Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08KAMPALA1469, NORTHERN UGANDA: WHITHER THE PEACE PROCESS?

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KAMPALA1469.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KAMPALA1469 2008-11-10 05:50 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kampala
VZCZCXRO7023
RR RUEHGI RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #1469/01 3150550
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100550Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0844
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0753
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 0509
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 3507
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001469 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL MOPS CG UG SU
SUBJECT: NORTHERN UGANDA: WHITHER THE PEACE PROCESS? 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: The Chief Mediator of the Juba Peace Process, 
Government of Southern Sudan Vice President Riek Machar, held a 
stakeholders' conference in Kampala on November 5 aimed at creating 
a roadmap for the stalled process between the Lord's Resistance Army 
(LRA) and the Government of Uganda (GOU).  The conference allowed UN 
Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas, Joachim Chissano, to carry out 
consultations with the GOU, LRA, donors, northern Ugandans, and 
Southern Sudanese Government (GOSS) officials.  Participants 
demanded that the LRA stop attacks in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) and sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) without 
conditions by November 30.  In addition, the stakeholders urged 
Chissano to continue his role and donors to continue support for the 
peace process.  Machar and Chissano will make a final effort to 
bring Kony together with his delegation in order to get the LRA 
leaders' signature on the FPA.  We are not holding our breath.  End 
Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
STAKEHOLDERS FLOCK TO KAMPALA 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2.  (SBU) GOSS Vice President and mediator Riek Machar called the 
parties and other stakeholders together in Kampala on November 5 to 
discuss the way forward for the peace process.  UN Special Envoy 
Joachim Chissano, who wanted to consult with key constituencies in 
order to prepare his report to the UNSC, joined Machar.  LRA 
delegation leader Dr. David Matsanga's presence marked the first 
time he had been to Uganda in 22 years and was not without 
controversy.  Ex-LRA delegation members, who reside in Uganda, 
complained bitterly that they were excluded.  One UN official said 
that Matsanga's presence in Uganda would help to legitimize him as 
LRA leader Joseph Kony's designated representative against these 
detractors.  The stakeholders included the parties, observers to the 
peace process, northern Ugandan leaders, and civil society 
organizations. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Machar told the stakeholders that the process of 
negotiations had ended and that it was important to get Kony to sign 
the peace agreement.  He said that even if Kony does not sign, 
internally-displaced persons could still return home.  He asked that 
the establishment of the Joint Liaison Group be considered to 
oversee implementation.  He announced that he did not disband the 
Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team (CHMT).  Machar said that 
he decided to keep the structure of the process until Kony signed 
the agreement.  Machar explained that he has not given up on Kony 
signing the FPA because Kony had never told him or Chissano that he 
had abandoned the process.  Machar said that Kony continues to have 
difficulties with the International Criminal Court (ICC), but that 
the FPA is his only way out.  Machar said that Matsanga told him 
that Kony does understand the agreement.  Most of the participants 
condemned LRA attacks in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
including Machar, Chissano, and Ugandan Government lead negotiator 
Ruhukana Rugunda. 
 
4.  (SBU) Gulu District Resident District Commissioner Walter Ochora 
said that the stakeholders' conference and the potential meeting in 
Rikwangba were orchestrated to buy more time for the LRA leader, who 
is under some military pressure in DRC from the Congolese military 
and local villagers.  Northern Ugandan leaders also were highly 
critical of Kony's activities.  Archbishop Onono, leader of the 
northern religious leaders for peace, called Matasanga a sinner for 
representing someone who carried out brutal atrocities.  Finally, 
the GOSS Internal Affairs Minister and the Governor of Western 
Equatoria criticized their government's failure to protect civilians 
from the LRA, reading out a list of the attacks in southern Sudan 
since the beginning of the peace process. 
 
- - - - - - 
COMMUNIQUE 
- - - - - - 
 
5.  (SBU) Matsanga refused to sign the communique, drafted at 1:00 
a.m.  He told P/E Chief that it was not appropriate for one of the 
parties to sign a document that was meant to be suggestions from 
stakeholders to the Chief Mediator and Facilitator.  However, he 
also said that he could not be expected to sign a document that 
criticizes Kony's attacks on civilians in DRC, which the LRA denies 
carrying out.  He claimed that he did read the communique to Kony on 
the phone and Kony understood what his critics were saying about the 
recent activities.  The communique acknowledged that the LRA had not 
assembled, that LRA military attacks in the DRC had caused great 
suffering, that non-implementation of the peace agreement was 
putting at risk the stability of the affected Great Lakes, and that 
the mandate of Chissano was coming to an end (December 31).  The 
stakeholders' urged: 
 
--The LRA to stop attacks and unconditionally sign the FPA before 
 
KAMPALA 00001469  002 OF 002 
 
 
November 30, assemble, and immediately release the children held 
captive. 
 
--All parties, the Chief Mediator, Special Envoy, to make necessary 
arrangements for Kony to sign the agreement for implementation to 
commence. 
 
--Continuation of Chissano's role in resolving the LRA conflict 
 
--The international community's continued support for the process 
and implementation of the FPA. 
 
- - - - - - 
NEXT STEPS 
- - - - - - 
 
5.  (SBU) A group of donors, led by the Netherlands, Norway, and 
Sweden will likely fund the logistics for a meeting between Kony and 
his delegation and a signing ceremony, if warranted.  President 
Museveni maintains that he is ready to sign the FPA.  A few donors 
want Museveni to unilaterally sign the document if Kony refuses 
again.  In our view, this would be a mistake because it relieves a 
source of pressure on Kony and the ball needs to remain in his 
court. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
6.  (SBU) The conference, which was billed as a discussion of new 
ideas on the way forward, essentially endorsed the old pattern of 
peace process activity.  The added twist is that Machar and 
Chissano, after Kony has failed to show up to sign the FPA five 
times, insist that Kony attend a meeting with his delegation in 
Rikwangba before they, as the Chief Mediator and Facilitator, come 
to meet the LRA leader.  We are not holding our breath that such a 
meeting will materialize, but stay tuned.