VZCZCXRO9515
RR RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #2986/01 3180302
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130302Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6137
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0706
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3745

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002986 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
THE HAGUE FOR POL 
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ETRD EFIN AF TI
 
SUBJECT: RC South: Dutch PRT Overview 
 
REFTEL: Kabul 2780 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary.  Dutch Embassy representatives gave ISAF's PRT 
Working Group Secretariat an overview of the Dutch Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Uruzgan province.  The Dutch Embassy is 
unsure of the effects of its expiring mandate to lead the PRT, 
noting that its PRT will become civilian-led and station its 
representatives at the district level.  The number and location of 
these district-level PRTs have not been determined.  Dutch 
development looks to cooperate with NGOs, its German counterpart, 
and the Afghan government.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) The parliamentary mandate for The Netherlands' "military 
lead" will expire in 2010; however, the mandate for development aid 
will continue.  How this will work out in practice at the PRT is not 
clear to the Dutch Embassy.  In the interim, the Dutch will continue 
to create an increasingly civilian PRT (reftel).  Currently the 
civilian chief representative "sits next to" the military commander 
(in effect, the civilian chief representative is the co-commander), 
and is the lead for governance and development issues.  In March 
2009 the civilian chief's current deputy will take over as the PRT 
commander, with a "steering committee" created above him.  This 
model was developed by studying the Canadian-led PRT in Kandahar. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Dutch policy is to support the local provincial 
government.  It currently funds twelve Afghan government Independent 
Directorate of Local Government (IDLG) advisors who work directly 
for the governor.  Gubernatorial advisors serve to strengthen the 
ties between the governor and line ministers to "offset the 
influence of local power brokers who have direct access to the 
Presidential palace."  As long as Governor Hamdam is in power the 
Dutch will support him, but his political position is not secure. 
To help address popularity and management issues, the Dutch PRT has 
encouraged the Governor to visit the districts more often, but with 
limited success. 
 
¶4.  (U) Travel in the province is difficult, and requires a military 
escort.  To overcome the resulting provincial capital bias in PRT 
reporting, the Dutch plan to station civilians at the district level 
for one to two weeks at a time.  The number and location of these 
district-level efforts remain to be determined. 
 
¶5.  (U) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation 
(administratively part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the 
Ministry of the Interior are the main Dutch players on the PRT. 
After early friction, civilian-military cooperation in the Dutch PRT 
in Uruzgan is now excellent, according to the Dutch Embassy.  Early 
joint pre-deployment training helped resolve early problems, 
creating a better sense of teamwork. 
 
-------------------- 
Looking for Partners 
-------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The bulk of the Dutch development funds flow directly to 
the central government in Kabul.  The PRT project budget itself is 
controlled by the embassy in Kabul, but the embassy laments that it 
only receives reports on specific projects "in bits and pieces." 
Dutch development focus is primarily on health, education, 
irrigation, infrastructure, and alternative livelihood projects. 
The Ministry of the Interior program is focused on counternarcotics 
and police mentoring, and will soon bring in five additional Dutch 
police mentors.  The Dutch PRT also has access to a Dutch 
post-conflict stability fund that can be used to build installations 
such as police stations. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The general Dutch PRT policy is to engage with NGOs and 
use local contractors as often as possible.  Due to security 
concerns, however, few NGOs are active in the region (although UNAMA 
plans to open a provincial office in Tarin Kowt); therefore, it is 
not always possible for the PRT to work with local NGOs.  For their 
own security, local NGOs acceptable to the embassy often do not wish 
to be publicly identified as a partner.  As a result, projects with 
local NGOs are typically very small scale and very low profile. 
 
 
KABUL 00002986  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶8.  (U) The main partners of the PRT are "Dutch Consortium Uruzgan" 
which consists of four to five Dutch or Dutch-led NGOs, and the 
German development agency (Dutch Development works very closely with 
its German counterpart around the world). 
 
¶9.  (U) In the Dutch Embassy view, the provincial development plan 
(PDP) is working well and is the basis for all projects.  The Dutch 
PRT will, however, consider local non-PDP ideas for projects.  A PRT 
executive steering committee is attempting to revive the local 
Provincial Development Council and improve the relevance of the PDP. 
 
 
WOOD