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Viewing cable 08KABUL3027, DECLINING SECURITY MIGHT SPELL THE END TO HERAT GOVERNOR'S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KABUL3027 2008-11-20 13:11 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO5687
RR RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #3027/01 3251311
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201311Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6187
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 5220
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003027 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
ROME PASS TO POL 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ETRD EFIN AF
 
SUBJECT:  DECLINING SECURITY MIGHT SPELL THE END TO HERAT GOVERNOR'S 
TENURE 
 
1. (U) Summary:  Following two years of declining security and 
repeated kidnappings in and around the city of Herat, Governor 
Anwari's days may be numbered.  Responding to citizens' demands and 
after the President's receipt of a report from a high-level 
investigating delegation from Kabul, the Ministry of Interior has 
sacked 10 district police chiefs and replaced the provincial police 
chief, border police chief and other senior police officials.  The 
head of the provincial office of the National Directorate for 
Security (NDS) has also been transferred.  For his part, the 
Governor has taken a number of actions to beef up security, 
including instituting well-publicized nocturnal visits to police 
posts, ordering more visible police patrolling and asking Kabul for 
2200 more police.  The Governor believes that former Mujahideen 
leader and governor and current Minister of Energy and Water Ismail 
Khan's supporters are organizing protests and strikes but 
acknowledges that kidnappings are a real problem.  According to 
sources within the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, the 
search has begun for a replacement for Anwari.  End Summary. 
PUBLIC CONCERN GROWS OVER DECLINING SECURITY 
 
2.  (SBU) The first and foremost security-related concern expressed 
by Herat citizens is the rash of kidnappings and threats of 
kidnapping of wealthy (and some not so wealthy) Heratis and their 
family members.  Local law enforcement authorities are perceived to 
be incapable of stopping these at best and at aiding and abetting 
them with inside information or by turning a blind eye at worst. 
Whether vocally protesting or not, many Heratis are exasperated with 
the declining security situation, most especially the threat of 
kidnapping.  Well-placed observers estimate there has been one 
prominent reported kidnapping a week for the past two years, and 
many more go unreported because families perceive the police are 
part of the problem.  Recent high-profile kidnappings and kidnapping 
attempts have led to several public protests. 
 
3.  (U) The provincial government has taken some recent steps in 
response, visible and not so visible to the local population. 
There are more, and more active, police checkpoints around the city, 
especially on roads leading to major commercial areas and in and out 
of the city.  These are being manned not just by the police but also 
by the Border Police and Force 119 (a separate Ministry of Interior 
force with a special focus on combating kidnapping), who are 
considered more trustworthy and capable than the ANP in Herat.  The 
Governor's several incognito nocturnal tours of police posts were 
featured on the local TV evening news, and he himself later 
mentioned them at press conferences.  He also asked Kabul for 2200 
additional police for Herat province. 
 
KABUL REACTS 
 
4. SBU) Responding to one of the protesters' (and Herati MPs') 
demands, on October 19 President Karzai appointed a delegation of 
senior Kabul-based officials, led by a Deputy Minister of Interior. 
It traveled to Herat, discussed the security situation with a wide 
range of civil society groups and govrnment officials and reported 
back to him.  According to one member of the delegation, the group 
called for several changes in senior provincial leaders.  Karzai met 
with Herati MPs on November 2 and reportedly told them he was going 
to replace 16 officials, including the Governor, as one of a number 
of steps to deal with Herat's security problems.  As a result of 
these commitments, the MPs ended their boycott of Parliament on 17 
November.  This was the third such Kabul delegation in the past year 
to troubleshoot security problems.  One came in 2007 led by the 
former Interior Minister.  Another in March 2008 
investigated/mediated and ended a three-day strike by doctors and 
health workers protesting the kidnapping of the son of a prominent 
doctor. 
 
5.  (U) Subsequent to Karzai's meeting with the Herati MPs, Kabul 
has replaced several of the province's top security and law 
enforcement officials.  Ten district police chiefs, eight in Herat 
city and in the two border police districts of Islam Qal'a and 
Torghundi, were sacked on November 3.  Brigadier General Hasham was 
appointed three days later as the new NDS Chief for Herat.  And on 
November 12 the appointment of a new provincial police chief, 
Ismatullah Alizai, along with several other senior police officials, 
 
KABUL 00003027  002 OF 003 
 
 
was announced. 
 
