VZCZCXRO2589
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHGI RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1613/01 3091017
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 041017Z NOV 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2226
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001613 
 
DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C, AF/E, NEA/ARP 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: JEM SENIOR LEADERSHIP ON DARFUR PEACE PROCESS 
 
REF A) KHARTOUM 973 
B) KHARTOUM 974 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Members of JEM senior leadership told poloff in 
meetings in London on October 28-29 that JEM remains open to 
negotiations. However, they noted JEM is withholding judgment on the 
Qatar Initiative until it obtains more information about its nature 
and scope. While predictably skeptical of the Sudan People's 
Initiative and wholly mistrustful of the Arab League, JEM is 
prepared to send a representative to Doha to find out more about the 
initiative, but is not prepared to commit to or endorse it, they 
said. They emphasized that UN/AU Joint Chief Mediator Bassole 
offered the only legitimate auspices for peace talks, and urged him 
to take control of the peace process and prevent others from 
speaking on his behalf. The JEM leaders also welcomed the recent 
meeting between Khalil Ibrahim and an SPLM delegation in Chad, but 
lamented that the SPLM's engagement with JEM has been sporadic at 
best, and that it still lacks any identifiable Darfur strategy. They 
also noted that JEM Chairman Khalil Ibrahim is engaged in talks with 
SLA-Unity aimed at increased coordination, and JEM has discussed 
plans to call a meeting of all rebel movements in the field aimed at 
finding common ground, though nothing has come of these discussions 
just yet. JEM leaders were mum on any future military actions, but 
predicted that if the peace process fails, JEM will focus solely on 
targets outside of Darfur. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) On October 28, poloff met with Dr. Gibriel Ibrahim, JEM's 
Senior Economic Advisor and brother of JEM Chairman Dr. Khalil 
Ibrahim. On October 29, poloff met with JEM spokesman Ahmed Hussein 
Adam. Both meetings took place in London. 
 
SKEPTICISM ON THE SPI 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) JEM was predictably skeptical on the motives behind the 
Sudan People's Initiative. "We believe the government convened it to 
impose its own positions on Darfur in the name of the Sudanese 
people," said Ibrahim. He added that the SPI was also a face-saving 
measure to spare the government from having to acquiesce to the 
demands of the rebels. "It shows that they gave into the people, but 
not the movements," he said. Hussein questioned whether the NCP 
would stand united if a consensus emerges from the SPI. Referring to 
Presidential advisor and hard-liner Nafie al Nafie, Ibrahim said: 
"His public rejection of one region for Darfur was as much a message 
for his own colleagues as it was for the people of Darfur."  Ibrahim 
added that Nafie "will not accept anything," but Vice President Ali 
Osman Taha recognizes the need for a solution to Darfur. Taha "might 
not want the scope of a solution that we seek," but at least his 
intentions are genuine, said JEM spokesman Hussein. When asked by 
poloff whether JEM has any contact--official or unofficial--with the 
GOS, both Ibrahim and Hussein stated they had not, for fear that 
such conversations would be leaked to the media and manipulated for 
political gain by the NCP, as they have been in the past. 
 
WHAT IS THE QATAR INITIATIVE? 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The JEM senior leadership maintained their willingness to 
negotiate with the GOS, and noted that while wholly mistrustful of 
the Arab League, they were withholding judgment on the Qatar 
Initiative--until they find out more about what it is. "We don't 
know what the Qataris are thinking, how they envision their role and 
what role the Arab League will play," said Ibrahim. "We're ready to 
listen, but they have no time to talk to us." Hussein stated that 
"we've put a lot of questions to the Qataris [about the nature and 
scope of the initiative], and unless we get some answers, we're not 
going to endorse it." He was particularly concerned about 
understanding the role of the UN/AU vis-`-vis Qatar, emphasizing 
that the peace process must be led by UN/AU Joint Chief Mediator 
Bassole. "These are the only legitimate auspices for peace talks," 
he said, adding that the parties must be involved in preparation for 
such talks. "We don't want [Qatar] to be another Sirte," he said, 
referring to the failed 2007 talks in Libya. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Both Ibrahim and Hussein stated that JEM has told the 
Qataris that it is prepared to send an envoy to Doha to find out 
more about the initiative, but will not yet commit to negotiations. 
"We're ready to go to Doha to listen, but are not prepared to offer 
any commitment or endorsement," said Hussein. He stated that a 
framework was needed along the lines of the Machakos protocol with 
the SPLM to bring about a cessation of hostilities. "We need to tie 
the demands of a ceasefire to the demands of people on the ground," 
he said, claiming that basic consensus exists among Darfuris on key 
issues affecting the region including participation in the national 
 
KHARTOUM 00001613  002 OF 004 
 
 
government, compensation, security arrangements, resettlement and 
returns, and land tenure. 
 
