VZCZCXRO6693
PP RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #2963/01 3140401
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 090401Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6091
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002963 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR MCGRAW 
CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV AF SA
SUBJECT: AFGHANS NERVOUSLY EYE RECONCILIATION TALKS 
 
REF: A. KABUL 2782 
     ¶B. KABUL 2746 
 
¶1. (SBU)  SUMMARY.  Afghan political leaders and ordinary 
citizens are following reports of reconciliation talks with 
Taliban representatives with great interest and, in many 
cases, significant trepidation.  A number of individuals who 
assume USG involvement, have approached us at many levels to 
express their concern over what Taliban involvement in the 
government would mean for human rights, women's rights, and 
Afghan society at large.  Independent media coverage of the 
reconciliation talks has been skeptical, with many 
commentators doubting the Taliban would ever support the 
Constitution and renounce violence, although pro-government 
papers have been more optimistic.  We have told our contacts 
the US is not involved in any talks with the Taliban and 
would only support reconciliation that is Afghan-led, 
respects the Afghan Constitution, promotes peace, does not 
involve ceding territory to the Taliban or other insurgent 
forces, and does not include persons linked to al Qaeda. 
Still, the perception remains among many Afghans that the US 
is a lead player in a process that may result in the return 
of at least some extremist leaders (and their policies) to 
Afghan society. 
 
Growing Concerns Over a Taliban Return 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.    (SBU)  Following reports of talks between GIRoA and 
Taliban representatives in Saudi Arabia in early October, 
Afghan politicians, students, and journalists approached us 
to express their nervousness at what reconciliation would 
mean for Afghan society.  Most Afghans assume USG involvement 
in the talks and shared their concerns with us in hopes of 
ensuring more extreme aspects of Taliban governance would not 
be welcomed into a future Afghan government. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Politicians commenting on the talks included 
non-Pashtuns threatened by a Karzai-Taliban alliance, 
Pashtuns who felt they could serve as better emissaries than 
Karzai's chosen representatives, and moderates worried about 
consequences for human rights under a government that could 
include Taliban members.  With rumors circulating that a 
second round of talks in Saudi Arabia is likely and other 
low-level efforts materializing elsewhere (reftels), those 
outside the Karzai administration have increased the number 
of comments to us in an effort to shape any negotiations. 
 
¶4.    (SBU)  Upper House MP Rida Azimi (Kabul, Tajik), a 
former journalist and the first female anchor to appear on 
Afghan television following the fall of the Taliban, 
emotionally described her prior experience as a woman living 
under Taliban rule, worrying that reconciliation would pave 
the way for a return of the Taliban's anti-women policies. 
If the Taliban joined the government, Azimi said she and 
other female politicians would be forced out of public life, 
while those with the resources would leave Afghanistan at the 
first sign of Taliban inclusion in the government.  "I 
survived them once, but I just can't do it again," she told 
us, with tears brimming in her eyes.  "I am tired and cannot 
fight them any longer.  They are not people who share power, 
they will take and take from us until they have their way 
with everything." 
 
¶5. (SBU)  Other women MPs have expressed similar trepidation 
at GIRoA contact with Taliban representatives.  Fatima Aziz 
(Kunduz, Tajik) said the lack of women involved in the 
reconciliation process showed the government was overlooking 
women's concerns about the Taliban's policies.  Aziz, a 
medical doctor, told us a Taliban official had once barged 
into an operating room demanding to know why she was not 
wearing a burqa.  With her hands occupied with the surgery 
she was leading, she yelled at him to leave the room, telling 
him she had better things to be doing, such as saving a man's 
life, than to listen to him.  She said she has no desire to 
return to those times. 
 
¶6.    (SBU)  Lower House Deputy Speaker Amanullah Payman 
(Badakhshan, Tajik) appealed for a better explanation from 
Karzai and the international community on what the process 
and goals were for the reconciliation talks.  Payman said 
many non-Pashtun leaders already suspicious of Karzai's 
motives in placing more Pashtuns in high-ranking government 
positions feared they were being sold out by the 
international community for the sake of ending the conflict 
with Taliban insurgents.  Payman said reconciliation with the 
Taliban or Gulbuddin Hekmatyar risked driving away groups now 
 
KABUL 00002963  002 OF 003 
 
 
part of the government and would not solve the overall 
security challenges facing the country.  Moreover, he added 
the Taliban would never respect the Constitution nor cut ties 
with al Qaeda, and wondered why international allies were 
"wasting their time" with such efforts. 
 