6. (SBU) Also, the Governor told the U.S. Poloff working at the 
Provincial Reconstruction Team that, in response to his request for 
2200 additional police for the province, Kabul was sending 300 more 
police to be deployed "temporarily" in the city of Herat. 
 
THE VIEW FROM THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE 
 
7.  (SBU) At a recent meeting with PRTOFF, Governor Anwari 
acknowledged kidnappings are a problem, citing by name the case of 
prominent money changer Haji Jalil.  (Comment:  Last month this 
well-known local was roughed up, but not kidnapped, when he resisted 
being abducted.  His brother, however, was kidnapped, and one of 
their armed bodyguards was killed near the Mayor's Office.  The 
brother was subsequently released, reportedly after the family paid 
300,000 dollars in ransom).  That case unleashed public protests and 
a merchants' strike.  The Provincial Council also suspended its 
meetings for several weeks in solidarity with the demands of the 
protesters for changes in senior provincial leadership and to put 
pressure on Kabul to make such changes.  Anwari believes supporters 
of former governor (and current Minister of Energy and Water) Ismail 
Khan are behind many of the problems in the security arena and are 
responsible for organizing protests and strikes. 
 
8.  (SBU) Asked about reports of clashes and insecurity in a number 
of outlying districts, the Governor said these were isolated, 
localized clashes, some also involving supporters of the former 
governor.  He feared, however, that the troublemakers in these 
districts might start communicating with each other, collaborating, 
joining forces, including with Ghulam Yahya Siyashwani (AKA Akbari), 
who operates near Herat.  He did not see any evidence of this 
happening yet, but this remains a concern. 
 
9.  (SBU) The Governor places priority on bringing to justice Ghulam 
Yahya, the person he believes to be responsible for some of the 
kidnappings and much of the security problems in Herat city and its 
immediate environs.  He sees, for example, Ghulam Yahya as likely to 
be behind the October 13 kidnappings of three RC/West local base 
employees, two Afghan and one Indian national.  He suggested ISAF or 
a Special Forces unit should go after Ghulam Yahya, given the fear 
of the ANA in Herat of doing so.  There have been attempts in the 
past to arrest Ghulam Yahya but all have failed, some say because 
sources within the police have tipped him off.  (Comment:  Ghulam 
Yahya is believed by some not to be a real insurgent at all but 
rather an ally of Ismael Khan.  As such, so goes the theory, he is 
making trouble via occasional kidnappings and calibrated, nonlethal 
shelling of the Regional Training Center (RTC), the UNAMA compound, 
the airport and the RC/West base to undermine the Governor and ISAF 
and to feed the desire for the return of Ismail Khan and/or his 
supporters to key positions in the provincial government.) 
 
10.  (SBU) At no time during the almost hour-long meeting with 
PRTOFF did the Governor make any direct reference to protestors' 
demand for his replacement.  However, his several references to 
former supporters of Ismail Khan and one direct mention of the 
Minister suggest he is well aware of efforts to unseat him. 
 
GOVERNOR ANWARI'S FUTURE 
 
11.  (SBU) The Governor's future remains uncertain, to say the 
least.  Sources at the IDLG confirm that they have begun the search 
for a replacement.  Two names keep surfacing:  Former Kandahar 
Governor Khaled and Ismail Khan.  However, many influential Heratis, 
including some MPs from Herat, the elected Provincial Council and 
the ad hoc Herat strike committee, have signaled their staunch 
opposition to Khaled, a Kandahari Pashtun.  As for Ismail Khan, he 
is rumored to be asking for super-governor status and authority over 
not just Herat province but several neighboring provinces in western 
Afghanistan as well, something that would presumably be very 
difficult for Karzai to accept.  Repeated follow-up inquiries, 
however, suggest no irrevocable action has yet been taken. 
 
12.  (SBU) Governor Anwari, rumored off and on for the past two 
years to be on his way out, is a survivor and is now one of the 
 
KABUL 00003027  003 OF 003 
 
 
longest serving governors in Afghanistan, at three plus years. 
President Karzai, particularly as the 2009 election approaches, 
could decide to keep the Governor, reportedly a Karzai election 
supporter, in place to work with the new security/law enforcement 
team just appointed.  On the other hand, the President's fairly 
recent appointment of two new governors with military backgrounds 
(Kandahar and Logar) suggests security is an increasing 
preoccupation.  If kidnappings do not decline and security does not 
improve after the new security/law enforcement senior appointments, 
Karzai may feel he has no choice but to act. 
WOOD