VZCZCXRO4383
PP RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #3020/01 3240602
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190602Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6175
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003020 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR MCGRAW 
CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: LEARNING LESSONS, LOOKING AHEAD ON ELECTION 
SECURITY 
 
REF: KABUL 2914 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary: As noted reftel, the Independent Election 
Commission (IEC) and the Afghan security forces continue to 
improve their cooperation on voter registration security.  In 
the wake of an attack on completed voter registration 
materials in Wardak province, representatives from the IEC, 
Ministry of Interior (MOI), Ministry of Defense (MOD), 
National Directorate of Security (NDS) and ISAF compared 
their incident logs, shared intelligence information and 
analysis, reviewed missteps, and collaboratively identified 
"lessons learned" for future incidents.  The developing 
spirit of cooperation and teamwork, as well as police pledges 
to improve performance, suggest that Phases 1 and 2 of voter 
registration are serving as a useful practice for the greater 
security challenges ahead in the south in Phases 3 and 4. 
 
----------------------------------- 
ARMED MEN SEIZE MATERIALS IN WARDAK 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  On November 6, armed men of unknown affiliation 
attacked an unscheduled convoy transferring completed 
registration materials from Jalrayz district to the 
provincial capital of Wardak.  Cognizant of violence in the 
area, IEC headquarters had planned to move the material by 
air.  The Jalrayz district electoral official (district field 
coordinator, or DFC) decided, however, to accept the police's 
written invitation urging him to join their convoy as they 
departed the district.  The DFC did not contact IEC 
headquarters.  The police and the attackers fought for over 
four hours, with four attackers killed and three police 
wounded. The IEC's driver and his assistant, employees of a 
transport firm, were kidnapped and have not yet been 
released.  The attackers seized or burned data on 1,360 
voters as well as blank voter registration forms. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Many details of the attack remain unclear.  The 
security forces and the IEC agree that they cannot 
conclusively determine the affiliation of the attackers; some 
reports say the attackers were Taliban, some say "local 
Taliban," some say Hizb-e-Islami (HIG). On November 12 Afghan 
National Army Colonel Mo'men noted with exasperation that the 
Ministry of Defense had produced five reports on the 
incident, yet the motive of the attackers was still unknown. 
The NDS on November 12 reported that its sources confirmed 
that the transport driver had no connection to the Taliban, 
suggesting that the common scenario of complicity between 
transport drivers and their would-be attackers did not occur. 
 NDS also noted its sources reported no threat at the time of 
the movement.  The MOI has yet to determine why the police 
were departing Jalrayz. 
 
------------------------- 
LEARNING LESSONS TOGETHER 
------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  In a series of meetings, the IEC, the Afghan 
security forces, ISAF, and UN technical advisors identified 
together three "lessons learned" from the Wardak incident. 
 
-- First, the greatest failure was a lack of communication 
through the chains of commands.  The Jelrayz DFC did not 
notify the Provincial Electoral Officer (PEO) or IEC 
headquarters of his decision to make an unscheduled move. 
The police in Jelrayz did not notify the provincial or 
regional security coordination centers of their decision to 
leave the district.  In turn, the Afghan National Army and 
ISAF forces learned of the move only after the attack was 
underway.  ANA and ISAF representatives noted that their 
organizations did not receive actionable information or a 
specific request for assistance. 
 
-- Second, the provincial and regional levels for all the 
organizations can play an immediate role in addressing 
problems, but only when officials respect the established 
chain of command.  In the November 6 incident, information 
flowed from those involved in the incident to the various 
headquarters, bypassing the levels closest to the scene and 
snarling efforts to deploy more forces. 
 
-- Third, only the IEC has authority to decide whether 
materials move or not.  The IEC must coordinate information 
from the security agencies and communicate its plans to them. 
 The police and the army do not, however, have the authority 
 
KABUL 00003020  002 OF 002 
 
 
to modify or overrule the IEC's plans, as the IEC is 
ultimately responsible for election materials. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Separately, the IEC is taking steps to improve its 
ability to respond to such incidents.  It is tightening 
procedures in its headquarters operations center, to create a 
more useful log of events and allow better decision-making. 
In current procedures for transport from the district to the 
provincial center, both copies of the completed voter 
registration forms move together; the IEC now is examining 
advantages and disadvantages to separating the forms at the 
district level and moving the two identical data sets 
separately. The IEC on November 17 again pressed its request 
that ISAF designate a liaison to the IEC operations center; 
ISAF's initial response on November 12 was negative. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The election security players on November 17 
debated together how to adjust plans for the return of other 
Phase 1 materials from Wardak to avoid any recurrence of the 
failures of November 6. The PEO reports that materials in 
four districts are under threat and should be moved to the 
provincial capital and IEC headquarters as soon as possible. 
The IEC is investigating all transportation options, 
including requests for Afghanistan National Army Air Corps 
(ANAAC) and ISAF air support. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
PHASES 3 AND PHASE 4 LOOK TOUGHER BUT POSSIBLE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Despite the greater security challenges ahead for 
the troubled Phase 3 provinces of Zabul, Paktika, and Khost 
(Farah, Nangarhar, and Laghman are relatively calm), and the 
substantially greater challenges in Nimroz, Uruzgan, Kandahar 
and Helmand for Phase 4, prospects for improved and 
integrated planning and response on voter registration 
security look good.  The IEC on November 12 shared its 
district-level threat assessments for Phases 3 and 4 with MOI 
and MOD representatives.  Reviewing this mixed picture, the 
MOI's Colonel Almas underscored the police's commitment to 
provide security to allow the IEC open and operate for thirty 
days every voter registration center, from the 43 sites the 
IEC has in "low threat" areas to the 9 sites it has plans for 
in areas "under enemy control."  Colonel Mo'men seconded this 
sentiment for the MOD.  He added that, unlike Phases 1 and 2, 
the Army has forces in every district of these provinces, 
giving it more capability and flexibility to support the 
police. 
 
WOOD