¶7.    (U)  At a recent visit to Kabul University, political 
science and law students peppered PolOff with questions 
related to what they assumed was USG involvement in 
reconciliation talks.  Students said they felt the talks were 
a sign of abandonment by the US and other ISAF countries. 
One student said the international community had driven the 
Taliban from power, but now was seeking to bring them back in 
-- a sign the US must be reconsidering its support for 
democracy and human rights in Afghanistan.  Another student 
said US support for Taliban reconciliation would send the 
message that the international community was more focused on 
ending its "failed" mission in Afghanistan quickly than on 
protecting Afghans from terrorism and repressive governments. 
 
¶8. (SBU)  At a meeting of the National Coalition for Dialogue 
with Tribes of Afghanistan, a variety of tribal elders 
expressed their concerns that negotiating with the Taliban 
would only give them legitimacy.  They argued Saudi 
reconciliation talks could not work because talks would be 
sponsored by one of only three countries to have recognized 
the Taliban and included the participation of Pakistan's 
Nawaz Sharif (viewed unfavorably by many Afghans) and many 
non-Afghan Taliban.  Other tribal elders expressed similar 
pessimism on reconciliation, saying the fighting would not 
end until Pakistan stopped fueling the conflict.  Other 
elders have said they would support reconciliation as long as 
anti-Afghan forces agree to accept the Constitution and 
respect human rights at a minimum.  Most do not think Taliban 
leaders will agree to these conditions. 
 
A More Positive, But Cautious, View 
------------------- 
 
¶9.    (U)  Commentators in the independent press have viewed 
the reconciliation talks skeptically, saying the Taliban 
would be a dishonest negotiating partner.   In the 
anti-government Arman-e-Meli daily paper, a writer said the 
Taliban cannot be negotiated with because they are not a 
coherent political-military group, but a loose confederation 
of entities.  The paper criticized Karzai for using the issue 
for political leverage in an election season.  Cheragh, 
another independent paper, also raised doubt about the 
seriousness of the talks, pointing out Foreign Minister 
Spanta was disengaged from the process and that the recent 
up-tick in Taliban attacks shows the insurgents have no 
interest in peace and reconciliation.  Pro-government media 
has had a more optimistic outlook, with both Weesa Daily and 
Erada Daily noting the positive role of Saudi Arabia in the 
talks.  Erada also highlighted local efforts to invite 
Taliban representatives to jirgas in Farah and Nangarhar 
provinces.  Another pro-government paper, Islah Daily, said 
the best way to restore security is by talking with the 
Taliban. 
 
¶10. (SBU)  Upper House Deputy Speaker Hamed Gailani (Paktia, 
Pashtun) said he was supportive of reconciliation efforts, 
but doubted the meetings in Saudi Arabia would lead to much 
progress, especially since Karzai had not invited him or his 
father, Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani, to participate.  The Gailani 
family, leaders in the Qadiriyya Sufi religious order and 
close to the former king, maintains significant influence in 
some areas of Afghan society, particularly in the eastern 
border provinces.  Hamed Gailani said the current talks, 
while not serious, opened the door for future efforts.  He 
added that in future talks, the Gailani family could use its 
influence to bring senior Taliban and HIG leaders to the 
table. 
 
¶11. (SBU)  One Afghan political party loyal to Karzai has 
taken steps to address some concerns about the reconciliation 
process.  The Republican Party, headed by Karzai's chief of 
policy Sebghatullah Sanjar, held its party conference Nov. 1, 
where nearly every speaker touched on the reconciliation 
issue from a cautious, but supportive, perspective.  Sanjar 
and other speakers said reconciliation with the Taliban and 
other insurgent groups was an acceptable path to peace, but 
such talks should only be held with groups or individuals who 
respect the Constitution.  With the party's chairman employed 
in the Palace, it is reasonable to assume such language was 
vetted by Karzai himself before being presented for public 
consumption. 
 
KABUL 00002963  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
Perception Does Not Match Reality 
-------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU)  In this case, perception does not match reality -- 
we have repeatedly told our contacts we are not involved in 
the Saudi Arabia process, adding that any reconciliation 
process must be Afghan-led, respect the Constitution, disarm 
insurgents, and adhere to the authority of the central 
government (i.e., no territory set aside for insurgent groups 
to administer).  The specter of a return of the Taliban has 
stoked fears among many Afghans and is a useful reminder that 
not everyone shares international partners' near boundless 
enthusiasm for reconciliation, nor do all Afghans necessarily 
share the conviction that a "political solution" is the best 
way to end the conflict here. 
 
WOOD