VZCZCXRO2626
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1614/01 3091315
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 041315Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2230
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001614 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C, DRL 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR SECURITY UPDATE, OCTOBER 2008 
 
Ref: A) Khartoum 1588 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: With Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) making 
significant advances in North Darfur, UN security officers based in 
El Fasher report that humanitarian security has increased slightly 
in the last month despite last week's killing of a South African 
UNAMID soldier.  There is currently no indication that Arab militias 
intend to overrun Kassab (an IDP camp 2 km from Kutum,) though UN 
and rebel contacts have reported significant movements of Arab 
militia throughout Darfur.  End Summary. 
 
SAF HOLDS ITS GAINS. . . 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶2. (SBU) Security officers from the El Fasher office of the UN 
Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) met with poloff on October 
30 to discuss recent changes in the security situation in North 
Darfur (names of UNDSS officers available via SIPRNET 
communications.)  Successful SAF engagements with rebel forces in 
the last two months have solidified Sudanese control over a 
crescent-shaped swath of land stretching from Malha (170 km 
northeast of El Fasher) through El Fasher, and on to as far west as 
Kebkabiya (200 kilometers west of El Fasher.)  UNDSS described the 
SAF as "determined to hold onto its gains." The SAF is currently 
rotating and refreshing their troops in place, in contrast to their 
2007 strategy, which relied on Arab militias holding the ground. 
This resulted in the territory being later recaptured by rebels. 
These recent advances have pushed rebel movements further northwest, 
into more sparsely settled land closer to the border with Chad. 
UNDSS predicts that GoS forces will move Arab families into the 
areas in greater numbers to further consolidate their control. 
(Note: In telephone conversations with polasst, Suleiman Marajan of 
the Sudanese Liberation Army/Abdulwahid faction confirmed continuous 
SAF build-up and logistical support in these  areas, particularly 
near Millet, 60 km northeast of El Fasher, and Malha. Abu Bakr Kadu 
of SLA/Unity also confirmed continuous SAF advances towards Dar 
Zaghawa, northwest of Kutum. End note) 
 
. . . AND ACTUALLY IMPROVES HUMANITARIAN ACCESS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶3. (SBU) Ironically, UNDSS notes that during October recent SAF 
advances in North Darfur contributed to increased humanitarian 
security there.     As the criminal elements within rebel movements 
have moved further northwest into Dar Zaghawa, UNDSS has begun an 
outreach program to communicate better with local sheikhs and umdas, 
and to begin regular meetings within communities to further explain 
the role of UNDSS and humanitarian security workers.  One UNDSS 
officer was skeptical of the "top-down" approach for creating 
humanitarian security through workshops with high-level rebels and 
government officials, as proposed by the Geneva-based Centre for 
Humanitarian Development (reftel.) He noted that Darfur's rebel 
movements are too fractured and lack a central chain of command to 
offer any assistance.  Instead, the officer added that sundry UN 
agencies in North Darfur have begun to communicate with each other 
better in the last month regarding security issues, and this advance 
has also made a significant contribution to increased humanitarian 
security there. 
 
OCTOBER 29 AMBUSH ON UNAMID 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶4. (SBU) UNDSS confirmed that a patrol of South African UNAMID 
peacekeepers was  ambushed by unknown assailants on October 29 near 
Kassab (near Kutum, North Darfur,) killing one soldier and injuring 
two others.   Three weeks ago, Kutum was the site of fighting 
between Arab militias over land surrounding the town.  UNDSS 
believes this to be a localized, intentional act and part of a 
consistent pattern of low-level attacks to send the message that 
UNAMID's presence is not welcome.  UNDSS officials were less 
concerned that Kassab IDP camp, 2 km outside of Kutum, was in 
danger. 
 
REBEL AND SPLM COORDINATION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶5.  (SBU) UNDSS related that Suleiman Jamous, leader of SLA/Unity 
recently approached Khalil Ibrahim of the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) to join another advance on Khartoum, but Ibrahim 
would only agree to the move if SLA/Unity fought under the banner of 
JEM.  After an unsuccessful attempt at convincing  his followers in 
SLA/Unity to accept JEM's offer, Jamous' movement effectively 
sidelined him, leaving him with no troops and no control over the 
movement he once headed. SLM/MM contacts earlier told poloffs of the 
ongoing power struggle between Unity leaders Suliman Jamous and 
Abdallah Yehia.  These contacts stated that Jamous previously had 
more military influence on the ground than Yehia.  (Comment: If 
UNDSS's account of Jamous's loss of power is accurate, this 
represents a major change within SLA/Unity. End comment). Due to 
 
KHARTOUM 00001614  002 OF 002 
 
 
this division and other problems within SLA/Unity, some Unity 
commanders have told Minnawi that they are ready to join his 
movement, according to SLM/MM sources. Minnawi has been hinting as 
much in his frequent phone calls with CDA Fernandez, mentioning 
Bahar Abu Garda and others. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Despite its division , there has been significant 
coordination between SLM/Unity  and other movements. 
JEM/Collective Leadership Commander Abdallah Banda (and former 
commander for Khalil Ibrahim) has been coordinating with SLM/Unity, 
according to SLM/MM sources.  Abdulwahid's forces are also 
coordinating with Unity.  SLA/AW contacts separately reported in 
October that there is a movement toward unification, and "we have 
strategic relations with many different movements."  These SLA/AW 
contacts also reported that they are expanding their coordination 
with the SPLM, and have recently organized meetings in South Sudan, 
including two meetings in Wau and Juba during September. NCP 
officials have noticed such contacts and raised this issue with us 
in the past. 
 
SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENTS OF ARAB MILITIA 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶7.  (SBU)  UNDSS sources, including senior military leadership, 
separately expressed concern about the massive buildup of Arab 
militia east of Muhajariyya throughout September and early October. 
One official speculated that this buildup may be directed against 
Minnawi's forces "in an attempt to build up their positions before 
things get worse."  This individual said that some of the limited 
violence in October has been attributed to Arab militia  attacking 
former SLM/MM commanders now unaligned with any movement. 
Separately, SLM/MM contacts acknowledged Arab militia activity, 
reporting that Arab militia (from the Ma'aliya tribe) ambushed 
SLA/Unity on October 8 killing an important commander.  Although the 
fighting near Muhajariyya has been close to SLM/MM areas "formally, 
there has been no engagement between SLM/MM and the Arab Militia," 
said this contact.  UNDSS sources also stated that they are 
concerned about the buildup of forces along the Chad-Sudan border, 
specifically noting the movement of GoS helicopters to the western 
border. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
¶8. (SBU) The GoS's temporary provision  of improved humanitarian 
access and security is positive.  However, the concentration of 
rebel movements along the northwest border could also be a recipe 
for disaster, encouraging rebel military coordination, easing supply 
lines to Chad, and forcing the rebel movements to take drastic 
measures to regain lost territory.  UNDSS predictions of Arab 
relocation to these newly acquired areas are  also deeply troubling. 
  This and significant GoS troop and Arab militia deployment 
throughout Darfur signals that the government is not putting all of 
its faith in the peace process and upcoming negotiations.  Although 
October was largely a quiet month by Darfur standards, the military 
option is still alive and well and, unfortunately, we expect 
increased military activity at the end of 2008 and start of 2009. 
 
 
 
FERNANDEZ