Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1612, NO PROGRESS IN DPA IMPLEMENTATION IN LAST TWO WEEKS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KHARTOUM1612.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1612 2008-11-03 15:53 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO1843
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHGI RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1612/01 3081553
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031553Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2224
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001612 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: NO PROGRESS IN DPA IMPLEMENTATION IN LAST TWO WEEKS 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Contacts from the Sudan Liberation Movement of 
Minni Minnawi told poloffs November 2 that there has been no 
progress in implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in 
the last two weeks, and limited overall progress since the September 
19 deal between Minnawi and Vice President Taha.  The GoS continues 
to stall on allocating money to the Darfur Reconstruction and 
Development Fund. Frustration within the movement is rising.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
NO PROGRESS AT ALL IN LAST 2 WEEKS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2.  (SBU)  On November 2, SLM/MM General Counsel and the 
Transitional Darfur Regional Administration (TDRA) Legal Secretary, 
Abdulaziz Sam, told poloff that there has been absolutely no 
progress in implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in 
the last two weeks.  Sam said that the travel of Atta Al-Mannan (one 
of the NCP's key brokers of the September 19 Minnawi-Taha agreement) 
has negatively impacted the negotiations.  Sam also stated that it 
is possible that some NCP hardliners within the NCP intentionally 
sent Al-Mannan outside of Sudan to slow the peace process.  Sam said 
that the others who worked with Al-Mannan on the peace deal "are 
worthless" and hinted that he sees NCP hardliners winning the battle 
to marginalize SLM/MM again. 
 
COMMON REFRAIN: WHERE'S THE MONEY? 
---------------------------------- 
3.  (SBU)  SLM/MM still has not received any money for the TDRA or 
the DRDF. This remains the primary point of contention with the GoS, 
stated Sam.  He added that the GoS has focused on bureaucratic 
impediments, legal minutiae, and the wording of the DPA to delay 
funding the DRDF.  For example, stated Sam, GoS officials told 
SLM/MM representatives that before funding is allocated to the DRDF 
a comprehensive development plan should be completed at both the 
state and federal levels.  Sam also noted that SLM/MM and GoS 
officials continue to dispute particular development projects, the 
employment of national construction companies, and the percentage of 
funds delivered in seed money vs. in-kind development.  Sam added 
that DRDF Chairman Abduljabar Dausa (also SLM/MM's former political 
chief) traveled to London approximately two weeks ago, and that he 
will not return to Sudan unless the DRDF is funded. 
 
"THIS IS A POLITICAL DECISION." 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4.  (SBU)  Sam acknowledged that the problem of funding the DRDF is 
not one of mechanics, details, or bureaucracy, but rather a 
political decision by the NCP.  "They [the NCP] have told us [in the 
SLM/MM] that you will take the money we give to the DRDF, and go buy 
weapons in preparation for the next war," stated Sam.  Sam added 
that the NCP also fears that if they deliver money to SLM/MM, 
Minnawi may become less flexible in his willingness to accept a new 
Darfur Peace deal with non-signatory movements in the next round of 
negotiations. 
 
LITTLE PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5.  (SBU)  Although there has not been direct conflict between 
SLM/MM and GoS forces in Darfur since September 19, Sam 
characterized GoS-SLM/MM military cooperation as "slow."  With 
respect to bringing the DPA into the national constitution, Sam said 
that the National Constitutional Review Commission has held up the 
process, and that he was less optimistic that the DPA would be 
legally recognized in the next month.  (Note: This represents a 
change from our last meeting with Sam two weeks ago when he was very 
confident that the DPA would be quickly adopted into the interim 
constitution.  End Note.)  Sam said that although there has been 
agreement on expanding Darfuri participation in the national civil 
service and senior diplomatic and government positions, SLM/MM has 
been slow to provide lists of names and put pressure on their NCP 
interlocutors. 
 
MINNAWI'S PLANS 
- - - - - - - - 
6.  (SBU)  Minnawi returned to Darfur on October 30 after 
participating in the Sudan People's Initiative, reported Sam.  The 
GoS authorized Minnawi to pursue outreach to non-signatory rebel 
movements.  While in Darfur, Minnawi will attempt to meet with JEM, 
SLA-Unity, and URF.  According to Sam, Minnawi realizes that the 
Government "used" him for their propaganda campaign, and that he 
received little in return.  Sam said that Minnawi will travel back 
and forth between his camps in North Darfur as well as to and from 
El-Fasher and Khartoum for the foreseeable future.  Sam added 
Minnawi recognizes that he needs to balance his attention on 
political matters in El-Fasher and Khartoum as well as focusing on 
his military organization.  (Note:  Minnawi is scheduled to speak 
 
KHARTOUM 00001612  002 OF 002 
 
 
with A/S Frazer on October 3 via satellite phone.  End Note) 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - - 
7.  (SBU)  Compared to our last meeting with Sam two weeks ago, 
there was a dramatic change in his tone, demeanor, and outlook. 
Increasingly frustrated and pessimistic, Sam may be representative 
of SLM/MM as a whole.  The NCP's tactic of focusing on the details 
and bureaucracy of a peace deal (while neglecting inconvenient 
passages, the timeframe of its implementation, and its overall 
spirit) has been all too evident in the DPA, CPA, and ESPA.  Given 
its weak position, SLM/MM will have to continue to cooperate with 
the NCP while also recognizing its supporting role in the latter's 
political strategy. 
 
FERNANDEZ