BASSOLE "NEEDS TO FIND HIS OWN VOICE" 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Ibrahim and Hussein were initially skeptical about  the 
appointment of Bassole (Ref A), but this time around they struck a 
more conciliatory tone. "We have nothing against Bassole, and want 
to give him the chance to show what he can do," said Ibrahim. "But 
I've never met him, and I can't say I know much about him." Hussein 
(who has met Bassole) characterized Bassole as "a good listener," 
but noted that his efforts are still very much in the exploratory 
stage. "He's trying, but up until now he hasn't put anything on the 
table." He added that JEM has fully cooperated with Bassole and was 
willing to give him some time, but then hinted that its patience 
with the lack of progress might be wearing thin. He also expressed 
doubts about Bassole's team. "Peacemaking takes a lot of effort, and 
I'm not sure he has the people in place to be successful," he said. 
He also urged Bassole to be more outspoken and take control of the 
peace process. "There are many people speaking on his behalf," and 
it's difficult to know what he's thinking, he said. "He needs to 
find his own voice." 
 
SEEKING ENGAGEMENT FROM THE SPLM 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Both Ibrahim and Hussein lauded the meeting between Khalil 
Ibrahim and the SPLM delegation led by Secretary General Pagan Amun 
in Chad, but lamented such engagement has been sporadic at best, and 
that the SPLM still has no identifiable Darfur strategy. The Chad 
meeting "is welcome, but it came out of the blue," said Hussein. "We 
wish they'd leverage their position in the GNU to help resolve the 
crisis." Ibrahim noted that JEM has been pursuing cooperation with 
the SPLM for some time, recalling how in March 2006 in Paris he 
asked Salva Kiir why he did not travel to Darfur and visit IDPs. 
"[Kiir] told me that he would like to visit, but was very busy, and 
he did not want to go empty-handed," he said. "But in three years, I 
see his plane only flies between Juba and Khartoum." Hussein noted 
that the SPLM is beset by its own internal problems, and spoke of a 
need to empower those within the party who are advocating unity. 
Ibrahim added that JEM has nothing against the SPLM, and considers 
the CPA a breakthrough agreement. "We support their right of 
self-determination, but we wish they'd stay," he said. 
 
EFFORTS AT REBEL UNIFICATION AND INCREASED COORDINATION 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) JEM maintains that it is serious about trying to unite 
Darfur's rebel movements (Ref B). Ibrahim stated that JEM is 
contemplating a bottom-up approach to rebel unification by calling a 
meeting of all movements in the field to search for a common ground, 
but plans have not yet materialized. JEM has, however, been engaging 
in discussions with SLA-Unity to step up potential coordination. 
"[Khalil] is talking with Suleiman Jamous and Abdallah Yahia," said 
Ibrahim, though nothing has come of those discussions yet. (Note: 
UNDSS and SLM/MM contacts have both reported increased coordination 
and a possible alliance between a weakened Jamous and JEM.  End 
Note.)  Hussein stated that increased cooperation between the two 
movements on humanitarian issues--as agreed upon in Geneva under the 
auspices of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue--has unfortunately 
been very ad hoc, because the statement they signed contains no 
mechanism for implementation. But he confirmed that discussions for 
improved political coordination are ongoing. Ibrahim also stated 
that JEM talks to Ahmed Abdulshafie from time to time, but nothing 
has materialized there either. Hussein added that while Abdulshafie 
maintains some stature from his earlier role in the struggle, he 
currently has little to offer in terms of political or military 
might. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Both Ibrahim and Hussein had given up on Abdul Wahid Nur. 
"He doesn't speak to anyone. Not even to his own people," said 
Hussein. With regard to Minni Minnawi, both Hussein and Ibrahim 
emphasized that JEM "does not want to exclude anyone," but noted 
that Minnawi had lost legitimacy since signing the DPA. Hussein also 
criticized Minnawi for his erratic behavior and his failure to 
articulate the reasons that led him to return to the field. "We 
eventually realized it was essentially to stop defections from his 
movement," he said. 
 
THOUGHTS ON CHAD AND THE CHADIAN OPPOSITION 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Ibrahim stated that "the GOS believes it cannot solve the 
 
KHARTOUM 00001613  003 OF 004 
 
 
problem of Darfur without regime-change in Chad," noting that JEM 
has received information that the GOS has supplied Chadian 
opposition with more advanced weaponry. Referring to Chad's rebels, 
he said:  "They are not small in number, but they lack political 
cohesion." Hussein seconded the notion that the Chadian opposition 
has received new military equipment from the GOS. "Nafie will not be 
content with any real political solution [in Darfur]", he said. He 
only wants to topple the regime in Chad." Hussein insisted that 
"there was no strong love" between JEM and President Deby, arguing 
that their relationship was a product of circumstance. "Khartoum 
wants to overthrow Deby and replace him with a puppet regime in Chad 
and squeeze Darfur from both sides." He acknowledged that there was 
"no question JEM has participated" in assisting Chadian rebels, but 
argued that it did so in its own self-interest. "We are not 
mercenaries," he said. 
 
