.  (SBU)  Dausa's rise to the position of Secretary General comes 
at a particularly difficult time for SLM/MM.    Dausa deserves to be 
commended for reaching out to women leaders within SLM/MM, 
recognizing the need to improve SLM/MM's public relations, and 
attempting to reorganize the movement.  However, it will be nothing 
short of a miracle should this soft-spoken individual succeed in 
transforming the divided, disorganized and severely weakened SLM/MM 
into a real political force.  Dausa's call for independent (or at 
least some sort of special status) SLM/MM representation at the next 
round of negotiations (something noticeably absent at the failed 
Sirte negotiations of 2007) is a point well-taken.  It is something 
we support and will raise with representatives of the UN/AU's Joint 
Mediation Support Team and with the NCP.  If the DPA ceases to exist 
following the negotiation of a new agreement, the SLM/MM should 
indeed have some sort of special status at the talks. 
 
FERNANDEZ