VZCZCXRO5683
RR RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #3025/01 3251310
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201310Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6183
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003025 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ETRD EFIN AF
SUBJECT: KUNDUZ GOVERNOR NERVOUS AS SECURITY TRENDS NEGATIVE 
 
REF: KABUL 841 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Although the violence in Kunduz Province has not 
reached levels found elsewhere in Afghanistan, security incidents 
are on the rise.  Increasingly organized and deadly insurgent 
attacks throughout the summer and autumn have frayed the nerves of 
officials in Kunduz Province.  Regular rocket, improvised explosive 
device (IED) and suicide attacks against the PRT, combined with 
sophisticated assaults against ANP positions, have increasingly 
frustrated Kunduz Governor Mohammad Omar, who feels the needs of the 
Northeast are neglected.  Under increasing pressure, Omar has 
traveled to Kabul to lobby for more resources.  He used the occasion 
also to meet with the Ambassador to underscore his concerns. 
 
¶2. (SBU) A number of high-profile attacks against coalition forces 
throughout the summer and autumn underscore what has been a 
troubling year for PRT Kunduz.  Earlier in the year, Berlin 
dispatched a 200-strong airborne infantry company to shore up 
near-perimeter security after a series of rocket attacks on the PRT 
in the latter half of 2007 (REFTEL).  While this temporarily 
neutralized the immediate threat, their numbers were reduced in June 
to 120 and rocket attacks resumed in August.  That same month, an 
IED killed one German soldier and wounded three.  In October, a 
suicide bomber killed two German soldiers on patrol.  Five Afghan 
children were also killed in the attack.  So far this year, five 
suicide bombers in Kunduz Province have attacked German forces.  All 
three German military deaths in Afghanistan this year occurred in 
Kunduz's Chahar Dara District. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Afghan security forces have been plagued with a series of 
personnel changes, resource limitations and disruptions which have 
strained efforts to effectively combat increasingly sophisticated 
insurgent activity in Kunduz.  In July, Chief of Police Mohammad 
Ayoub Salangi transferred to Kabul and was replaced in August by 
General Rizzaq Ayuby.  While General Rizzaq, who served as temporary 
Police Chief of Kabul from April to August, has made an impression 
as an innovator, he has yet to firmly establish himself.  Also this 
summer, the ANP was compelled to dissolve its 100-man protective 
detail, used to guard NGO and international facilities, in order to 
shore up the dwindling number of regular ANP soldiers caused by this 
summer's Tashqil enforcement.  Further straining ANP resources is 
the regular seconding of ANP troops to troubled provinces further 
south. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In September, the Afghan Army replaced the 2nd Kandak 
(battalion).  Newly arrived in the province, the 3rd Kandak was 
quickly dispatched to Badakhshan and Takhar Provinces in support of 
the Voter Registration process.  The 360 man Kandak is widely seen 
as stretched too thin, as its area of responsibility includes 
Baghlan, Badakhshan, Kunduz and Takhar Provinces.  The arrival of 
the new Kandak has also created structural difficulties in its 
relationship with the PRT.  Whereas the previous Kandak's German 
Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) was well integrated with 
the PRT command structure, the Croatian OMLT has found communication 
more difficult, at times straining coordination efforts. 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In recent weeks, the ANP has found itself on the defensive 
as attacks have become increasingly sophisticated.  A frontal 
assault on the Chahar Dara District Headquarters, while without 
casualties, was notable in its utilization of a classic three-point 
attack strategy.  The newly appointed Police Chief of Chahar Dara 
District was attacked by an IED, had to seek medical treatment in 
India and has just recently returned.  In addition, the technical 
level of attacks has increased, with the recent introduction of 
jammer-proof IEDs to the province.  Provincial officials have 
responded to the increased disruption in Chahar Dara by dispatching 
50 extra ANP, NDS and ANA personnel to the district to supplement 
existing ANSF forces. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The picture, however, is not entirely bleak.  While the ANA 
and ANP personnel changes were disruptive, the new ANA Commander and 
ANP Chief have made a positive impression.  The ANP's General 
Rizzaq, for example, has worked closely with the U.S. Army CSTC-A 
Police Mentoring Team to train a "Quick Reaction Force" of up to 50 
officers who will be able to conduct operations throughout the 
district.  Baghlan Province is now also considering a similar, 
though shorter, training program.  Chahar Dara and Imam Sahib 
Districts are now also completing their Focused District Development 
 
KABUL 00003025  002 OF 002 
 
 
training cycle, with Khanabad District the next to be trained.  This 
program has brought about a noticeable increase in morale and 
effectiveness.  Most importantly, there are signs the general public 
does not want to move down the road to insurgency, despite ongoing 
insurgent intimidation campaigns.  A recent suicide plot directed 
against ISAF forces unraveled when villagers in Khanabad District 
overpowered the handler, who is now in NDS custody.  The suicide 
attacker himself exploded on his motorbike far from his potential 
victims (SEPTEL). 
 
¶7. (SBU) Local officials remain frustrated by the lack of resources 
and the belief the Taliban are now targeting Kunduz Province for 
destabilization on a priority basis.  Governor Omar has expressed 
disappointment with German tactics, as IED and suicide incidents 
increase and joint security activities yield few results.  He 
believes the German forces are too conservative in their methods and 
when the PRT acts, it is only with large numbers after days of 
preparation, allowing insurgent forces plenty of time to vacate an 
area.  Omar has repeatedly expressed the need to set up a 
multi-lateral quick reaction force to quickly act upon intelligence. 
 NDS Chief Majid, for his part, lays blame with the judicial system 
and has ready anecdotes of arrested insurgents being subsequently 
released due to corrupt and frightened officials.  Governor Omar 
recently traveled to Kabul to lobby for additional reserve 
policemen, funding to reinstate the ANP protection unit and an ANA 
Kandak devoted to Kunduz Province alone. 
 
¶8. (SBU) While in Kabul, Governor Omar also met on November 16 with 
the Ambassador to reiterate his concerns.  He said the Taliban has 
decided to target his province because it previously was one of its 
military and political bases, many TB supporters had escaped 
following the Taliban's fall and those people continued to provide 
backing.  He also cited poverty as a factor influencing some popular 
attitudes.  Omar indicated that while in Kabul he was approaching 
both MOI and NDS to request help.  The Ambassador said he would 
speak to Minister of Interior Atmar regarding the law enforcement 
presence in Kunduz but would of course support the Minister's 
decisions. 
 
¶9. COMMENT: Although one of the longest serving governors in 
Afghanistan, Omar faces these worsening security challenges at a 
time when he is widely perceived as weak and increasingly 
disconnected.  Omar's frustration ultimately lies in his inability 
to respond effectively to escalating security concerns with his 
limited resources.  Lack of ANSF manpower, the drying up of 
actionable intelligence due to insurgent intimidation, the continued 
power wielded by local strongmen and a weak government 
infrastructure all contribute to his security problems.  This year's 
opening of Kunduz's Joint Provincial Coordination Center, CSTC-A and 
EUPOL mentoring of ANP forces and continuing joint-action exercises 
and operations with the German PRT have all worked to raise the 
level of ANSF operational effectiveness.  Without the resources to 
build on these successes, however, Omar will continue to feel hemmed 
in and his position remains unstable. 
 
WOOD