JEM MILITARY STRENGTH AND FUTURE PLANS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Ibrahim asserted that JEM "is not receiving any 
substantial assistance from the Government of Chad," adding that 
most of JEM's equipment was captured from the SAF. "We also import 
[Toyota] Landcruisers and other equipment from time to time," he 
said. He noted that the primary damage resulting from the Omdurman 
attacks was in the form of "our colleagues we left behind," and not 
equipment. "We think we're better off now," he said. Conversely, he 
admitted that in terms of funding, JEM is "in pretty bad shape." He 
noted that in the past, they received popular support in the form of 
food and livestock, but this has dwindled. JEM also collects duties 
from areas it controls, he said, but such resources are limited. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Hussein stated that JEM is stronger both politically and 
militarily since the attack on Omdurman, crediting it with inspiring 
popular support all over Sudan. He touted the fact that JEM carried 
out this operation in compliance with international humanitarian 
principles, and strongly denied accusations that JEM has used child 
soldiers in the attack. He asserted that such military offensives 
"are conducted in accordance with our political strategy," and 
characterized Omdurman as "a political operation designed to incite 
third party intervention" spurred by the low morale in the IDP camps 
and "slow motion genocide." 
 
¶13. (SBU) With regard to its combatants captured in the Omdurman 
attack, Ibrahim stated that JEM "has made it very clear we consider 
them prisoners of war, and they should be treated in accordance with 
the Geneva convention." He predicted the GOS would not execute 
captured JEM fighters because "they know the cost" of such an 
action, implying that a similar fate would await GOS soldiers held 
by JEM. Hussein stated that JEM had been contacted by the British 
about a possible prisoner exchange through unofficial channels.  He 
added that Khalil Ibrahim had approved the idea in principle, but to 
date nothing had come of the proposed exchange. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Ibrahim claimed no knowledge of JEM's military plans, but 
stated that "I don't think JEM will spend much time in Darfur" any 
more. Hussein seconded the notion, adding that if political 
solutions fail, JEM will not fight in Darfur any longer because 
"[the GOS] doesn't give a damn about fighting in Geneina or El 
Fasher." Ibrahim also dismissed rumors of his brother Khalil's ill 
health as media fabrications, noting that he reads each report with 
amusement. "At least they haven't reported that he's pregnant yet," 
he joked. 
 
DISAVOWING ANY CONNECTION TO KIDNAPPERS IN KORDOFAN 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶15. (SBU) JEM strongly disavowed any connection between their 
organization and the kidnapping and subsequent deaths of Chinese oil 
workers in Southern Kordofan. "This particular incident has nothing 
to do with JEM," said Hussein, who reiterated JEM's commitment to 
international humanitarian principles. He added that while JEM does 
have a presence in Kordofan "it is very structured, and no one can 
do or say anything without permission from senior leadership." He 
stated that while JEM condemns the killings of innocent civilians, 
it is nonetheless unhappy with China  for propping up the NCP regime 
with political and financial support. 
 
TROUBLE BREWING IN THE EAST? 
---------------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Ibrahim stated that some elements of former Eastern Front 
rebels--both in the diaspora and the Eastern States--have approached 
JEM about their grievances regarding lack of implementation of the 
2007 Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA). He stated that while JEM 
 
KHARTOUM 00001613  004 OF 004 
 
 
maintains a small contingent in the border region between Sudan and 
Eritrea, "we don't want more bloodshed." He noted that the 
discontent points to the need for a more holistic approach to 
Sudan's problems, as advocated by JEM, rather than a piecemeal one. 
(Note: Hussein estimated that JEM's forces in the East number around 
¶500. End Note.) 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Hussein's and Ibrahim's comments on JEM's military 
strength, independence from Deby, and military plans for Khartoum 
cannot be entirely trusted.  Hussein and Ibrahim are two of JEM's 
most educated, sophisticated, and wily characters.  They know how to 
use the media for their own purposes, what to tell the diplomatic 
community, and what messages to provide for external consumption. 
JEM's reservations about the Qatari Initiative relate primarily to 
process, but nonetheless deserve honest answers given the role of 
Qatar and the Arab League in their attempt to secure an Article 16 
postponement should there be an ICC indictment against President 
Bashir.   JEM has nothing to lose and everything to gain by waiting 
for the next step in the ICC process.  For this reason, this is a 
good time for the USG to engage with JEM and other rebel movements 
to prepare the stage for inclusive peace negotiations.  This could 
address problems raised by the failed Sirte talks. JEM's generally 
positive disposition towards Joint Chief Mediator Bassole is 
encouraging, but its concerns about his assertiveness over the 
process are equally worrying. The next month is critical for Bassole 
to engage with the parties and assert his own role in the process. 
The GOS will of course attempt to manipulate him, but we must 
continue to make clear to the regime, the rebels, and to the Qataris 
that Bassole must play a central role in the process.  However it is 
also up to Bassole himself to prove his mettle and remain engaged 
and relevant. 
 
¶18. (U) Embassy London cleared this cable prior to transmission. 
 
FERNANDEZ